[As of 5/23/22 I have chosen from here on out not to refer to myself as a "general equity theonomist". I originally took the term to myself in an effort to give clarity to others regarding what my beliefs are, without actually liking the term myself. I agreed with many theonomist conclusions but could in no other way claim the title for myself and didn't want to. I now prefer the "Confessional Baptist" position, but I did not use the term since most associate this with Escondido and Tom Hicks' ahistorical view of general equity. I have decided that I should not give ground to historical revisionists in this way. My position IS the Confessional Baptist position. All other are fake. I will die on this hill. And as of at least 6-15-2022, I have adopted the view that the civil magistrate is in fact bound to punish 1st-table offenses. I believe there is some controversy over how this is to exactly work out among the Reformed, but I largely follow Turretin, Junius and Piscator with exception to the Sabbath, which I believe to have been purely ceremonial. Also apostasy in and of itself must not be punished and heresy must be carefully defined so that all Christian denominations are allowed (see here https://twitter.com/brandoncorley99/status/1531810854320017408?s=21&t=J9yrdwe_4s4-flp4zSZILw Blackwood's treaty as a whole, which Ive read through a few times is somehwhat confusing as to what exactly he is advocating for and I question whether it is consistent with itself; and Im not the only one who thinks this, see pg. 966 here: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3020858.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af5f05711be66429487803e3bd6c673c3&ab_segments=&origin= but I think his main concern, being a Baptist, was to prevent orthodox Christians who disagree on certain matters from being charged with heresy and punished, which certainly I would absolutely and strongly agree with. I think a more well thought out and consistent system is already found in Reformers like Turretin and Junius, which it would seem Baptists like John Tombes agreed with, although himself being more of an antipaedobaptist) I think that punishment-wise, John Cotton's laws are near perfect (https://reformed.org/ethics/an-abstract-of-the-laws-of-new-england-as-they-are-now-established-by-john-cotton/), just with exception to punishing for the Sababth and I don't think forcing of a maid must absolutely not be punished with death, but perhaps it is safer that it is not.]
[Edit: Since writing this post, as a result of reading this: https://twitter.com/theonomytweets/status/1518687700156653570?s=21&t=U5ZVBSWFG0tmqPsRC7HFfA I have realized that I myself may have absorbed misrepresentations of theonomy from reading/listening to Tom Hicks. I realize that I may be agreeing with Hicks when he is presenting strawmen and I may not know it. If you are a theonomist reading this, I ask that you point out where I have done this]
I have presented my take on what I choose to call, “general-equity theonomy” before on this site here: https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/of-the-sabbath-general-equity-and-theonomy. In the article, we noted that while we agreed with everything Tom Hicks had to say in his post on the CBTS website about “general-equity theonomy” (the absolute equation of the moral law with the decalogue aside, as we saw that I part ways with the 1689 on that point, but this is a different issue), we still choose to continue to use the name (though I'm not exactly militant about it). Now, Theonomy itself is a denial of two-kingdom theology tied to postmillennialism that seeks to derive judicial laws directly from the Mosaic Law. In contrast, I hold to a two-kingdom theology that derives judicial law from the natural law (which is epistemologically corrected through the Mosaic Law). I use the term "general equity theonomy" to show my principles ("general equity", i.e. the natural law), and my conclusions (natural law demands execution of murderers, sodomites, adulterers, manstealers, etc., which for some reason has sadly come to be associated specifically with "theonomy"). In reality "GE-Theonomy" is an oxymoron for the aforementioned reasons, but I use the term as I believe it best reflects my position and the Confessional position of penal law. In this post, I want to offer a short critique of another of Tom Hicks’ articles on theonomy, namely, “Why Is Theonomy Unbiblical?”. It should be noted that Hicks is dealing with classical theonomy in this article, so I will agree with much of his assessment, as we will see. However, we will also see that when Hicks’ critique also touches upon the position of “general-equity theonomy”, he falls short in both his logic and in the historicity of his position. It seems to me that most criticisms of Theonomy today end up critiquing far more than Theonomy and end up denying the Reformed and Confessional view of general equity, which is a strange and very dangerous antinomian development. We will comment on each of Hicks’ reasons that he mentions in his article one-by-one.
1. Theonomy has a flawed hermeneutic of Old Testament priority.
On this, we are absolutely and completely in agreement.
