I have decided that the best way to organize this post for the purpose for which I have intended it is to, first of all, list out every single minority position I take on any issue that was debated amongst the Reformed (or when there is controversy, just to give my side of things), or just straight-up departures from them. Then I will list what exceptions to a given Reformed confession would result from these things. I have left out the Westminster Standards as I felt the amount of exceptions even just to get it to conform with 2LBCF would be unwieldy.
The sum of my departures from the majority Reformed Tradition (which I basically define as what is in the Westminster Confession and the 3FU and the majority views on debated issues among those holding to them), I think can be summed up by saying I am a Keachian in covenant theology, a moderate New Englander in ecclesiology, and a Cocceian on the Sabbath. Everything else is miscellaneous and mostly me giving my determination on various debated issues here.
Now here are the departures:
I am a credobaptist and a congregationalist.
I take Cocceius's view of the Sabbath, with the one modification that I think Calvin was right that gathering for worship specifically on Sunday is of custom and not a jure divino apostolic ordinance (see Wedgeworth on this). I would not say that I take the progressive covenantal view of the Sabbath, as their view seems more akin to Heidanus's view, completely denying general equity to the sabbath command, and the way that I arrive here I think is rather different.
I side with Voetius and Scotus on the entirely practical nature of theology.
With the Scotists, I embrace the formal distinction. Paulus Voet and Richard Baxter agree here, although I somewhat question the former's understanding of the distinction. There are hints at the formal distinction among such theologians as Voetius and Junius and metaphysicians such as Senguerdius and Burgersdijk, but as a whole I don't think the Reformed fully understood it and often thought of it either too much like a strictly real distinction or simply as a modal distinction. Above all, the works of Bartholomew Mastri should be read here.
I follow the Roman Catholic ordering of the 10 commandments. Jason DeRouchie has done the best work proving this is the correct order.
I side with the majority (according to Turretin) on the dispensibility of the Decalogue with Thomas and against Voetius and Scotus. But the two sides (especially as Turretin explains it) do not seem very far off and I reckon they perhaps can be reconciled.
I side with Junius and Turretin on Infralapsarianism.
I believe that the Covenant of Redemption and the New Covenant are actually two different phases or parts of one covenant (so Benjamin Keach, Samuel Petto; I think Turretin's formulation can be made to fit this scheme as well, see 2:177, XII; WLC 31 also appears to support this). The Scriptures deduced for a real distinction between the two are not strong (e.g. Luke 22:29 ought to be read as one single act of covenanting in two phases. The verses from Isaiah taken to speak of the CoR in context speak of the New Covenant). This is also far more accurate in accounting for Christ's works for us, for he fulfilled the antecedent meritorious conditions of the evangelical covenant (that is, the covenant of grace) on our behalf and it is this covenant by which we are justified and not another. That is, the rewards he won for us are given to us and we share in his reward in the same covenant in which he won it, just as Adam's descendants would have shared in the reward of the Covenant of Works through Adam's obedience imputed to them by that covenant and not through a really distinct covenant. The evangelical covenant consists in that the works of the federal head and surety are imputed to us, even as the Covenant of Works for Adam would have consisted in this for his descendants had he obeyed, and yet this would not have established a really distinct covenant, but one covenant with a new phase in which the ones represented by the surety now share in his reward. Keach also rightly saw the implications of this in eschewing any form of neonomianism in which the evangelical covenant might have its own antecedent conditions.
Unlike most 1689 Federalists today, I do not believe the Mosaic Covenant was an *outward* covenant of *external* obedience. Instead I agree with Owen that it clearly demanded inward obedience (you shall love the Lord…you shall not covet, etc.) for blessed life in the land which the nation as a whole was so often unable to render and thus a New Covenant, where all are believers, was needed. The covenant demanded perfect, natural obedience of all under it, but it did not demand supernatural obedience. Once this point is clarified, I believe many objections to our position immediately fall.
I hold the minority view of (modern) 1689 Federalists that the Mosaic Covenant operated both as a typological covenant of works for life in the land upon imperfect obedience as well as an actual CoW for eternal life upon perfect obedience (Bunyan, Blackwood, Petto, Keach). It is not repugnant to say that Christ earned eternal life through both covenants, the merit through the New Covenant being what is formally imputed to us. If someone were to object that in holding this I make works of nature meritorious of grace, I am aware of this issue and have an answer to it: although the Old Covenant only formally demanded natural obedience, it still virtually demanded supernatural obedience by necessity of the offer of sufficient grace held out to any man in its foreshadowing of the Gospel and men were morally obligated to comply with this grace as the contrary would be sin. If one sees this as insufficeint, I answer that even Scotus's comment that "He [God] is not believed so to have made disposition that pure nature or its act he would thus accept" does not seem to have to refer to God's ordained power per se, but only to actual.
As one can see, I largely follow Keach on the finer points of covenant theology over agaisnt other Particualr Baptists like Coxe. You can call me a 1689 Federalist, but I am really just a Keachian on covenant theology.
With Boston and agaisnt the majority of Reformed (e.g. Turretin, Owen, Mastricht) I think it is more than probable than Adam's obedience would have been imputed to his descendants had he passed probation.
