Modern "Reformed" theology in some circles has adopted an understanding of the general equity that is quite contrary to what the Westminster Divines meant when they wrote XIX.4,
To them also, as a body politic, he gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the state of that people, not obliging any other, now, further than the general equity thereof may require. (Westminster)
To them also he gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the state of that people, not obliging any now by virtue of that institution, their general equity only being still of moral use. (Savoy)
To them also he gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the state of that people, not obliging any now by virtue of that institution; their general equity only being of moral use. (1689)
As documented here and here many moderns have understood "general equity" to be only explicating the crimes that are to be punished, but not what the punishments are to be or have even removed general equity from civil law altogether and confined it wholly to the church (thus collapsing the two-kingdoms; this is done in Kingdom Through Covenant) and completely bypassing any thoughts on how the lex talionis works and so how justice is to be proportionate. This is not, of course, what the Reformed meant by general equity (which is the natural or moral law that is written on all men's hearts and forever binds all). As these posts argue (see also here: https://reformedbooksonline.com/topics/topics-by-subject/covenant-of-grace/the-mosaic-covenant/the-civil-law/ ), the Reformerd understood the general equity of capital civil crimes to forever bind all (they bind always, but not to always, as I will explain after Junius's comments.). While the mode of execution may differ according to times and circumstances, the general equity (i.e. the moral law demanding the death penalty for such crimes), remains forever immutable in ordinary circumstances. This is very clear in men like Junius (who wrote what I consider to be the greatest treatise on civil law), Beza (who coined the term "general equity"), and Piscator (who's commentary on Exodus greatly influenced XIX.4) and I am unsure how a different interpretation could have possibly arisen except by modern revisionism.
The issue with many of those who oppose the Theonomists is not their biblical theology, which is correct, but their natural theology (which teaches that the death penalty for murder, adultery, sodomy, bestiality, kidnapping. delinquent children are demanded as the just and proportionate punishments in ordinary circumstances, as all men know from the light of nature); Escondido is incorrect in their natural, not biblical theology (and I think this is often how they err). I want to be absolutely clear on this point. My argument (and Junius') does not rest on your covenant theology. One can be anything other than a Marcionite and affirm our argument. The reason for this is because covenant theology cannot change natural law, which is the sole basis upon which the argument rests. Both Theonomists and Escondidoites miss this and end up with a deficient and sickly view of natural law.
The best expositor of this matter is Franciscus Junius. Here we have Junius clearly teaching that the general equity of capital crimes under the Mosaic Law demands the death penalty for such crimes today, though the mode of execution may vary:
Regarding Junius's final comment about exceptions, I wish to emphasize that what Junius says here is not contradictory to what he has said previously about the universal applicability of capital crimes. The reason is that such crimes ought always to be capital in ordinary circumstances. It may be said that the substance of the punishment is not actually eliminated because the law intends a different thing and thus in a way the crime is altogether a different crime with a different punishment annexed. For instance, the Puritans had a law that sodomites are to be put to death and this is the substance of the law against sodomy, but if the offender was a boy under 14, he would be whipped instead. It may then be argued that one can do this because the moral equity of the law against sodomy is intended for those who are adults. Whether such a mitigation would be legitamate, I suppose is where the debate would be. But the principle itself is no different from what we do in ecclesiology with the sacraments or with excommunication for instance (in which it is commonly affirmed that the matter of the sacraments may be switched out in extraordinary circumstances, e.g. if someone has some sort of disease that prevents them from taking it or if the materials are lacking). Or with excommunication, there are many sins for which a man ought to be excommunicated for in ordinary circumstances but it falls out that extraordinary circumstances call for a different approach when doing so would lead to greater harm. See especially William Perkins on Christian Equity. In this, Theonomists err who do not allow such a thing, and many theologians today likewise err in their ecclesiology, not taking into account greater natural considerations which change with the circumstances since the heart, soul, and form of a law is the reason of it and the reason of it may very well be non-applicable to any given circumstance since there are an infinite number of circumstances that no one law can ever adequately address.
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