2. Theonomy does not account for the fact that Gentile nations are not and never were under the Old Covenant.
We agree that “The laws peculiar to the Old Covenant do not bind Gentile nations. Gentile nations are under natural law, which is the work of the moral law written on the hearts of all human beings”. However, as we will see, more nuance is required here because some laws of the Old Covenant must necessarily be penalized in a certain way throughout all time by virtue of the moral law (the death penalty for murder, for example).
3. Theonomy doesn’t properly account for the fact that the Old Covenant as a whole, together with all of its laws, has been abolished.
We are again in absolute and complete agreement.
4. Theonomy doesn’t acknowledge the existence of positive law in contrast to moral or natural law.
I essentially agree, but I feel this may be too unfair to theonomists to charge them with having absolutely no concept of positive law in contrast to moral law. Any theonomist will be able to distinguish between the positive prohibition given to Adam and the eternal moral law. The argumentation here is too simplistic and easily refuted and thus not contributive to actual conversation. Hicks has consistently proved himself to be unable to fairly and accurately represent Theonomists. I am afraid that even I have done so, and so I apologize if this is so. As an aside, to be honest, I don't even know what it would even mean for someone to deny natural law (as some theonomists have been accused of or have themselves professed) and I don't believe anyone actually consistently does anymore than I believe people legitimately and consistently can deny natural theology.
5. Theonomy does not account for the fact that the judicial laws of Israel were only to be practiced in the land of Canaan.
Agreed. The judicial laws of Israel have “expired together with the state of that people, not obliging any now by virtue of that institution; their general equity only being of moral use”. As we will see next, however, Hicks does not understand that last phrase as the Reformers did.
6. Theonomy misunderstands the reason for the death penalties in Old Covenant judicial law.
Here’s where the rubber meets the road and we start seeing conflation on Hicks’ part. Hicks is correct that the death penalties of the Old Covenant were related to Israel’s role as a covenant nation; no baptist who takes the title of “general-equity theonomist” denies this (at least none who are very well versed in biblical theology and typology, as I acknowledge myself to be as a simple statement of fact and nothing of boasting on my part). Certainly, the death penalties hold typological and redemptive-historical significance. However, to then argue that “therefore, it would be unjust to apply Old Covenant death penalties in a Gentile nation”, does not follow (non sequitur) because some penalties are based on eternal moral principles, even while holding typological significance. To limit the OT penalties simply to positive redemptive-historical law without realizing that they also reveal natural, moral law, is to fall prey to a biblicist hermeneutic that does not look for deeper ethical/metaphysical truths revealed within the biblical covenants themselves and is contrary to the Reformers' emphasis on the noetic effects of sin by which we know what the natural law demands being combatted by Mosaic legislation. Hicks recognizes this in the case of the death penalty for murder at the start of this paragraph when he says that “The death penalty for murder is part of universal moral law”. To this the general-equity theonomist will say "amen and amen" and then tell you this is also so for adultery, sodomy, man-stealing, and so forth. You just need to apply the same logic. The typological and covenantal function and importance of the death penalty for murder does not do away with the requirement to impose it for murder across all time and places because such a penalty is grounded in the universal moral, natural law. It would not, therefore, be unjust to apply the death penalty for murder on a Gentile nation for that very reason. This argument, therefore, does not show that any penalty necessarily does not still apply (as we assert that the death penalties for such crimes as we advocate to be punished are rooted in the universal moral law). Some penalties must inherently be attached to the crime due to the very nature of such things (adultery, murder, sodomy, man-stealing, disobedience to parents all deserve the death penalty by virtue of natural law). These are moral infractions, the general equity of the punishments of which are universally applicable across all times and cultures. If there is any disagreement about what the natural law teaches, we must go to the Mosaic Law to correct the noetic effects of sin, since in the Mosaic Law alone is a perfect human law found. If Hicks disagrees, he needs to make a positive argument for what the punishments for these crimes should be, why that is, and how he knows; I guarantee you I could eat him and anyone else alive on this point.
7. Theonomy does not account for the fact that the Old Covenant law was intentionally severe to preserve the line of promise.