Consequently, I deny that those represented by the Adamic Covenant have any obligation to the covenant to personally merit eternal life, as I hold that only the federal head, Adam, was under this stipulation. All men are condemned in Adam due to their sin nature, which is a violation of the moral law, and this, and their own sins, puts them under a curse. But they have no obligation upon themselves to merit eternal life through the Adamic covenant. Only Adam was given this opportunity, by which he could have earned eternal life for himself and for them, but he failed. The only other people who had the opportunity to merit eternal life held out to them were the Israelites under the Mosaic covenant, which covenant has now passed. Many among the Refomred (e.g. John Norton in A Discussion of that Great Point) seem to say that we are currently under obligation to merit due to "the Law of Works" and that Christ fulfilled this law, but I cannot see how this can be as it seems to amount to saying that Christ fulfilled (and therefore was under) the Adamic Covenant of Works rather than his own covenant of works, the Covenant of Redemption. Nor does it seem to me that the promise of life is anywhere in Scripture held out to unbelievers universally, but rather this promise was special and limited to the Jews under the Mosaic Covenant. See my comments on Baxter below, with whom I am in agreement (and by the way, this isn't unique to Baxter. Samuel Petto says the Covenant of Works "ceased in its promise of life.")
I side with Vermigli and Chamier against the legal imputation of Adam's actual sin to his descendants. See my comments on the 2LBCF below for elaboration.
I side with a minority of the Reformed, who start Christ's mediatorial active and passive obedience at His baptism and thus say He was officially installed in covenant with God as our mediator there rather than at the literal conception of His life. Thus I am against the majority of the Reformed who start the beginning of Christ's vicarious active and passive obedience at the literal beginning of His life. This parallels Adam very well, as he was first placed as our covenant head in the garden after being a private person prior to this just as Christ would be installed as covenant-head-mediator in the wilderness after being a private person prior to this. The majority of commentators today say that this is when He is installed publicly as mediator and entered into covenant with the Father.
I am not at all partial to saying that Christ ought to be called mediator according to both natures. I much prefer the classic position by which it is said that he is a divine person who is mediator according to his human nature alone. And I very much do not like saying Christ was mediator before the incarnation (unless one means virtually and with consideration to the decree, as Vermigli rightly puts it), as many who hold the Reformed position have carelessly and dangerously asserted. Louis le Blanc
seems to have the most level-headed comments on this issue and agrees that Christ is a priest only according to his human nature. I am in basic agreement with him here and he gives many of the same arguments which led me to this in the first place.
I am in basic agreement with Wenham and Heth on divorce and remarriage. Divorce (that is, civil separation) for adultery is valid (and even necessary to eschew scandal). But it does not annul the marriage bond. As for civil toleration of remarriage, it is obviously ideal to allow for no remarriage at all and thus all "remarriages" would be punished as adulteries, and such can be done since no OT positive law binds us and it is in accord with the natural law. Nevertheless, necessity which has no law may allow it. I say similarly with polygamy that they may tolerate it if necessity demands. But it must be remembered that the government ought to be working towards the ideal to recognize such "remarriages" and polygamies for the adulteries that they really are (as I will argue below that they are invalid) and thus punish accordingly. This, of course, is assuming that there is no reason that the common law ought to treat polygamy/remarriage any different than adultery given they are substantially the same. If an argument could be made that grants that the natural law treats such marriage as invalid and therefore adulterous, but also holds that the common law per se is for some reason, more restricted in defining adultery, then I would be open to such an argument but I can't see how to make it. Certainly, the Roman Catholics are right to discipline here and the Reformed sadly lag far behind them.
Edmund Bunnius is among those in support of the no-remmariage view among the historic Reformed, along with John Whitgift, although of course, this would remain an extreme minority among the Reformed.
On polygamous marriages, I hold that every marriage after the first wife is invalid, and marriages within the degree of consanguity are invalid as well. This is the common position among the Roman Catholic causists (see ligamen https://www.catholic.com/encyclopedia/ligamen) This can be reasoned to from my above position on remarriage, as it is clear that a man who is with a "new wife" is commiting adultery with her and is not really married to her, but ought to return to his first and valid wife. I add as an aside that, even granting that such marriages were valid, the dominant recommended practice among mission boards today is still contrary to the histoirc recommendations of Calvin and Vermigli to whom divorce is preferable to polygamy (of course, with the man still financially providing for the women in some way), and thus needs reformation.
I am not sure I am totally convinced of the majority Reformed opinion that marriages contracted without the consent of parents are invalid and void. Joseph Hall and Dalrymple make me doubt here. Perkins's "he who hath not power, nor right over himself, cannot bind himself by promise to another. Now children have not power over themselves, but are under the government and at the disposition of their parents; therefore the covenants which they make, are not made and appointed of God, and those which God maketh not, are indeed and truth none at all." is the best argument for it. Thomas's "The maid is in her father's power, not as a female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for the purpose of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into another's power without her father's consent" isn't clear as to what he means by a child having power over their own body in the relevant sense (for instance, a parent can punish bodily and forbid their movement) and it is not at all clear that she is free in the relevant sense to be able to give herself into another's power when that very giving gives one away from their parent's power. Nevertheless I am still unsure. Furthermore, any view that applies Perkins's argument to only natural as opposed to adoptive/legal parents, I cannot follow as it seems inconsistent and would much rather side with the minoriry view that they are still valid. The common Reformed position also raises the question for me: say a marriage is consented to by the two parties when they are still dependent and is done so without the consent of parents. At this time, the marriage is invalid. But say nothing is done about this and the two continue living with each other up to the point when they are no longer dependent upon the parents. Since valid mutual consent makes a marriage and the parents are no longer a factor in preventing that valid mutual consent, has their invalid marriage now become valid? It seems so.
