I. At the end of my post on final justification, I had an appendix at the end relating to the use of “merit” in the fathers and the medievals. I was particularly concerned with showing that our heavenly rewards are not based upon merit, which I defined as something along the lines of: that work which being done grants a right to a reward. I mentioned I was unsure at the time how to show that our heavenly rewards are not based upon ex pacto merit, seeing that they seemed to have the same components that ex pacto merit requires.
II. I now wish to suggest this solution. The Catholic Encyclopedia when defining congruent merit says that,
there are also other meritorious works which at most are entitled to reward or honour for reasons of equity (ex cquitate) or mere distributive justice (ex iustitia distributiva), as in the case of gratuities and military decorations. From an ethical point of view the difference practically amounts to this that, if the reward due to condign merit be withheld, there is a violation of right and justice and the consequent obligation in conscience to make restitution, while, in the case of congruous merit, to withhold the reward involves no violation of right and no obligation to restore, it being merely an offence against what is fitting or a matter of personal discrimination (acceptio personarum). Hence the reward of congruous merit always depends in great measure on the kindness and liberality of the giver, though not purely and simply on his good will.
If this is all that it meant when one speaks of congruent merit, namely, that there is a fittingness to reward or a rewardable condecency, but no legal right by way of debt upon which the reward is received on the basis of a work, then this is perfectly in line with what the Reformed mean to speak of when they speak on distributive justice. Compare Leigh:
[God's distributive justice is]
of reward, when God bountifully rewards the obedience of the creature with a free reward, 2 Thess. 1:5, 7; Matt. 10:41, 42; Mark 9:41. God bestows this reward not only on the godly, both by heaping divers mercies on them in this life, and by the fulness of glory and felicity in the life to come, but also on the wicked, whose moral actions he rewards with temporary rewards in this world, as the obedience of Jehu, the repentance of Ahab.
III. Such rewards are given as something fitting, not as something earned in justice. With this category in mind, all we must do is subsume eternal reward under this category of fitting reward, which nevertheless is not ex pacto merit, which would bestow a right to a reward.
IV. Clearly, however, this defiitnion of congruent merit is different from the "congruent merit" that the Reformed commonly equate with ex pacto merit. This is because the Reformed usually redefine "condign merit" as meaning that something is strictly and intrinsically meritorious. This is not, however, how the Romanists understand the meaning of condign merit, which has to do with proportionate rewardability by way of justice in contrast with congruent merit which is based on God's generosity. Ex pacto merit, if we use the Romanists own categories, ought to be equated with condign merit because condign merit is proportionate to a reward in justice and this is precisely what a covenant does (i.e. covenant makes this work proportionate to this stipulated reward). Wherea justice is involved in God's dealings with Adam in the Covenant of Works, the same principle does not hold in e.g. God's rewarding of the wicked with temporal blessings.
One theologian who continues the more accurate use of "condign" as relating to proportion in justice is Patrick Gillespie who wrote, “There was an equality of proportion or merit betwixt the conditions required from, and performed by Christ, by vertue of this Covenant, and the conditions promised and performed unto Christ by this Covenant” and this merit was “de condigno, there being a just and equal proportion betwixt the fault committed, and the satisfaction given, and betwixt the reward promised and given to Christ, and the obedience required from and performed by him.” (69-70 here). Thus we see that "condign" is not about intrinsic worth per se.
V. The result of this, as Becanus had already realized, is that "merit of congruity has not properly the relation of merit, but only of a certain suitableness." That is, if merit is properly defined as involving that which bestows a right/creates a debt in justice, then congruent merit is not merit. This is why Leigh is able to use the, at first seemingly paradoxical phrase, "free reward." To illustrate the difference, a father might promise his son a reward of money or some other gift if he cleans his room. Whether this reward is congruent or condign is a qualitative question about the action & reward. One would have to ask whether cleaning the room is an action that is proportionally rewarded with the reward by way of debt or not. One reward is of fidelity/promise, the other is of justice/debt (see Alsted make essentially the same distinction). Of course, it is ultimately the design and constitution of the rewarder which determines whether this is so.
