Francis Turretin's Refutation of Supralapsarianism from Nature/Grace

I have mentioned a couple times in the past that the primary reason that I favor infralapsarianism is due to Turretin's argument against supralapsarianism on the basis that it confounds the orders of nature and grace. It seems to me that this point in Turretin has not been sufficiently understood and appreciated because the nature/grace discussion itself has not been sufficiently understood and appreciated until very recently. Yesterday as I was on a flight, I decided to write up this post in order to outline Turretin's argument here. I hope to be able to expand on this in my own words in the future, but for now, I hope that it is helpful to draw attention to Turretin's own thinking on this issue.

First, it is important to define some terms.

Turretin says that predestination can be taken in 3 senses:

(1) More widely for every decree of God about creatures and most especially about intelligent creatures in order to their ultimate end. Thus it is frequently employed by the fathers for providence itself. (2) More specially for the counsel of God concerning men as fallen either to be saved by grace or to be damned by justice (which is commonly called "election" and "reprobation"). (3) Most specially for the decree of election, which is called "the predestination of the saints." Again according to the latter, it can be taken in two senses: not only for the destination to the end, but particularly for the "destination to the means" (in which sense it is used by Paul when he says that God predestinated those whom he foreknew to be "conformed to the image of his Son," Rom. 8:29, 30). Here it is plain that predestination is distinguished from foreknowledge and refers most especially to the means, not to the end.

For our purposes, the third sense is relevant here. What is important to see here is that predestination deals with the means, not only the end, which is referred to foreknowledge.

Election on the other hand is taken properly for the election to eternal salvation (viz., for the counsel of God by which he decreed to pity some from grace and to save them, being freed from sin by his Son). Formally, this may be considered either in the antecedent decree (as it was made from eternity) or in the subsequent execution (as it takes place only in time by calling).

Reprobation strictly taken is the decree of deserting in the fall and of condemning them on account of it. Thus, taken properly, reprobation is a consequence of sin. Widely taken, it is the decree of not preserving from the fall and of permitting it. “Hence the fall in time was not the means of executing reprobation, but it was the condition required in the object (on which reprobation followed, both as to desertion in the fall and as to damnation).”

In understanding Turretin’s argument, it is important to start with his comments on the predestination of the elect angels because one might reason that their predestination was necessarily supralapsarian since they never fell into sin (referring to this as supralapsarian is already improper given the fact there was never a lapse for them, but I digress).

Now, regarding the angels, Turretin says:

Angels were considered by God [in predestination] as unequal. For those who are elect among them are regarded as standing by God's grace, whereas those who are reprobate are viewed as having fallen by their own fault [I have provided a better translation of this phrase here]. Liability to fall was indeed common to ail, but they could not be reprobated on account of it. Otherwise all would have been reprobated because this was a state of pure nature; but they were reprobated on account of the fall (which was a state of corrupt nature) and so justly reprobable.

Let us say something of bath parts of the predestination of angels. First there is the election of the good angels, consisting of two acts: preservation from falling or confirmation in good; and destination to supernatural life and happiness (both of which appear from the event). Since some of them kept their first estate and were confirmed in good (so that they always do behold the face of the Father, Mt. 18:10), it cannot be doubted that this depended upon election, since it could not arise from that nature which was common to all from the creation (for common things afford no room for a difference). In the meantime, the grace or virtue by which the good angels stood until their confirmation and the fall of the others, must be distinguished from the confirming grace which was the first benefit of election. For as long as they stood (before they were confirmed), they stood by that strength which they had received at their creation and which was concreated with them (by which the evil angels also stood until their fall). But when they were confirmed, not only that they should not fall, but that they should be no more capable of falling, this flowed from election, which separated them from the others. Before, they had the help sine quo non, which sufficed for them to stand if they willed. Through election, they had the help by which they could actually and immutably stand (in virtue of which they were transferred from a state of liability to an immutable state of happiness and glory incapable of being lost).

Now, although it is true that all of the angels were in a state of grace prior to the fall, what matters as far as election is concerned is the confirming grace by which the elect ones stood. This being the first benefit of their election, it follows the elect angels were predestined out of their previous state of grace while the others were passed by. “The election of some being supposed, the preterition of others follows. By this he not only was unwilling to confirm them in good, but decreed to permit their sin.”

