Soon, I wish to come out with something explaining the nature of Reformed thought on nature, grace, and the image of God in more detail, but for now, I want to make some observations about the way in which Thomas Aquinas in comparison to Franciscus Junius seeks to answer the question "whether man was created in grace" and what this reveals about more fundamental underlying assumptions that the two have and differ on.
When Thomas Aquinas seeks to answer this question (https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1095.htm#article1), we need to pay very close attention to the reasoning that he gives for an affirmative answer:
I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.
For Thomas, it must be said that man was created in grace because "the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace." The thought is rather straightforward: Thomas sees rectitude in man's original state and concludes from that that man must have been created in grace. The reason for this is because, according to Thomas, this rectitude (which consists of "his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul") is "not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin". The implication here is, of course, that man in a state of pure nature, without any grace, lacks rectitude.
That this rectitude is not natural man is seen too in Thomas's De Malo, Question V, in which Thomas argues that: "in addition to this necessary help, human beings needed another supernatural help because of their composite nature. For human beings are composed of soul and body, and of an intellectual and a sensory nature. And if the body and the senses be left to their nature, as it were, they burden and hinder the intellect from being able to freely attain the highest reaches of contemplation. And this help was original justice, by which the mind of human beings would be so subject to God that their lower powers and their very bodies would be completely subject to them..."
Again we see that this rectitude is equated with the supernatural gift of grace. It is not from his nature that man has rectitude, but from grace. The result of this, is that such habitual concupiscence is natural to man. Compare this way of thinking to that of Franciscus Junius (from Reformed Thought on Freedom, 102-103):
32. Furthermore, this principle in the creation being right, holy, not contaminated by any stain of inordinate desires, voluntary followed the judgment of the intellect (which could not be deceived because of the innate light of truth), in such a way that under its guidance, both angels and mankind, in accordance with the order that is congruent to their nature and in an intelligent way, were willing the ends and the objects shown by reason, and performed them by acting: although the angels acted in a more excellent way than mankind, because of the excellence and simplicity of their nature.
33. For in man, even before the Fall, the intellect could not raise itself by transcending the natural limits to supernatural knowledge, nor could the will apprehend those things, except supported and sustained by supernatural help.
34. For this reason, to this particular principle of his nature was added (superadditus) a singular principle of grace for Adam, by which his intellective will was acting, singularly moved, above its natural mode. Hence, those words of Genesis 2:23 announced by that prophetic spirit: "This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Hence also in the same place, verse 20, the imposing of names to every single animal and many other things, which the intellect would never have been able to exert by its own insight or by the powers of its natural will.
What should stand out as the first significant difference between Junius and Thomas is that in thesis 32, Junius places rectitude in the nature of man even before a "principle of grace" is superadded to Adam in thesis 34. The superadded gift of grace does not give Adam his rectitude as it does for Thomas. This is already given to Adam from his nature. in other words, original righteousness is, for Junius, natural to Adam. The superadded principle of grace raises Adam above his nature and orients him to the beatific vision, but it does not grant to him a rectitude that he naturally lacks.
There is precedent for this view in the thought of Henry of Ghent. Speaking of his view, Richard Cross writes, "In the middle ages, Henry of Ghent defends the extreme Augustinian line. He holds that the prelapsarian state of original justice is natural, and that its loss is transmitted as a physical defect. Henry characterizes original justice as the 'natural rectitude' of the will, something like a natural quality belonging to the will. Henry, expanding on an Augustinian image, likens the will to a line. The will naturally has natural rectitude in the same way as a line is naturally straight; the will can, however, just like a line, curve in on itself and lose its natural rectitude. By calling this quality 'natural', Henry makes it clear that it is the sort of quality that the will has unless prevented. Henry also believes that the effect of this natural justice is to allow the will to dominate the lower sense appetites." (Duns Scotus).