Exodus 22:17 is at least strong evidence in favor of the majority view, as it seems that if both the man and woman consented, yet the father did not, then the marriage is not counted as valid. It also seems significant that Paul seems to assume such authority in 1 Corinthians 7:36.
The best overall treatment of the above issues in my opinion can found here: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A61249.0001.001/1:4.4?rgn=div2;view=fulltext
I lean towards the view that one can portray images of Christ (see Peter Martyr Vermigli, Thomas Cranmer, Girolamo Zanchi all of whom I find convincing) as long as they are not worshipped, although I do try to avoid them altogether in my own conduct since I am still uncertain here. Though with Turretin, I think mental images preceding judgement must in any case be allowed of necessity. The reason for siding with Vermigli and Zanchi is that theophanies as such are intended to portray God by their very nature (the portrayal of God being what the commandment forbids) whereas Christ’s human nature, although He is the perfect representation of God, is not as such and by its own nature intended to portray God, but a thing simply natural.
I used to side with the continental view on feast days, but Gillespie and others have now convinced me otherwise. Since I side with Cocceius, the Sabbath would fall in this category as well (as Cocceius himself well brought out).
Against many Reformed, I don't see the anointing oil in James as connected to the gift of healing, but only as a civil custom. I think it may even be medicinal (more accurstely, therapeutic). The early Baptists who employed this were wrong to see this as a standing ordinance and those who practice it ought to list it as an element of worship. And if one sees the anointing as significant, then they ought to admit that they believe in 3 sacraments since the form of a sacrament is the relation of the sign to the thing signified.
I do not believe it is morally permissible to eat blood in ordinary circumstances. I know there are few among the historic Reformed who agree with me (but Bunyan is with me!) but I agree with articles such as this: https://carm.org/about-bible-verses/are-the-commands-of-acts-1520-still-applicable-today/ which I think make far more sense out of 1) Acts, given that all the instructions would, on this reading, be moral and not temporary 2) Genesis, as it would reveal the moral law and besides that, as part of the covenant, would presumably be in effect as long as the covenant lasts anyways. The Greek Orthodox agree, the Council of Trullo also condemned this practice and Tertullian condemned it, saying it was unlawful among Christians in his time. Thomas Barlow argues "bloud doth contain, and maintain, and convay the vitall spirits to all the parts of the body, which receive their ordinary nourish∣ment from the Blood, so that blood being taken away, their lives are taken away. Now God would not have Men eat the life and the soul of Beasts, a thing barbarous and unnaturall". Thomas Aquinas gives a similar reason for the sinfulness of cannibalism, which is not sinful per se in extreme situations. Therefore the prohibition of eating blood ought to be seen as likewise a general moral prohibition. Thus I place the eating of blood in the same category of cannibalism or boiling a calf in the milk of the mother or taking a bird with its young, as cruel practices to be avoided in ordinary situations.
With New England and the 1st London Confession, I see "teacher" as its own distinct office.
Against some Independents (Baxter) and with Rutherford, Gillespie, and John Cotton, I affirm that kneeling while receiving the supper must of necessity be idolatrous.
I side with Willard on the matter of swearing on the Bible. It cannot be done as it at the very least wrongly brings something in to the act of worship, yet even beyond this, I fail to see how it does not make such an object the object of idolatry. And if it is kissed, then doubtless even more idolatry is committed.
I think a table ought to be used in the supper. Gillespie and the New Englanders are the best here.
I think communion ought to be administered, with Owen, "Every first day of the week, or at least as often as opportunity and convenience may be obtained." The main thing is that ending part, that it is done as often as it may possibly be done in a convenient and orderly manner when the church meets together.
I am unsure whether I think Mass is completely invalid and would be much more open to seeing it as still essentially valid even if extremely mangled and unlawful as I have great trouble seeing what essential element in matter (as the Reformed grant a single element may validly be used), form, intent (as it seems only general and not specific intent enter into validity), and minister. It is at least invalid qua mass, but it seems valid to me qua supper.
I believe women can be ordained as deacons, as it seems clear to me that this was the practice of the ancient church. It should be noted that the historic Reformed position is that "deaconesses" do not hold the office of deacon as such and thus are not ordained but serve rather as an order within the church. I recognize my departure here, but I also recognize many have wrongly tried to co-opt them in support here.