VI. To the objection that every promise implies a right and so every promise implies condign merit, we can respond that this is not even true on the Roman Catholic position. Take the following:
Congruous merit implies no previous contract or agreement, but only the kindness and generosity of the donor. Thus an employer may give his workmen a liberal bonus over and above their regular salary, not because they have a right to it but because he wants to show his appreciation of their services. Their salary would be merited condignly, whereas anything beyond would be gained congruously. Propriety suggests that employers occasionally favor their workmen with some evidence of good will; but if they fail to do so, they have not violated justice or done wrong to their employees.
In a comparable way God acts towards us in the supernatural order. Certain actions we perform He regards as worthy of merit in justice, which He has bound Himself to honor and on which we can depend with the surety of God's word. Others He prefers to consider dependent on His promise, perhaps, but not in justice. Thus a sinner making an act of perfect love congruously merits the state of grace, with something more than divine propriety but something less than strict equity. God does not owe him the grace of justification, but in His mercy has promised to infuse it under specified conditions and will be infallibly true to His promise.
VII. The Sacrae Theologiae Summa pg. 224 divides congruent merit into infallible (when a divine promise is present) and fallible (when no such promise is present). So once again, promise of reward ≠ condign merit.
VIII. To further defend the final point (about not every promise granting a right by way of debt), this is from David Hollatz:
"not every promise confers a right (ius) to another to confer a thing, as though exacting a debt. For powerful and kind men sometimes seriously promise their commendation, intercession, promotion, or suffrage, which nonetheless cannot be required from them by a certain right, but is imputed to ... their humanity and veracity. As far as this reaches to divine promises, it is certainly impossible that God who is immutable and the most truthful would revoke them; nonetheless, it seems to bespeak too much pride to say that a mortal [man] obtains a right from the promise against God. [He gives an example about the relationship of a father and a son.]." This will be expanded on in XIII.
He goes on to say "that God renders according to works but not on account of the merits of works - that is, God renders according to the qualities of the works but not on account of the works as meritorious causes of eternal life." This is the point I am making in denying good works to be the (condignly) meritorious cause of eternal life (which I define briefly as conferring a right by way of debt as Turretin speaks at 20.6.XX or by comparison at 17.5.VII), but nevertheless holding we can speak of them as what I would call congruently meritorious insofar as they are fittingly rewarded (and even from promise) and act as moral instruments holding some sort of metaphorical efficacy in relation to the reward. Some promises confer a right by way of debt so that the reward is given in justice. Such is the case with the promise to Adam in the Covenant of Works. Other promises confer no such right and so are not given in way of justice. The Reformed most often refer only to the first as a "meritorious cause" (as per Turretin); this will be expanded on in X and in the appendix.
Note: that line to ex pacto merit being purple does not mean anything. I didn't see the color correctly and now I am too lazy to fix it.
IX. For the top category of "merit/meritorious cause" see Burgersdijk's definition of a meritorious cause here: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A30233.0001.001/1:10.1?rgn=div2;subview=detail;type=simple;view=fulltext;q1=merit as "that which moves the Agent to a Requital, and that either in good or evil things."
X. First some comments on the overall structure of the chart. It may be asked whether or not condign and congruent merit belong to the same univocal genus. The answer to this depends upon how strictly one chooses to define their commonality. If merit is defined in a broader sense as, per Burgersdijk, anything which “moves the agent to a requital,” then in this first sense, congruent is analogous to condign and both properly belong to the genus of merit as defined by Burgersdijk. However, if merit is defined more strictly in terms of justice (and thus proportion between act and reward, procuring real right to reward), then condign and congruent merit do not share the same univocal genus as they differ in their fundamental mode of efficacy. This second way is why the Reformed tend to use the term “meritorious cause” to refer only to condign merit (whether that be arithmetic or geometric) and is why Martin Becanus says that “merit of congruity has not properly the relation of merit, but only of a certain suitableness” since in this sense “proper merit” refers only to the genus of condign merit. It is because of this stricter sense of merit that Voetius defines it as "the work provided, to which a reward or retribution is due proportionate to the work."
XI. Proper/strict condign merit is condign merit of arithmetic proportion in commutative justice which all theologians reject as having place in God. This merit is rejected when theologians deny that there is commutative justice in God. Sometimes people call this "ontological merit." While all theologians deny that this merit can exist between God and men, Thomists hold this merit is true of Christ; Scotists do not. With that one exception of Christ on the Thomist scheme, this merit is only ever brought up to be rejected; it does not exist. This merit is proportionate to a reward in justice. This is the merit denied by Romans 11:35 and Acts 17:25. This is one species of condign merit.