When Turretin comes to the question of the object of predestination as it regards men, he notes 3 general positions:

The opinions of theologians can be reduced to three classes. Some ascend beyond the fall (supra lapsum) and are hence called supralapsarians. They think that the object of predestination was man either not as yet created or at least not yet fallen. Others descend below the fall (infra lapsum) and hold that man not only as fallen, but also as redeemed through Christ (and either believing or unbelieving) was the object of predestination. Others, holding a middle ground, stop in the fall (in lapsu) and maintain that man as fallen was considered by God predestinating. We will treat the second opinion later; now we will examine the first and third.

Notably, Turretin does not identify his own position as infralapsarian. He refers to refer to it as inlapsarian because the third position, which he calls infralapsarian, he identifies with Arminianism:

Besides these two opinions about the object of predestination, there is a third held by those who maintain that not only man as fallen and corrupted by sin, but men also as redeemed by Christ (and either believing or disbelieving in him) was considered by God predestinating. This was the opinion of the semi-Pelagians and is now held by the Arminians and all those who maintain that Christ is the foundation of election, and foreseen faith its cause (or, at least, the preceding condition). But because this question is involved in that which will come up hereafter (concerning the foundation and impulsive cause of election), we add nothing about it now. For if it can once be proved that neither Christ nor faith precede election, but are included in it as a means and effects, by that very thing it will be demonstrated that man as redeemed and, as believing or unbelieving, cannot be the object of predestination.

In the Arminian position, the object of predestination is man as redeemed by Christ such that being redeemed is the cause of election.

Now, the reason this is important is because, as Turretin will go on to argue, “For from what mass in time God calls a man [the reason being this calling is the start of the means of salvation] the same he elected him from eternity. The kind of man that was considered by him in the execution of the decree, such he ought to be considered by him in the decree itself…From this, it may be gathered that man as a sinner was elected because he is called as such.” Thus, when we come to the angels, the elect angels were elected out of the state of grace they were previously in to receive confirming grace. This is important to note as a preliminary in order to see the coherency of Turretin’s position on the predestination of men lest one accuse him of inconsistency as though he accuses supralapsarians of mixing nature and grace while at the same time holding to a supralapsarian view of angelic predestination. The angels were elected out of their previous state but with regard to their standing by the grace of God as a consequent condition or quality in them.

[As an aside also keep in mind that although the object of predestination is determined to be man as fallen, it does not follow that predestination is made only in time. Fallen man is understood as to his known and foreseen being, not as to his real being. Also the prescience of the fall and its permissive decree is no less eternal than the predestination itself.]

Now, regarding the predestination of men, Turretin notes that:

Not without warrant, a reconciliation of this double opinion is attempted by some from the broader or stricter use of the word "predestination.” By the former, it is taken generally for every decree of God about man in order to his ultimate end (in which sense it undoubtedly embraces the decree concerning the creation of man and the permission of his fall). By the latter, it is taken specially for God's counsel concerning the salvation of men from his mercy and their damnation from his justice (in which manner it is resolved into election and reprobation and has for its object man as fallen).

Yet Turretin notes that the former use “confounds the works of nature and grace, the order of creation and redemption.” Why does he argue this? The reason is because, as we have seen, predestination in the stricter and most proper use of the term is about the means. This is the foundation of Turretin’s ultimate argument against supralapsarianism.

In predestination, we are directly dealing with a question of means—of something which has a necessary connection to the end—and not merely with a question of quality or condition. Thus Turretin argues against the supralapsarians:

If predestination regards man as creatable or apt to fall, the creation and fall were the means of predestination [the reason being because predestination is about the means]; but this cannot be said with propriety. (a) The Scripture never speaks of them as such, but as the antecedent conditions while it passes from predestination to calling. (b) The mean has a necessary connection with the end, so that the mean being posited, the end ought necessarily to follow in its time. But neither the creation nor the fall has any such connection, either with election or with reprobation, for men might be created and fall and yet not be elected. (c) The means ought to be of the same order and dispensation; but the creation and fall belong to the natural order and dispensation of providence while salvation and damnation belong to the supernatural order of predestination. (d) If they were means, God entered into the counsel of saving and destroying man before he had decreed anything about his futurition and fall (which is absurd).