Regarding whether women should be allowed to vote, Rutherford changed my mind on this (agaisnt many early Congregationalists). There are different kinds/levels of authority. Women would be equal insofar as they are part of the congregation of Christ in which rests legislative and judicial authority and to which voting pertains, but unequal at it relates to ecclesiastical authority/hierarchy which deals with executive power and is limited to males. But while the women always have a valid say in the election of officers, excommunication, and other affairs in which they exercise legislative and judicial power, and their consent cannot ever be invalidated, the method by which consent is determined is not formally mandated by Scripture, and so different practices can in principle exist, although I would think it almost always more fitting that they be allowed to vote just as it is more fitting that the congregation gather everyone together to vote for things rather than consenting a posteriori to decisions made by the elders.
Congregationalism is jure divino. John Cotton gives the best defense.
With the congregationalists (e.g. Samuel Willard), I think double consecration to be necessary for proper use as it seems inconsistent to say that the use of common bread and of one cup are also necessary from the example of the institution, yet this is not. The bread should be passed around before the wine, again following the example of the institution.
Communion for the sick (i.e. deacons bringing communion to those who can't make it to church) ought to be allowed in principle per Beza and Vermigli.
On whether laity baptisms are still valid, I think: 1) all ought to at least say they are valid if a minister gives some sort of delegated or implicit authority to them. The reason is that it seems to me if a King were to give authority to a Baron and then the Baron unlawfully delegates certain duties that belong to his authority to a private man, it seems that man acts with true authority, though unlawfully.
If I am correct about the above, it seems that such delegation may even be lawfully done in cases of necessity (hundreds are converted and so the minister delegates others to help baptize).
But 2) going even beyond this, against the majority Reformed position that only ministers can validly baptize, I hold that anyone may validity baptize. The reason is that the common Reformed view that only ministers are able to establish the form of the sacrament is simply incorrect. The form is nothing but the relation between the sign and the thing signified, but literally anyone is capable of establishing this relation through their spoken words. Therefore anyone may validly administer the sacraments.
And yet, with the 1LBCF, I say that only those who are called to be preaching disciples may lawfully and properly administer the sacraments. The great commission was given to the apostles not qua apostles but qua preaching disciples, as Henry Jessey argues and thus any preaching disciple may lawfully baptize.
“Private baptisms” (as described here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A03927.0001.001/1:15.10?rgn=div2;view=fulltext and here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A05535.0001.001/1:14.1?rgn=div2;view=fulltext ) are warranted by reason of Paul’s baptizing of the jailer. The reason this must be so is that the common arguments against it (by e.g. Cartwright) only work if the family of the jailer was constituted a distinct congregation in itself. If this is so, Paul established a new church in Philippi that day and became its pastor. Yet this is absurd. If it is argued that there only needs to be a good amount of people (2 or 3), then this is precisely the Anglican position and so one is in agreement with it. Therefore, private baptisms are permitted in principle, but good order should be followed so that they ought not to usually occur in an already established church.
It seems the above considerations also warrant emergency baptism in situations where someone is wanting to follow the ordinary necessity of the precept; although it doesn’t immediately seem clear to me that this would also warrant switching out the matter of the sacrament in such a situation.
I am of the opinion that in ordinary circumstances baptism ought to be in running water/rivers as it seems spiritually significant and this I think is why the Didache mentions baptism in living water. The same reasoning by which the Reformed conclude that a single common cup and loaf ought to be used seems to conclude this once we recognize that this is how it was done in Scripture. This was the opinion of the Broadmead church and it seems it was popular in the Southamptom association and it is the view of Henry Jessey.
On whether infant baptisms are valid though unlawful, I used to explain this in terms of retroactive validity based on profession of faith, but I see now that retroactive validity is an impossibility. I have gone back and forth on this issue many times. Currently I lean towards them being invalid. The main reasons are 1) I have come to see that consent to baptism needs to be accounted for as a part of the substance of it and thus necessary to its validity. If the substance of baptism does not factor in consent, you end up seemingly having to say that men may be baptized in an unconscious state, or without consent, or even against consent. Though nobody actually holds that last one, it’s hard to see how any reason against it doesn’t entail that consent is necessary to the substance of baptism. Any difference between infants and adults would not seem admitable here, as what is substantially required for baptism (that which defines what baptism essentially is) would seem to have to be the same for both infants and adults, otherwise you establish two substantially different baptisms, each with their own substantially-defining features. This, I think, is the decisive argument. 2) 1 Peter 3:21 describes baptism as a pledge, but all pledges are invalid unless there be consent, as all are agreed upon. I find these reasons (especially the first) to be quite convincing and thus I conclude that infant baptisms, as much as I loathe and hate to say it (and I cannot exaggerate this point enough, for it greatly pains me to say this of my heroes whom I love with intense love), are no baptisms.
Because of the above, I must disagree with the reasoning of Rutherford, Junius, and Thomas Aquinas that a magistrate may compel those baptized as infants to profess faith on the basis that the magistrate can compel men to keep their vows since these particular "vows" were never valid. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the magistrate cannot command sin, but any insincere and lying profession would be sinful (though they would not disagree with this) A confession may be compelled insofar as truth may be compelled and thus if a man sincerely believes, the magistrate may compel this confession out of him, yes, but not otherwise.