XII. Ex pacto merit is condign merit of geometric proportion in distributive justice which earns a real right to reward. This is the merit involved in purchases and legal debts. This is the type of merit established in Adam’s Covenant of Works and in Christ’s Covenant of Redemption. This is the sense in which people usually think of “merit” and it is this merit especially which must be denied of our works. When the Reformed charge Romanists with holding that we earn eternal life, this is because the Romanists hold to this type of merit of eternal life. Always remember that merit is concerned with right/debt/title. This merit is proportionate to a reward in justice. This is the merit of Romans 4 and Galatians 3. This is the other species of condign merit.
(This part may be skipped) Note that although I am expositing this category according to Reformed principles, the Thomists are sometimes wronged in the presentation of their views, as if their condign merit were a form of arithmetic, that is proper/strict condign, merit of commutative justice. Thomist condign merit simpliciter is a form of geometric merit of distributive justice; Thomists only differ in that they place the formal basis for merit intrinsically in the work due to a virtual covenant they believe is entailed by the very giving of grace itself. Thus whereas grace and condign merit cannot exist apart from one another on Thomist principles, they can on Scotist principles since the Scotists are able to make a real distinction between proportion to an end and proportion to a reward in justice (for this distinction see my second review of Perkins). Cf. my comments on Cajetan’s view of merit in my fourth review of Perkins.
XIII. Congruent merit has been well-defined above. It is the most broad sense of merit that we might use when we say that I “merited” that something happened, or when we say that someone “deserved” something even though we don’t actually mean they have a right to that thing; as when a crowd shouts “you deserve it” to someone they admire, or when we say someone who acted badly and got beat up for it “had it coming”. Congruent merit is the broad sense of merit in which works simply obtain some reward which follows upon it. Congruent merit does not procure a right/title/debt. Congruent merit is not in justice, and thus not proportionate to a reward in justice. It may, however, be based on promise, in which case it is called infallible congruent merit (on this see: https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/john-davenant-on-infallible-congruent-merit). Some examples of infallible congruent merit are: 1) our works in relation to eternal life, 2) our works in relation to the increase of grace, 3) our use of the means of grace (such as the elements of the supper) in relation to the dispensing of grace. This is the merit of James 1:12 and Philippians 3:14. An example of fallible congruent merit is the works of unbelievers in relation to temporal blessings.
(This part may be skipped) Note also that although sometimes congruent merit is referred to distributive justice (as for instance in the Leigh quote above, or the Catholic Encyclopedia definition), this is said improperly and secundum quid since only geometric condign deals with distributive justice properly speaking because only it deals with real right/debt/title that can be obtained through distributive justice; thus you may sometimes see congruent denied to be of distributive justice; cf. X. Also, the term “ex pacto” may also be applied to infallible congruent merit inasmuch as it is a species of merit out of covenant.
The first 2 examples are held to be condign by the Roman Catholics, but congruent by the Reformed (by the way, on 2, here is Voetius, "The obedience of Christ the Mediator, rendered for his own, is the sole or only procatarctic and meritorious cause of subsequent grace'). The 3rd example is agreed upon to be congruent by all parties.
Ockham and Biel famously held to a version of infallible congruent merit where a person could merit the first grace through natural virtue. The problem with such a view is that it still imports at least some moral efficacy from the order of nature into the order of grace, which, as Scotus noted, is not to be granted in God’s ordinate power, or at the very least, actual, as there is no congruency between nature and grace. Cf. my second review of Perkins and also my post on Turretin’s argument for infralapsarianism.
XIV. Per the broad definition of Burgersdijk, which is reflected in the chart above, in a broader sense, even congruent merit, that is, our works in relation to the rewards for our good works (whether it be the degrees of Heavenly reward per Turretin 20.10.V even Heaven itself considered as a reward given to our works), and even considering the condition of faith in relation to justification may be referred to as (congruently) meritorious causes [Note that if faith is at all being considered as meritorious, then it isn’t being considered as a passive and receptive instrument, but as a condition or as efficacious to that reception. In this case, it must be only congruently meritorious, as it is a condition or as it is being used by us in order to procure justification, but it certainly cannot be condignly meritorious of justification, as this belongs to Christ’s obedience alone.]. In this way, you can speak of congruent merit of the possession of the right of eternal life, not however, formally of the right itself, since then the merit would not be congruent but condign by virtue of its formal object (i.e. a real right).