In his Quodlibet VI, Q. 11, Henry writes about this original righteousness, that:
Such rectitude is indeed something beyond the substance and essence of the will—otherwise, the will could not lose it. It is like a quality in a spiritual quantity, just as straightness in a line is a quality in a bodily quantity, and curvature is preternatural. In a growing plant, for example, straightness is natural because all naturally grow upward, while curvature is preternatural. (ChatGPT translation).
Rectitude is a quality of man's will in his natural state, but it is not a quality of man qua man such that were man to loose this quality he would cease to be man. Ghent's argument is very reminiscent of Turretin's:
So far is the inferior part of the soul from contending of itself with the superior that on the contrary (according to the Philosopher), it was born to obey (peitharchein pephyke) and is naturally subordinated to it (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 10.9.4 [Loeb, 628–29]). The propensions of both can be diverse, but not contrary in themselves (rather only accidentally on account of sin). Man could be carried naturally towards both sensible and spiritual good, but in their own order and without a rebellion between the flesh and the spirit. Thus the soul would always hold dominion and the flesh obey and subject all its own motions and inclinations to it. The sensible good is contained in the intelligible good and the object of the sensitive appetite stands related to the object of the natural (as the means to the end). Therefore, as long as man regarded the sensible good as the means, there was no vice in him. But when departing from God, he began to be drawn to the object of the sensitive appetite as his ultimate end and highest good (which was effected by sin). At length, the disorder (ataxia) arose which disturbed the order constituted by God. Therefore, we must accurately distinguish here the appetite (which was natural and ordinate) from that which was preternatural and inordinate. The latter is repugnant to reason, but not equally the former. - IET 5.11.15
Original righteousness is not constitutively natural so that man, loosing it, ceases to be man, but it nevertheless is a sort of natural quality due to man in the state of pure nature so that the lack of it ought to be seen as preternatural rather than natural.
Interestingly, Junius takes the same principle that Thomas uses to conclude that original righteousness was supernatural (that naturals remain, while supernaturals are lost) and uses it to prove the opposite:
The principle is the image of God, which is the same, whether old or new, and purified from corruption. The acts or habits, inwrought by that principle, are righteousness, holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness, and truth are not the image, but pertain to the image. Let us return, if you please, to that principle, which the Fathers laid down "natural things are corrupt, supernatural things are removed." You may certainly, hence, deduce with ease this conclusion; -- righteousness, holiness and truth are not removed, therefore, they are not supernatural. Again, they have become corrupt, therefore, they are natural. If they had been removed, none of their elementary principles would exist in us by nature. But they do exist; therefore, they are by nature, and are themselves corrupt, and, with them, whatever originates in them. (https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xii.html)
In other words, since we still see a natural inclination toward righteousness, toward rectitude, we can conclude that righteousness and rectitude are natural to man. To carry on Henry’s analogy, even while curved, the line is oriented to straightness and this ought to let us know that, naturally, the line ought to be straight. Original righteousness, rectitude, has formally been lost. But because some it’s elementary principles remain, we may conclude that it was natural to man.
The result of this, as it relates to our question, is that for Junius it ultimately does not matter whether or not man was created in grace because he would have had a natural rectitude in any case by virtue of it being a quality of man's will in a state of pure nature (again, note that this is different from saying it is a quality of man qua man). Grace is only necessary upon the supposition that God begins to lead Adam on toward a supernatural end. Thus there is no issue with holding that it may possibly be the case that Adam was not literally created in grace at the very first moment of his existence. Thus Junius says in reply to Arminius,
Your antecedent, namely, "Adam and in him all men were created in a state of supernatural grace," is ambiguous. Again, it can not be proved, as we have shown, in answer to the tenth proposition.