It has not been made clear to me that the Reformed opposed them in principle and there has even been evidence to the contrary presented to me, but it seems to me that the very same argument that allows saying “amen” and corporate confession of faith (I know this was somewhat controversial itself, but I believe it falls under religious oaths per Calvin and Augustine) also allows responsive readings.
I side more or less with Henry Jessey’s reasoning on open communion, but with a modification. His assertion that Scripture does not at all hold forth baptism as a prerequisite for communion is simply indefensible, but, ordinarily, no unbaptized person ought to be administered to the supper (and I suppose in this sense I can be said to hold to an ordinarily closed communion). But if a paedobaptist is firm in his conscience that he has been baptized, then God would here prefer mercy over sacrifice and the greater sin of barring one you reckon brother who has given a credible confession of faith from the supper outweighs that of admitting an unbaptized person thereunto and so a greater concern overrides the lesser positive law. This is established upon the same principle upon which it is lawful to change out the matter of the sacraments in cases of scandal and necessity. Absolutely all ecclesiastical law is overridden by both natural and more pressing demands. In fact, Jessey's appeal to David and the showbread makes more sense only if communion is ordinarily closed to the invalidly baptized and open communion is a concession out of the greater duty of charity, and thus I modify his position accordingly. Nor can Church membership be made a requirement for the supper. See below.
Closely related to the above, I agree with Rutherford (and Knollys) that formal church membership covenants are not required and cannot be made necessary for church membership. What is required for the church to be able to admit one to the church membership is a credible confession of faith. To add any other requirement contradicts the Regulative Principle. Jessey is also correct about the form of a particular church being mutual (at least implicit, that is, virtual) consent. Of course, none of this is to deny the usefulness of explicit church covenants, just that they cannot be made necessary and are not that which makes church membership valid (and, by the way, this is what the best among the New England churches held, as they did not make such covenants obligatory).
I don't know if this is a departure from the majority Congregationalist position, but I think the ordinances can, in principle, be given to those not yet members of churches who have made credible profession of faith. Thus the Ethiopian eunuch was baptized even though he was not a church member. But this ought not to ordinarily be so with established churhes.
I take the earlier Reformed/Anglican view of Christ's descent to Sheol (So Vermigli, Zanchi, Bullinger).
I want to qualify many of their arguments agaisnt purgatory (or any temporal punishments) from the satisfaction of Christ. The argument only works if the Roman Catholic holds that the punishments in purgatory or in this life as proper punishments and satisfactory. Otherwise, the argument doesn’t work and another must be used.
I’m drawn to the continuationism of Richard Baxter, but neither he nor I see any confessional departure from this. Assuming the historiography of Garnet Milne here, I currently do not think the Reformed distinction between “immediate” and “mediate” revelation to be sufficient/adequate or even valid. The prophets and apostles were not always (actually hardly ever) immediately inspired so as to loose all volition and modern prophets were not always mediately inspired by Scripture (Huss’s prediction of Luther coming in 100 years). Nor is true that all inspired writings and preachings must be canonical, because the Canon depends upon the will of God intending an inspired writing to be canonical, just as the prophecies of the 2 witnesses will not be canonical nor were many things which God revealed to Adam or to Moses or to Paul of which we have no record. I am mainly concerned with denying that such a counterfactual, namely, that a man were to speak inspired prophecies immediately from God, would render Scripture insufficient. This argument, I am convinced, must be denied no matter what position one takes. I lean towards affirming a continuationism taken to mean that these “immediate” revelations can still occur (as I see the distinction as inept), thus my view currently leans closest to that Augustinian continuationist view of Richard Baxter, and Vermigli seems not far off. I hope to one day write something criticizing the mediate-immediate distinction, some other arguments I consider bad, and construct a better way following Baxter, as I think there needs to be much more discussion here.
Edit Sep 9, 2024: I now see that the immediate/mediate distinction maps onto the distinction between law/fact. If this is the case then, contra Milne, Baxter is not a continuationist in his own camp apart from the Westminster cessationists, but perfectly in line with the majority.
I am of the (from what I can tell, now majority, but then an extreme minority) opinion that we will live forever on the New Earth rather than the empyrean Heaven. I only know of this one historical source (a Baptist confession) https://www.reformedreader.org/ccc/scbn.htm which supported the view.
I am an amillenialist in the line of Beale, Kline, and Bauckham.
Miscellaneous exegetical interpretations: I often find myself in disagreement with the Reformed on many exegetical interpretations. This is probahly the one area I think contemporary theologians and commentstors excel at. An exhaustive list would be unwieldily. I will just list a few against the majority: with Gentry on the fallen-angel Nephilim interpretation of Genesis 9, with most modern biblical scholars on Michael being a created angel, with Voetius and virtually all modern biblical scholars on Mary’s having of other children, with Schreiner on basically every interprestive controversy in Romans with the exception of: against the post-Augustine majority interpretation of Romans 7 being about one regenerate, with modern scholars on the ghost of Samuel really being him, with most modern scholars (as far as I can tell) on the baptism of John being of the Old Covenant.