My above comments apply here as well, but I do want to recognize that this is a very strange statement at the heart of it. Is the death penalty for——And, I will use only the examples of "second table" offenses here——rebellious sons, adultery, and sodomy “severe”? Certainly, I suppose there’s a sense in which you could use the word “severe” in relation to, say, the death penalty for murder for example, but the “severity” of the punishment is not the issue. The issue is lex talionis; the severe punishment matches the severe crime. The death penalty is the minimum in such cases by virtue of the nature of justice. I would submit to you that one who does not see the death penalty as the appropriate penalty in regards to persistent disobedience to parents, adultery, sodomy, pedophilia, bestiality, etc. has not nearly at all rightly considered the heinousness of such things.
8. In each case, when the New Testament applies one of the judicial laws of the Old Covenant, it applies the law’s general equity to the church, and never to the government of a Gentile nation.
And here is where the conflation and ahistoricity of Hicks’ position reaches its zenith. The problem with this argument is that if it is successful, it proves too much. Whereas Hicks' argument on point 6 is underbaked, this one is overbaked. We saw a version of this argument in my original post when we considered Tom Schreiner’s words in “40 Questions about the Law”. I will simply paste in my old words here:
Let us use an example to illustrate. Schreiner in his book on 40 Questions about the Law, argues, rightly, that we are not under the entirety of the Mosaic Covenant. Therefore, none of the prescribed penalties necessary apply to any given crime. However, he then argues based on 1 Corinthians 5:13, that the punishment for sexual immorality is excommunication, not the death penalty. This, however, fails to rightly apply the general moral equity of the laws against sexual morality to the government, as excommunication is only the prescribed penalty for the Church. In other words, it is fallacious to similarly argue that the correct penalty under the New Covenant for murder is simply excommunication since this is what the Church is to do in response to such an action. The question here does not regard the Church, the question regards the civil government. A civil government must punish evil doers in order to remain just. This is not the job of the Church. It is an absolute mistake to argue that the government should not execute murderers because the Church is only to excommunicate them just as much as it is a mistake to argue that the government should not execute the sexually immoral because the Church is only to excommunicate them. Such an argument is a simple category error. General equity does not mean the same thing when applied to the church as it does when applied to the civil government. A government must bring justice to evildoers; to punish all those who commit crimes against the natural law, the civil order, and the common good of society. The argument from Hicks and Schreiner ends up collapsing the two kingdoms into one, creating a form of one-kingdom ecclesiastical antinomian Theonomy in which moral infractions against our fellow man can only be punished by church discipline.
As one writer says, "modern Reformed pietists use the term equity to empty the law of its contemporary political application, a usage that is technically and historically incorrect and anachronistic" (https://www.kuyper.org/questions-content/2016/12/13/the-westminster-confession-of-faith-and-the-equity-of-the-judicial-law) much as I love Dr. Schreiner, he has fallen prey to this error.
As far as historicity goes, consider Thomas Cartwright and Peter Martyr Vermigli (and, implicitly, Aquinas, seeing how he responds to obj. 4 here) both of whom argued for the death penalty in a civil context for adultery on the basis of natural law, to which we can add Martin Luther, John Calvin, Theodore Beza, Ulrich Zwingli, Franciscus Junius, William Ames. Johannes Piscator, John Knox, Martin Bucer, Heinrich Bullinger, William Perkins, Samuel Rutherford, George Gillespie, John Downame, Henry Barrow, and possibly John Gill and St. Patrick of Ireland (and for what it's worth, this isn't anything near merely a Christian distinctive, but has been practiced by plenty of ancient pagan societies along with the death penalty for many other crimes we have already mentioned, even down to our modern day). This is because the Reformers never meant by “their general equity only being of moral use”, that the general equity of a Mosaic law only applied in matters of Christian practice in the Church. They rightly understood that the general equity of a Mosaic law is rooted in eternal, natural law, and therefore has implications for all men, and this includes the moral principles by which a human government either rightly or wrongly decides upon just and unjust laws for a society. All nations are subject to God, not only naturally due to His moral law, but also covenantally due to the Noahic Covenant, and as such must conform their laws to His. The Mosaic Law is indispensable to determining exactly what His natural law calls in civil government. This was the unanimous teaching of the Reformed. When dispute arises as to what natural law is, we must go to Scripture to epistemologically clear up the subjective distortion of natural revelation that has occurred through the noetic effects of sin. While the light of nature testifies to everyone, our consciences have been seared by culture and by sin. Thus, while to some that the natural law demands the death penalty for adultery, for example, might be perfectly clear (as it has always been to me and as it was to many Reformers and Puritans), it is sadly not clear to others due to a seared conscience and sinful repression. Thus, to truly figure out what the natural law calls for, we need to return to Scripture, for grace perfects nature. The Old Covenant Law is done away with in whole. It was completely typological and every aspect of it was typological. However, it still functions as Scripture by which our misguided apprehension of the law of nature is corrected. Thus, while one correctly argues that we are not under the Mosaic Law to punish adulterers by virtue of that institution because it was typical, the Mosaic Law still reveals the ethical norm that the natural law calls for the death penalty for adulterers in the same way it does so for murder. Such a moral crime against nature must always be punished in the same way because the natural law does not change in these instances as they are applicable to all nations and times.