And his reason for this:
Now, I come to the particular members of your Proposition. First, you affirm, "that no man was ever created in a merely natural state." If you mean that he was created without supernatural endowments, I do not see how this can be proved, (though many make this assertion). The Scripture does not any where make this statement. But you are not ignorant that it is said in the schools, that a negative argument from authority, as, "it is not written, therefore, it is not true" is not valid. Again, the order of creation, in a certain respect, proves the contrary, since the body was first made from the dust, and afterwards the soul was breathed into it. Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the moment of its creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or that they were superadded after its creation? I would rather affirm that, as the soul was added to the body, so the supernatural endowments were added to the soul. If God did this in relation to nature, why may He not have done it, in the case of grace, which is more peculiar.
Thus we can see how the difference between the answers given to this question by Thomas and by Junius reveal the differences between their two positions. Junius would look at Thomas's argument, that "there is integrity, therefore, grace" and find such reasoning repugnant, as he holds that integrity is a part of man's pure nature. Because of this, Junius does not need to say, as Thomas does to account for man's "uprightness", that man was created in grace in the very first moment of his creation. Indeed, he prefers to say, with the Franciscans, that the soul of Adam was infused with superadded grace only after his soul was created and not along with it, so that Adam was created, if only for a moment, in a state of pure nature. (I might add that this is precisely what we see in Genesis, as Adam is created outside the garden before being placed in covenant with God inside the garden).
I hope that is at least helpful in getting us started in thinking about a distinctly Reformed conception of nature, grace, and the image of God. It seems to me that the most important thing that the Reformed are going to want to emphasize here is the naturalness of original righteousness and rectitude so that the habit of concupiscence and any deviation at all from this inherent and natural rectitude may be rightly seen, with Augustine, as sin, whereas for Thomas such is only the matter of sin and may lead to it. There is still much to be written on this topic. For now, I highly recommend Jordan Ballor's chapter on Junius in Beyond Dordt (especially the end of it), which I think also helpfully highlights how the concept of pure nature is crucial to understanding the ordering of the decrees of God in predestination, as well as Seung Joo Lee's PhD thesis (see especially pages 57-58) both of which have been very helpful in my thinking here.
I take Junius's position not only to be correct, but also to be the dominant position among the Reformed, as I will try to prove in later posts. I cannot yet solidly prove it, but it seems to me that a minority of the later 17th-century Reformed theologians took a Jansenist approach here. At the very least, Richard Field (see here and here) was an adherent to this view, as it seems so was Theophilus Gale (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A41769.0001.001?view=toc) and possibly even John Owen. The Jansenist approach denies the category of pure nature as something that could exist because it views grace as due to man in the state of innocence so that without it, man would be in sin. Henri de Lubac is, in my estimation, something of a modern proponent of the Jansenist view, as Lawrence Feingold has indicated. I view this as a fundamentally incorrect approach, although I cannot argue that here. Whereas the Jansenist view falls prey to implicit Pelagianism in affirming the beatific vision as man's natural end and Thomas's position still does not account for the sinfulness of the very privation of rectitude in man, I contend that Junius paves a third and better way, affirming rectitude as a natural due to man, while also holding to a superadded gift given to raise man above his natural end and to a supernatural one. Later theologians who, with clarity, continue Junius's thought include Stephen Charnock, Johann Gerhard, Daniel Tilenus, and (with some differences in matters of fact) Thomas Goodwin.
Addendum on primary first motions: The original version of this post argued that Thomas disagrees with the Reformed on primary first motions, the Reformed holding them to be sinful and Thomas holding them to be sinless. After discussing this with others, it seems Thomas uses "primary first motions" to refer to the faculty of desire (e.g. hunger or sexual desire) without regard to any object or excess and thus without regard to sin. If this is what it is meant, it may be consistent with the Reformed. I believe what is happening is that the Reformed are following Henry of Ghent’s take on primary first motions and using the temrinology accordingly. If Ghent and Thomas may be reconciled on primary first motions, then the Reformed and Thomas might be as well. As to whether that can actually happen, I must do more research to determine. Here is Ghent, who seems to be consistent with the Reformed who say that primary first motions are sins (such as Van Mastricht, Turretin, Voetius, Rutherford):
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