This broad definition is not, however, what the Reformed intend to deny when they deny our works to be meritorious causes. Rather, when the Reformed use the term "meritorious cause", they are most often taking merit more strictly for condign merit (as per Turretin, Hollatz, Voetius, and Becanus above) and even more specifically for ex pacto condign merit. Cf. X.
XV. At the same time (and the following I think is not directly related to the primary concern of this post, but I wanted to address it anyways), we can speak of two different kinds of rights: a more strict one which confers personal right and a broader one that confers real right. Personal right is what we normally think of as right granted by merit, and real right is the condition which grants possession of right. So if the condition for receiving my paycheck is that I reach out my hand, such an act confers real right, although personal right was given to me by the very fact that I had worked. It would then be the conferral of personal right that the Reformed deny when they deny that our faith is the meritorious cause of justification. And a similar thing would be said about the sacraments insofar as Christ is the meritorious cause of the grace we receive through them, but they may be considered as bestowing real right to the present possession of the grace we receive through them. An easy example to tell the two kinds of causality apart, regardless of what we are calling them, would be this: the specified way of receiving your paycheck (according to the stipulations of the company) is to reach out your hand to take it. The act of reaching out your hand will be same kind of instrumentality as our faith has in relation to justification or our good works have in relation to eternal life (or our works in relation to the degree of eternal reward) whereas the work you did for your paycheck is the same kind of instrumentality in Christ's obedience. If the reaching out of my hand is made the basis upon which I am paid (instead of my work) granting personal right and not simply real right, confusion has resulted.
XVI. If I may be so bold, I believe the way that I have worked things out above is ultimately the way things must be worked out. Any other division will:
Struggle to account for the phenomenon the Roman Catholics have named “congruent merit.” A military hero “merits” a medal recognizing his service, a nation that generally lives according to the natural law “merits” the blessings of God. They have not earned a right by way of debt in justice whereby the rewards they receive are due to them. But we recognize their actions have been fittingly rewarded. This struggle leads to:
Blurring the lines between the works of Adam/Christ and our works in relation to heavenly reward (again, whether this reward is considered as eternal life itself or the accidental degree of reward we will receive). If the only two categories in our head are strict/proper merit (which we know to be impossible) and a general notion of merit by promise, we will have a hard time distinguishing our works in relation to eternal life from the ex pacto condign merit of Adam and Christ.
XVII. To give an example: Turretin’s use of “condign merit” is equivalent to my “strict/proper merit” and his “congruent merit” (which he identifies Adam’s merit with) is nearly equivalent to my “condign merit.” I say nearly equivalent as this reworking where “condign” is now focused on intrinsic worth rather than rewardable proportion—whether that proportion be supplied intrinsically or extrinsically (which became a common way to speak of condign merit among the Reformed) makes his comments on condign and congruent merit as a whole somewhat incoherent to Roman Catholic ears. “Congruent” is now equivalent to “ex pacto” simply on the basis of the fact that it isn’t intrinsically worthy of reward. Of course, this is not at all how the terms have been historically defined (others, such as John Tombes, more accurately saw that condign merit has to do with causality, not with whether the merit is intrinsic or extrinsic to the work, e.g. "yea, [Romanists] teach that a man may by his good works merit of condignity (either by virtue of Gods promise, or the worth of the work) eternal life"). The result of this is that one may come away from Turretin wondering why Adam had congruent merit from the covenant between him and God, but we have no congruent merit in between our works and the degree of heavenly reward (that is, why does Turretin affirm the former to be a “meritorious cause” but deny the latter to be a “meritorious cause”? Is he stupid?). The answer, of course, is that Turretin’s “meritorious cause” is equivalent to our definition of “condign merit” (as we have already noted), but this comes at the cost of losing any sort of name for what we have identified as “congruent merit.” The traditional definition of condign, recognizing it as about proportional rewardability by way of debt rather than about intrinsic worthiness, should be retained. This more clearly and accurately labels Adam’s ex pacto merit as condign merit, his works being made extrinsically proportionate to a reward by way of covenant. Finally, as we have seen, Leigh, for his part, recognizes the phenomenon of congruent merit but does not call it by that name or relate it to ex pacto merit in any way. My chart above takes all of these partial insights and organizes them in a coherent way.