Points (b) and (c) are the most important here. Supralapsarianism makes things of nature means of grace, thus confounding the two orders. Turretin’s argument is powerful here because it rests on a fundamental principle accepted by all of the orthodox: that nature has no necessary connection to grace. To see this principle at work we can look, for instance, at the arguments of the orthodox against Ockham’s theory of congruent merit of the first grace. All anti-pelagians responded to Ockham here by arguing that nature has no congruency to grace. There can be no necessary connection between a work of nature and supernatural grace. Although nature is a quality or condition sine qua non of grace, it cannot be a necessary means of it. Furthermore, the end ought to assume means of the same order unto that end. But creation and the fall belong to the order of nature and not to the order of grace.

Turretin clarifies the controversy on the point regarding conditions:

Again the question is not whether in predestination the reason of sin comes into consideration. They who ascend above the fall (supra lapsum), do not deny that it is here regarded consequently, so that no one will be condemned except for sin, and no one saved who has not been miserable and lost. Rather the question is whether sin holds itself antecedently to predestination as to its being foreseen, so that man was considered by God predestinating only as fallen (which we maintain).

The question is not whether sin holds the relation of the impulsive cause with respect to predestination. For they who stop in the fall acknowledge that it cannot be called the cause, not even with respect to reprobation (because then all would be reprobated [ie being fallen doesn’t cause reprobation since some aren’t reprobate though fallen]), much less with respect to election [ie being fallen doesn’t cause election]. Rather the question is only whether it has the relation of quality or preceding condition requisite in the object. For these two differ widely: What kind of a person was predestinated; and Why or on account of what? The former marks the quality and condition of the object, while the latter indicates the cause. So the question returns to this—whether to God predestinating, man was presented not only as creatable or created (but not fallen), but also as fallen; not as to real being, but as to known and intentional being, so that although the fall was not the cause, yet it might have been the condition and quality prerequisite in the object? The learned men with whom we now treat deny this; we affirm it.

Thus,

The creation and fall are not ordered as means by themselves subordinate to the end of predestination, but are presupposed as the condition prerequisite in the object (as existence and ductility in clay are not the means which the potter strews under his purpose of preparing vessels for honor and dishonor, but only the condition or quality prerequisite in the object and the cause sine qua non). For unless man were created and fallen, it could not come into execution.

Predestination is rightly related to the orders of nature and grace like so:

After sin had corrupted and disturbed this order [of nature] entirely, God (who elicits light from darkness and good from evil) instituted the work of redemption for no other end than to display more magnificently and (as it were) in the highest degree in another order of things, the same attributes and together with them his mercy and justice. To this end the means serve, not creation (which belongs to another kind and order), not the fall (which was only the occasion and end from which God began the counsel of salvation), but the covenant of grace, the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit, redemption, calling, etc. (which belong not to the order of nature, but to the higher supernatural order of grace).

Although the creation and fall come under the decree of God and so can be said to be predestinated, the word "predestination" being taken broadly for every decree of God concerning the creature; yet no less properly does predestination taken strictly begin from the fall because in this sense the decree of creation and the fall belong to providence, not to predestination.

Again, we see that the distinction between orders entails properly ordering the ends of acts within these orders with the means to achieve them. Predestination is an act of the supernatural order. Creation and the fall can, at best, be conditions or qualities prerequisite in the subject to be predestined, but they cannot be means of predestination as the supralapsarians hold. This is also the correct way to respond to the common refrain of supralapsarians that “what is first in intention is last in execution”:

the decree of election is called the first in intention, not absolutely (as if it was the first of all the decrees in order, even before the creation and fall), but both in the class of decrees concerning the salvation of sinful man and with respect to the means subordinate to it. Second, it holds good only in the same order of things and where a necessary and essential subordination of things occurs. They, with whom we treat, do not disavow this but maintain that it only holds good in things subordinated by nature. But no necessary connection and subordination can exist between the creation and fall and redemption. Rather all must see between them rather a gap and great abyss (mega chasma) (on account of sin) which has broken up the order of creation and given place to the economy of redemption. Sin is against nature. It is not the means either with respect to salvation (unless accidentally, i.e., the occasion) or with respect to damnation (for damnation is on account of sin, not sin on account of damnation). Therefore God's ways in nature and grace, and his economies of providence and predestination must not be confounded here. Since the end is different, the means must also necessarily be so. Therefore the axiom can have place in the same order—as what is last in execution in the order of nature or of grace, is also first in intention. However it does not hold good concerning disparates where a leap is made from one dispensation to another, from the natural order of providence to the supernatural order of predestination (as is the case here).