On whether the church and state were formally one in ancient Israel (that is, whether the judicial laws were given to Israel as a body politic and ceremonial to them as a church), it does not seem to matter, as if this were so, then this would simply have been a unique situation which has no bearing on anything and does not therefore in itself support either Erastianism or Gillespie's 2K (it's just that Gillespie's 2K is right because it is the position taught by nature). Gillespie says as much anyways. However, it seems to me Gillespie's position has to be true ecause two distinct and formal principles that are not one or united in themselves cannot establish a formal effect or reality. If civil power existed formally in Israel (and it undoubtebly did) and ecclesiastical power existed formally in Israel (and it did), then the formal effect of each principle must be distinct, that is, the civil power must establish a civil polity and the ecclesiastical power must establish an ecclesiastical polity; but they cannot both establish a single formal effect (that is, the nation of Israel). Therefore, the Erastian must hold that Israel was some tertium quid—neither a civil polity nor a church. But it is absurd to hold, at the very least, that Israel was not a civil polity. Therefore, the Erastian position on Israel is not true.
Cambridge Platform:
6.4, 7.1, 7.2: I do not so distinguish elders.
7.1: I do not think the imposition of hands and fasting to be necessary to lawful and proper ordination. I am not sure if this is an exception or if this article was added for order.
12.7: I am against the baptism of infants.
1LBCF (1644):
IV: But by the subtlety of the serpent which Satan used as his instrument
I don't want to say this as if he possessed a literal snake. I think it more likely that he just appeared in the form of a serpent-like being.
XXVI: Pastors, Teachers, Elders, Deacons
I do not distinguish pastors from elders.
XLIX: The supreme Magistrate of this Kingdom we believe to be the King and Parliament freely chosen by the Kingdom
I only object to the wording here. It cannot be known with divine faith who the magistrate is and so this article is unworthy of a confession faith and awkward as it states, “we believe…” attached to identifying who the current magistrate is. Obviously it wasnt their intention to say that the identity of the magistrate is known by divine faith and not merely by a moral certainty, but this needs to be more precise (plus this line clearly does not apply to my current context).
2LBCF:
3.3: and angels…through Jesus Christ
I do not hold to the view that Christ is mediator over the angels and thus the cause or means of their entrance into eternal life. I wish to use Scotus's distinction between the Word and Christ to make this point, but for fear that it will be misconstrued by those not familiar, I will simply say that Jesus Christ as the God-man mediator holds no relation to them as the means by which they obtained eternal life; rather, Triune God confirmed them in grace. Turretin was very wise at this point and I think it’s a natural outgrowth of Gillespie’s 2K theology. Christ as God is head of angels. But Christ as mediator is head of the Church, which is His mediatorial kingdom, consisting only of those for whom He died and mediates for. Voetius is also right to reject this. Since Chirst is not mediator of angels, neither is he an instrument through which they were predestined.
6.1 "Satan using the subtlety of the serpent..."
I don't want to say Satan "us[ed] the subtlety of the serpent" as if he possessed a literal snake. I think it more likely that he just appeared in the form of a serpent-like being.
6.3: They being the root, and by God's appointment, standing in the room and stead of all mankind, the guilt of the sin was imputed…
First, I will say that I do not believe the Confession should contain imputed guilt as it is a fine point based on a few verses in Romans 5 that could be interpreted otherwise. I believe that one can hold that Christ's righteousness is imputed yet deny that Adam's guilt is imputed and argue there is an asymmetry between the two. I do not think this actually changes much and should be left up to individuals to decide, being at best a probable theological opinion and so not strictly a part of theology or doctrine as opinions about the hierarchy of angels, the length of the final judgment, historical opinions about certain facts or ways God could have done things, etc. One can affirm Adam as a covenant head without necessarily affirming the legal imputation of his sin to his posterity, but only affirm that his one sin lost original righteousness and caused the propagation of a sin nature. This doctrine was not held by nearly anyone until the Reformation and even then it was not held by any among the first generation of them, and still denied by many orthodox men even into the 17th century.
Second, I used to be undecided on this issue, but I have since decided positively against it with Vermigli and Chamier (and Calvin for that matter).
The reason that I have moved from the position that it is not per se taught in Scripture but nevertheless might possibly be proved from reason (and thus I was left agnostic on it) is that I have come to realize that I should accept that: 1) God does not unnecessarily multiply things 2) Adam’s disobedience itself is formally adequate and sufficient to account for the reception of sinful natures on the part of his offspring. Thomas Aquinas has certainly proven 2 here: Are all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin? The first premise I take as a common principle in scholastic thought even though it’s mostly associated with Occam and the second premise I derive from Thomas here:
On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above.
Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as stated in the I:100:1, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder.
[[see also: https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1100.htm Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.]]
The reason a sinner begets a sinner devoid of original righteousness is actually quite simpe. Once the quality of original righteousness is lost, the parent, as the material cause, cannot pass it on to their child, as one cannot pass on what one does not possess (as Thomas explains in De Malo). Thus imputed sin is completely unnecessary to preserve the justice of transmitted sin (as it is by nature necessary that sinful man beget sinful man, so by natural necessity, it is just, for anything which is necessary by nature, for that very reason, cannot be unjust) and, being unnecessary, it ought to be rejected since God does not unnecessarily multiply entities.