XVIII. With that said, by way of example, we can illustrate how one may fall into error here by looking at Thesis XXVI of Richard Baxter's Aphorismes. Baxter states there:
(1) Neither can our performance of the conditions of the Gospel in the most proper and strict sence, be said to merit the reward: seeing there is nothing in the value of it, or any benefit that God receiveth by it, which may so entitle it meritorious; neither is there any proportion betwixt it and the reward. (2) But in a larger fence, as Promise is an Obligation, and the thing promised is called Debt; so the performers of the Condition are called Worthy, and their performance Merit. Though properly it is all of Grace, and not of Debt.
Notice Baxter only rejects merit of our performance of the conditions of the Gospel "in the most proper and strict sence", "seeing there is nothing in the value of it, or any benefit that God receiveth by it." This is only to reject what we have listed on our chart as "proper/strict merit." In other words, when Baxter rejects merit to our works, he only means to deny that they obligate God by any intrinsic worth they possess. It is only in this sense that he denies there to be "any proportion betwixt it and the reward", i.e. he only means to deny that our works are intrinsically equal to the eternal reward they earn. But when he goes on to explicate what our works do in fact do, he says that "in a larger fence, as Promise is an Obligation, and the thing promised is called Debt." Baxter does then, it seems, think that a debt is created by the promise of God in virtue of which God rewards our faith with justification. This is to make our faith condignly meritorious. Of course, he goes on to say that "properly it is all of Grace, and not of Debt", but this again is only to deny strict/proper merit. It is not to deny that the causality involved between God's promise to reward Adam with justification for his works and God's promise to reward us for our faith are different kinds of causality, one in which an improper debt is created (condign merit) and one in which no such debt is created (congruent merit). Rather, Baxter conflates the two and thinks that all that matters is to deny the (metaphysically impossible) category of strict/proper merit to our works. Indeed, this criticism was explicitly leveled against him by the orthodox:
Except. I do not so require good works as the Papists do, they require it, as merit, or satisfaction, I as a condition required in the Gospel.
Exam. 1. You have the same evasions to elude the places of Scripture. 2. They do not make our righteousness coordinate with Christs righteous∣ness, but subordinate: they are not so sottish as to think their owne works satisfactory to Gods justice, or in themselves meritorious of eternall life, they look for remission of the fault from Christ, and say that Christ did merit that we might merit. 3. It is false that you say, our good works are a condition required in the Gospel to our justification: they are not required of us that we may be justified, but that being justified we may glorifie our heavenly Fa∣ther. To whom with the Son, and holy Spirit be all glory.
(A similar criticism is made starting at around page 190 here for "neither hath Christ merited from Gods naturall but his ordinate Justice, not in the strict, but in the large sense."). This is precisely the reason for the common representation of neonomianism at the time: that faith (or repentance) holds the same kind causality that Adam's works would have held in the Covenant of Works, thereby turning one of the conditions of the New Covenant into something condignly meritorious (resulting in the same error of Rome) and so turning the Covenant of Grace into a new covenant of works (as the form of a covenant of works is nothing else but that the right to reward be won by condign merit**). This is why Rutherford said that:
Yet withal here we would beware of Mr. Baxter's order of setting repentance and works of new obedience before justification, which is indeed a new covenant of works, meriting the sprinkling of Christs blood and washing in justification, and this blood payeth them back again; for by the merit of Christs blood good works do justifie and save.
And Turretin states substantially the same thing:
Condition is used either antecedently and a priori, for that which has the force of a meritorious and impulsive cause to obtain the benefits of the covenant (the performance of which gives man a right to the reward); or concomitantly and consequently a posteriori, for that which has the relation of means and disposition in the subject, required in the covenanted. (2) A condition is either natural, flowing from the strength belonging to nature; or supernatural and divine, depending upon grace. (3) The federal promise is twofold: either concerning the end or the means, i.e., either concerning salvation or concerning faith and repentance (because each is the gift of God). (4) The covenant can be considered either in relation to its institution by God or in relation to its first application to the believer or in relation to its perfect consummation.