9. To sum up, theonomy’s central mistake is believing that God gave the judicial law of Israel as a universal norm of societal justice for all nations.
On this, we’re in complete agreement again.
The last thing I'd say here to the interested reader is just to go back and actually read the Reformers when they wrote on general equity and the civil government/penalties. Pick up Junius' "The Mosaic Polity" or, for a good example of how this would practically work out (again with exception to the "first-table infractions" of apostasy, blasphemy, heresy, sabbath; sadly, Roger Williams, who seems to me, as a whole, more liberal than others in his time, going against natural law and making an argument similar to Hicks' point 6, opposed the death penalty for adultery, but he is good on religious liberty. This is not to say, of course, that all Williams' arguments are sound. Rutherford rightly called out many as logically fallacious and showed they would lead to anabaptism if taken to their logical conclusions. A much better source from a more confessional baptist is Isaac Backus, though I disagree strongly with his support for the American Revolution) see here: https://reformed.org/ethics/an-abstract-of-the-laws-of-new-england-as-they-are-now-established-by-john-cotton/ . These men are with me so closely, that I might as well just commend them to you and ask you to stop reading this post and go read them. Forget me, I'm just some kid who loves the Bible, go learn from them.
Now, though baptists would differ from the paedobaptist Reformers in that we recognize the Kingdom of Christ is the Church alone, regulated by the New Covenant, and the Kingdom of Common Grace belongs to all men, regulated by the Noahic Covenant and would thus believe the Church has no authority over human government, but each has authority in its own sphere, and all men in the realm of common grace should have religious liberty, we differ with them only with regards to applying the general equity of what has been called "first-table" commands (i.e. commands relating to religion and the worship of God). However, in all other points, the particular baptist may absolutely refer to the works of the paedobaptist Reformers such as Junius (and the many other people we listed under point 8, some of whom helped write the Westminster Confession) because the 1689 is in complete agreement with the Westminster on the point of general equity otherwise. So, for example, while we may disagree with the paedobaptist Reformers that we should execute blasphemers and heretics, we should absolutely agree with them that we should execute adulterers and murderers, as we have seen (in response to point 8) a strand of great Reformers and Puritans, whose theology stands behind Westminster, and therefore also the 1689 at this point, agree on.
Also highly recommend (former-Baptist) Jared Longshore's article here: https://founders.org/2020/09/17/israels-old-testament-judicial-laws-can-help-america/ and Craig Carter here: https://craigacarter.substack.com/p/what-is-christendom?r=ba6cf&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&utm_source=twitter&s=r
*One thing I would slightly differ from Junius, and other Reformed scholastics who wrote on natural law (other than the whole religious penalties thing), on is that I wouldn't sharply distinguish between the principles and conclusions that exist in common notions (so for example, some would argue all men have in common the principle that God exists, but the conclusion that we should worship Him is not common to all. I would say that the notion that we should worship God is common to all, regardless, so I'd classify that as a principle Edit: I think I was mislead on this point. Stephen Wolfe clarifies that the conclusion that we should worship God is universal, and I can agree with separating principles from conclusions as along as the conclusion is universally know; but this is besides my point here, which is that I don't think the principle-conclusion classification is totally sufficient itself). I'd agree with John Frame that it is hard to draw a sharp distinction between meaning and application. The refusal to sharply divide meaning and application also applies to the area of hermeneutics (cf. typology is not simply an "application" of a text, but is itself divinely embedded meaning) as well as to the scholastic distinction in natural law between principles and their reasoned-out conclusions (cf. The Mosaic Polity), as I am applying it here; such a distinction may be somewhat helpful even as the distinction between "meaning" and "application" in dealing with typology may be of some use, but ultimately, I don't believe such a sharp distinction can be made. An application, if it is to be a legitimate application, must in some sense already be embedded in the meaning.