If one agrees with Thomas here (and one should) then all one needs to do is run a simple thought experiment: imagine God never made a covenant with Adam and thus never stipulated his sin to be imputed to his offspring. Yet Adam sins in this state of pure nature. Would his offspring have received sinful natures? If you agree with Thomas here (as you should if you have any coherent anthropology), of course they would have because that’s how the law of nature works. And so to create men’s souls destitute of original righteousness would have been perfectly just on God’s part even without imputation. This is the decisive argument that shows at the very least that it cannot be held that the legal imputation of Adam’s sin through covenant cannot be the cause of our receiving of a sinful nature since something contingent and positive cannot be the cause of something necessary and natural. It is natural and necessary that a pure man sinning loose original righteousness and thus cannot pass it on, whether in covenant or not. Thus, there can be no necessary reason to posit Adamic imputation and so some other reason must be looked for, yet none is to be found and Scripture is silent.
If one wishes to speak of Adamic imputation in a causal and natural sense and a posteriori inasmuch as we can be said to have sinned when he sinned because we receive a sin nature from him (as many medievals speak) this is licit and I do not deny it in this sense, but of course, this is denied by the later Reformed to be their meaning. What I reject is the common later Reformed idea that Adam’s act of disobedience is covenantally and legally imputed to us since, as I am quite sure, such an act is superfluous since the only reason for posting it (to secure the justice of the propagation of sin) does not follow, as I have explained, and so unworthy to posit of God.
7.3: is founded in that eternal covenant transaction that was between the Father and the Son about the redemption of the elect
If the predicate, “covenant” is allowed to be describing the New Covenant, it is affirmed. If it is taken to be a substantially different covenant, I deny and follow Keach
19.1 God gave to Adam a law of universal obedience written in his heart, and a particular precept of not eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; by which he bound him and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact, and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it, and endued him with power and ability to keep it.
It is understood by some that this paragraph means to say that Adam’s progeny are currently bound to obey the covenant of works. If this is so, then this I strongly deny it and follow Petto; only Adam was a covenant head and only he had the promise of life. Thus, the covenant promise pertains only to him. See below.
19.6: Although true believers are not under the law as a covenant of works, to be thereby justified or condemned…
The wording seems to imply that believers were once under, or could possibly be under, a covenant of works to be justified by it themselves, which is clearly impossible, as nobody is a federal head to which eternal life has been promised upon works (Adam excepted). As the wording stands, the only "true believer" this could ever even possibly apply to is postlapsarian Adam. One solution is that the Confession means to say "as if" believers were under a CoW to be justified and condemned by it. Another solution is that it means believers are not under the CoW to be justified or condemned by it through Adam. Either way, it's unclear as to what it means and therefore needs to be changed. The main problem though is it suggests the "law" (which I take to be the moral law) can function by itself as a "covenant of works". My main concern is that it must be made clear that the formal principle by which justification is given is placed in covenant, not in moral law, as any law with a promise of life is a covenant and not a mere law. Even granting this thought, someone might still say that the covenant promise of life is still held out to unbelievers, and if this is so, then this is what I deny with Petto and Baxter . Baxter at least appeared to understand the paragraph this way and so departed from it.
I personally lean towards the view that the Confession means to say simply that "believers are not under the (moral) law as if it was a covenant of works" and simply leaves it at that (not saying whether anyone actually is under such a covenant to be justified or condemned) so that either position could be taken. Nevertheless, since Baxter believed he departed for a similar reason, so I list this here.
22.4: "but not for the dead"
I think the dead can be retroactively prayed for or prayed for to receive spiritual blessings in Heaven and the future resurrection. The Lutherans and some Anglicans allow this. Bullinger and Davenant are in agreement with this, and John Owen even engaged in doing so. I think that Onesiphorus was likely dead when Paul prayed for him.
22.7, 22.8
I take Cocceius's view of the Sabbath.
25.2: Marriage was ordained for the mutual help of husband and wife, for the increase of mankind with a legitimate issue, and the preventing of uncleanness.
The wording here is unfortunate as it suggests marriage was originally ordained for the preventing of uncleanness, however, the Reformerd were clear that such concupiscence did not exist prior to the fall. It would be better written as "is ordained" or "and after the Fall, for the preventing of uncleanness". Turretin explicitly makes this exact distinction at 3:247, IV. Perhaps a bit more important is that the order should be switched around to make the increase of mankind first and then mutual help second since procreation is the primary end of marriage given that the final cause of sex, which is the proper act of marriage, is procreation. These aren't substantial disagreements, obviously, but I do not like the phrasing.