These things being laid down, we say first, if the condition is taken antecedently and a priori for the meritorious and impulsive cause and for a natural condition, the covenant of grace is rightly denied to be conditioned. lt is wholly gratuitous, depending upon the sole good will (eudokia) of God and upon no merit of man. Nor can the right to life be founded upon any action of ours, but on the righteousness of Christ alone.
XIX. All condign merit must be placed in Christ's obedience alone. It is His obedience which is the only antecedent condition of the covenant of grace in that only based upon it is any right to the Covenant of Grace granted to us. God rewards justification to our faith not on the basis of our faith as condignly meritorious, but on the basis of Christ's works as condignly meritorious. The essential difference between the Reformed and Rome on the question of merit is that Rome makes our works condignly meritorious of eternal life (Thomists by the Holy Spirit and Scotists by the covenant). The Reformed reject this because condign merit is the form of a covenant of works and so must be wholly removed from our part in the Covenant of Grace and placed solely in Christ.
XX. And in closing, I will say that whether Baxter truly meant to say that faith is condignly meritorious ex pacto, or whether he was speaking imprecisely and uncarefully, I think it would be difficult to prove with certainty one way or the other. But it should at least be clear how the orthodox took him to have been speaking for if he did intend this, he was in error. At the very least, the fact that he only ever (as far as I have been able to tell) intends to deny strict/proper merit and ascribes debt to faith, never distinguishing along the lines that we have above, seems to indicate that the orthodox were correct in their assessment of him. I use him here only to illustrate the essential difference between condign and congruent merit, as a peppercorn of faith may be formally condign merit even as much as Christ's perfect obedience is. In other words, the matter of merit is irrelevant to telling us about the form of it and whether it operates as condign or congruent. Thus, at the very least, falling into such an error as neonomianism always remains a real theoretical possibility even if nobody ever were to fall into it.
And in point of fact, the neonomians constantly made this error: their denial of merit was only ever limited to strict merit because they thought that the problem in affirming merit had to do with the material deficiency in our works such that they were imperfect and not strictly equivalent to the reward, not seeing that the issue lies not in the matter, but in the form. To put the matter rather bluntly: a covenant that offers eternal life on the basis of condign merit for even a sin-stained (I mean materially; obviously it cannot be rewarded qua sin-stained) and trivial action is, formally, as much as a covenant of works as Christ's own and differs from the Covenant of Grace, formally considered, equally as much as Adam's Covenant of Works does.
XXI. By the way, just as merit can be divided into condign and congruent, so can demerit. In line with the distinction above, condign demerit is about a proportion in justice to punishment whereas congruent demerit is about a fittingness/rewardable condecency (if I may speak about punishment as a "reward") to punishment. In condign demerit, you have "earned the right to punishment," but not so in congruent demerit. So, for instance, the fatherly chastisements of believers due to sins may be called congruent Gospel demerit whereas the merit of Hell by unbelievers by their sins may be called condign legal demerit. This may have relevance for how one thinks of the substance of the punishment of Hell over against the accidental degree of it (as well as in Christ's satisfaction), the degree possibly being only congruent and the substance condign, but I tend to lean toward both being condign, which at least seems to me to be the traditional position. See here.
XXII. **That this is so becomes evident when one considers the republication debate. The traditional Reformed view of the Mosaic covenant holds only to a material republication of the covenant of works in that it materially demands obedience for blessings. This is seen as congruent merit in the same way that a believer's works congruently merit eternal life. Thus, there is no formal republication and the Mosaic Covenant is not formally a covenant of works because the works materially demanded are formally demanded as congruent. However, for the republicationists, the works demanded by the Mosaic Covenant are condign. This being so, the Mosaic Covenant is formally a covenant of works because the material works demanded by the covenant are formally demanded as condign.
Appendix:
An example of the distinction in Turretin:
"Hence also it appears that there is no merit properly so called of man before God, in whatever state he is placed. Thus Adam himself, if he had persevered, would not have merited life in strict justice, although (through a certain condescension [synchatabasin]) God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense because it ought to have been, as it were, the foundation and meritorious cause in view of which God had adjudged life to him)." (Turretin, 17.5.VII)
Turretin here denies Adam “would have merited in strict justice” which here is to deny commutative justice, i.e. “merit properly so called” here means strict/proper merit of arithmetic proportion. Instead of this, he affirms Adam merited ex pacto, which is of geometric proportion; that is, Adam's works would have procured a right to life which would have been "adjudged" to him on that basis. He refers to this sort of merit as a “meritorious cause” keeping in step with what I noted above in X and XIV. Turretin’s “meritorious cause” is denoting a type of causality that deals with right to reward in justice (cf. XIV). So when you come to his comments on eternal rewards, he reads:
"However, although in this judgment to each one ought to be repaid “according to his works,” as to quality, so that it may be well with the good and evil with the wicked; still there will not be the same relation of good and bad works to the reward and punishment. For evil works indeed will be properly the meritorious cause of the punishment which will be intlicted on the wicked; but there is not the same relation of good works (which can have no relation of merit, as was seen in its place); rather they will be brought forward not as the causes, but only as the consequence, testimonies and effects of faith and of grace which they obtained in Christ. Thus the causal particle gar (found here) is not causal (denoting the meritorious cause of life), but only ratiocinative (indicating the reason a posteriori of the sentence pronounced by Christ) to denote not the merit of works, but the quality of the workers; not the why and on account of what, but to whom the kingdom is to be assigned. Nor if this particle has a causal force in the condemnation of the wicked, ought it for that reason to have an equal force also in the absolution of the righteous. For in this particular, bad works (which are both ours and not due and thus truly meritorious) differ widely from good works (which are both absolutely due and proceed not from us, but from God). Therefore, God will render to believers according to (kata to erga), not on account of their works (dia to erga); from the justice of fidelity and constancy, not from his distributive justice properly so called. For the true cause of the kingdom adjudged to them is to be sought in the mercy of their heavenly Father, who will give to his blessed children the kingdom prepared from eternity under the title of an inheritance in Christ, who purchased it for them from his mere grace, not from any merit of theirs." (Turretin, 20.6.XX).
“Meritorious cause” here has in mind the same kind of causality as above (a geometric proportion relating to right). So he can speak of a (condignly) demeritorious cause in sinners and also deny a (condignly) meritorious cause in our works. In fact he even specifies that our works are rewarded with eternal life out of “the justice of fidelity” (again exactly what infallible congruent merit is) rather than “distributive justice properly so called” (which has to do with geometric condign merit); cf. XIII.
Thus Turretin concludes that while Adam's works (would have) earned a right to a reward and thereby would have been made proportionate to a reward in justice (that is, that his works would have been condignly meritorious), our works do not earn a right to eternal life or even the degree of that eternal life, although God promises this reward to them (that is, they are congruent).
Finally it is worth quoting the excellent words of the learned Stephen Lobb, who made the exact point I am making here 300 years before I did:
Thus to make good Works meritorious, they [the Papists] assert a Law, with a Promise; making the Dignity of the Work to lean on the Promise: And that the Reward may be Due ex ju∣stitia, the Law is turn'd into a Covenant, where Obedience to the Preceptive Part is made the Condition, that giveth Right to the Reward. So that it is that Conditionality of the Covenant, on which the Merit of Condignity is Founded. All which is undoubtedly true of the Covenant given Adam. For if he had but rendred the Perfect Obedience required by the Preceptive Part of the Law; or, which is the same, if he had Perform'd the Condition of that Covenant made with him; it would have given him a Right to the Reward, it would have been in Justice due to him, that is, he would have merited it Ex Condigno.
Tho' his Temporary Obedience fell infinitely short of the Reward of Eternal Life; yet be∣cause of the Promise made on a Covenant-Condition, giving Right; the Reward, on his performing the Condition, would have been Due to him ex justitia (i. e.) he would have merited it Ex Condigno.
In like manner, if the word [Condition] when assign'd to the Covenant of Grace, be taken in this sense, viz. for that thing, which, being Perform'd, gives Right to the Reward, the Covenant of Grace is Confounded with that of Works, and Merit of Condignity effectually established.
'Tis Confounded with the Covenant of Works, and made a Covenant of the same kind with it, for in both, as there is a Precept enjoyning Duty, and a Promise of Reward; even so, notwithstanding the Work falls infinitely short of the Reward,yet the Reward being Promised on a Condition, giving Right; A Right unto it Results from the Performance of the Condition,and the Reward is due ex justitia, and so Merit of Condignity is also established.
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A48865.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext pg 76 and surrounding.
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