26.4: The Lord Jesus Christ is the Head of the church, in whom, by the appointment of the Father, all power for the calling, institution, order or government of the church, is invested in a supreme and sovereign manner; neither can the Pope of Rome in any sense be head thereof, but is that antichrist, that man of sin, and son of perdition, that exalts himself in the church against Christ, and all that is called God; whom the Lord shall destroy with the brightness of his coming
The part I take issue with is, "neither can the Pope of Rome in any sense be head thereof, but is that antichrist, that man of sin, and son of perdition, that exalts himself in the church against Christ, and all that is called God; whom the Lord shall destroy with the brightness of his coming". It is agreed that the Pope is an antichrist who takes his seat in the midst of the temple/church, but the confession here calls the Pope that antichrist, and that man of sin and son of perdition "whom the Lord shall destroy with the brightness of his coming". This clearly identifies the Pope as the eschatological, reflecting common historicist belief of the time that the office of the papacy had become the Antichrist. Attempts to read this section in any other way are unconvincing. The common Reformed eschatology of the time saw the Papal office as the Biblical Antichrist and this is precisely what the Confession intends to bind its confessors to. Now obviously, the final Antichrist may be a pope, but I have absolutely no way of knowing that until he appears, and thus I can't put this in a confession of faith since I can't see the future and God has not revealed the Antichrist's identity to us. I will confess the pope as "an antichrist" and "a man of sin" 100x over whom the Lord will destroy with the brightness of his coming, but I cannot confess him as "that antichrist" and it is presumptuous for anyone to do so now, even as it was back then.
26.9: “with imposition of hands…“
I do not see this as a commanded, jure divino, ordinance. But if it is, then so is fasting in ordination (as the Cambridge Platform consistently holds). I know that Renihan says that this “was not part of the Confession” (Edification and Beauty, 146), so, assuming he is correct, I imagine the Confession intends to describe the common practice rather than to speak on whether this is a commanded, jure divino, ordinance or not as I understand that there was great controversy among the early Baptists and Congregationalists on this point. And as I remember, many later Baptists stopped doing this altogether.
3FU:
I am a credobaptist.
I am a congregationalist.
Heidelberg 103 “day of rest”, I take Cocceius’s view on the Sabbath, yet I have read that he was able to subscribe to the standards. I have also read Rivet make the argument that this question forbids Sabbath keeping, although I don’t think that’s a good interpretation of it since it speaks of a “day of rest”.
Heidelberg 37 “all the days of his life” I have read multiple authors among the Reformed of lesser renown argue a minority view that Christ began to vicariously bear our sins as mediator at his baptism. I think their opinion is more congruent with what we see in Scripture, although I recognize there is a degree of uncertainty on this either way.
Belgic 31 “ministers, elders” I would not distinguish these as two distinct offices.
Dordt 5.5 “incur damnable guilt” I do not think I really depart here, but let me explain how one might think that there is disagreement here. The reason is that it seems to imply that the guilt of at least some sins are not actually forgiven until after repentance. It was certainly a live position among the Reformed that guilt for such sins required specific acts of repentance in order to remitted (See Louis le Blanc, Robert Baron, and perhaps Anthony Burgess at least with respect to sins committed after one is initially justified), and I could accept this if one means as a consequent condition (as this: “works are (consequently) necessary for justification”), but not a preceding condition as though repentance were before remission. However, not everyone held to this. Downame speaks similarly to Dordt here (around page 376) https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A20732.0001.001/1:28?rgn=div1;subview=detail;type=simple;view=fulltext;q1=David but interprets it along the lines of damnable guilt and remission in one's own conscience and from other comments of his seems to disagree that repentance is antecedently required for actual remission (Downmame makes the instrument of justification to be the habit and not the act of faith). The question is whether or not Dordt intends to specify whether one must accept the position of e.g. le Blanc or whether it only intends that the language be accepted in some sense so as to accommodate Downame (and by consequence, later theologians such as Thomas Boston). Downame also accepts that “if David should have died in those sins without repentance, he should have been condemned”, which I think is to be interpreted thusly: “if David had in actuality, died in those sins, he would have been condemned because it would mean that he was not at that moment justified.” But this is not necessarily to take the further position that his sins were not actually remitted, in the order of nature, until he actually repented. “Incur damnable guilt” can be picking out this relation (obstinance in heinous sins to a conditional damnation, i.e. it would prove one not to be justified). But the question is whether such guilt is actually remitted only upon repentance strictly and in the order of nature, which Dordt does not specify. So in e.g. Burgess's case, he really is not in opposition to Boston, at least insofar as he speaks of a "conditional actual guilt" which seems to be a very improper notion of actual guilt and Dordt also could only mean to speak improperly and pick out such a relation between obstinance in sin and damnation. If this is so, then there is no real opposition, at least as to that specific point. The only substantial question is whether or not one affirms that "gospel repentance doth not go before, but comes after [actual] remission of sin, in the order of nature", which at least le Blanc denies with clarity and which I think Boston, Owen, and Rutherford affirm, but which, again, Dordt does not explicitly specify one way or the other.
Dordt 1.17, Conclusion
I am a credobaptist and so do not hold that infants are a part of the covenant (unless regenerate) and have any presumed promise of election.
39A:
21: General Councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of Princes.
An association of churches can hold such like meetings apart from the command of civil authorities.
27: The Baptism of young Children is in any wise to be retained in the Church, as most agreeable with the institution of Christ.
I affirm credobaptism.
35: Rogation days
I'm with Gillespie here.
36: Archbishops, bishops, priests
I do not at all divide the ecclesiastical offices this way.
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