I recently came across a paper arguing for "narrow complementarianism". To explain, narrow complementarianism says that men should have positions of authority within the church only, but "broad complementarianism" applies the authority of men over women more widely. I have not given much thought to this issue, so these will be preliminary comments here. I have tended to focus more on deeper theological issues than social ones, however, it has become very clear to me that social issues, really issues of human nature and morality in general, are the defining issues of our time. A proper view of nature and grace, I am convinced, is *the* most important issue of our day. I have put much time and study into the issue of natural law, but I have not focused much on gender and complementarianism specifically. At first thought, it seems to me that narrow complementarianism cannot stand. I will write out my initial thoughts on the issue shortly. However, I also want to look at some comments from John Knox's The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstruous Regiment of Women which is a very important work to look at relating to this issue. Again, I have not thought much about this issue, but I absolutely agree with Knox that it is common-sensical from the light of nature that ideally women should not hold governmental authority and public office. This I have certainly never doubted in my life. It is clearly not ideal, however, I do not know if I am yet convinced by Knox that it is simply against nature and always immoral in itself. Nevertheless, I have pulled out a section from Knox's work where he addresses the example of Deborah, which seems to me to be often brought up as a counterexample. First, some thoughts on "narrow complementarianism".
Narrow complementarianism sets nature against grace. It suggests that the leadership of men exists only in the realm of grace, ironically turning the church sexist. It does not rightly consider the inherent difference between Adam and Eve that lie behind the functional difference. It falls prey to a biblicist hermeneutic, failing to see that God established men as leaders and women as helpers. It divorces the Adamic covenant from nature, not seeing that the functions of Adam and Eve within the covenant flow out of and are grounded in their own nature. It fails to see that the grace of the New Covenant does not obliterate fallen nature, but only restores and perfects it, again divorcing covenant from nature and therefore grace from nature.
What I mean is this: narrow complementarianism sees Adam's authority over Eve as being tied solely to his liturgical function within the covenant. This liturgical function is then carried over into the New Covenant which is why men have authority over women within the church. While obviously true that Adam as King-Priest serving in a liturgical function in God's Temple provides the biblical-theological rationale for men serving in a liturgical function in the New Temple of the Church, it fails to see that the only reason it was appropriate for Adam to specifically have this role in a liturgical setting is due to his nature itself. The special covenant context (which can be called "grace" in the sense that Adam was given a chance to work for a reward beyond his nature) of the Kingdom of God that Adam was placed into does not circumvent nature. The covenant is not a part of nature, it is superadded onto it, yes, but it does not destroy nature. So for example, if it is not natural for Eve to rule over Adam, then she cannot do so in covenant either. The reason for this is because grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. Grace can never and must never be set in opposition to nature. Therefore, Adam's authority over Eve in the covenant is not *simply* limited to his liturgical and covenantal role, but rather he can only have this role because of his inherent nature…his role and function within the covenant flows out of his nature. The fact that Adam had liturgical authority over Eve, even as men have liturgical authority over women in the church, reveals something about nature itself, namely that men were made to be in positions of leadership and women were made for positions of servitude. Thus, men can lead as elders, but women can only serve as deaconesses. This is good because it is how God made men and women. The church is not some twilight-zone that operates with a distinct set of laws beyond nature (as though men have authority over women here but not elsewhere), but instead, it ought to be the one place we can find that actually operates according to the natural law.
Again, I agree with Knox that it is not ideal for women to hold public office. Isaiah 3:12 says
"O My people! Their taskmasters are infants, And women rule over them", clearly indicating that women rulers are not an ideal thing. For that reason, bringing up Deborah as a counterexample against those who believe women ought not to be in power, misses the whole thrust of the indictment against Israel that Deborah's power has in the first place. The fact that God had to use a woman judge to rule over Israel says much about their rebellion and incompetence. But how does Knox respond to the counterexample of Deborah? Knox very simply and easily uses the descriptive/prescriptive distinction in order to answer this objection.
Objections:
1. The examples of DEBORAH [Judges iv. 4] and HULDAH [2 Kings xxii 14.]
To the first, I answer, that particular examples do establishe no common lawe. The causes were knowen to God alon, why he toke the spirite of wisdome and force frome all men of those ages, and did so mightely assist women against nature, and against his ordinarie course: that the one he made a deliuerer to his afflicted people Israel: and to the other he gaue not onlie perseuerance in the true religion, when the moste parte of men had declined from the same, but also to her he gaue the spirit of prophecie, to assure king Iosias of the thinges which were to come. With these women, I say, did God worke potentlie, and miraculouslie, yea to them he gaue moste singular grace and priuiledge. But who hath commanded, that a publike, yea a tyrannicall and moste wicked lawe be established vpon these examples? The men that obiect the same, are not altogether ignorant, that examples haue no strength, when the question is of lawe [Examples against lawe haue no strength when the question is of lawe] . As if I shuld aske, what mariage is laufull? and it shulde be answered that laufull it is to man, not onelie to haue manie wiues at ones, but also it is laufull to marie two sisters, and to enioye them both liuing at ones, because that Dauid, Iacob, and Salomon, seruantes of God did the same. I trust that no man wold iustifie the vanitie of this reason. Or if the question were demanded, if a Christian, with good conscience may defraude, steale or deceiue: and answer were made that so he might by the example of the Israelites, who at Goddes commandement, deceiued the Egyptians, and spoiled them of their garmentes, golde and syluer. I thinke likewise this reason shuld be mocked. And what greater force, I pray you, hath the former argument? Debora did rule in Israel, and Hulda spoke prophecie in Iuda: Ergo it is laufull for women to reigne aboue realmes and nations, or to teache in the presence of men The consequent is vain and of none effect. For of examples, as is before declared, we may establishe no lawe, but we are alwayes bounde to the lawe writen, and to the commandement expressed in the same. And the lawe writen and pronounced by God, forbiddeth no lesse that any woman reigne ouer man, then it forbiddeth man to take pluralitie of wiues, to mary two sisters liuing at ons, to steale, to robbe, to murther or to lie. [I take Knox to be saying in this next section that God may sometimes not rebuke people for certain sins. Certainly God cannot choose to do away with the Law, which is Himself and all transgressions remain transgressions always. Though God may not charge sin against those He's forgiven in Christ, the sins themselves remain actual transgressions nonetheless. So if he's saying something different, he's wrong, but I try to interpret him charitably though I would never use this language personally]. If any of these hath bene transgressed, and yet God hath not imputed the same: it maketh not the like fact or dede lawfull vnto vs. For God being free, may for suche causes as be approued by his inscrutable wisdome, dispense with the rigor of his lawe, and may vse his creatures at his pleasure. But the same power is not permitted to man, whom he hath made subiect to his lawe, and not to the examples of fathers. And this I thinke sufficient to the reasonable and moderate spirites.
Again, I am not yet convinced as Knox is that women rulers are themselves simply contrary to nature and therefore I do not think I would use the prescriptive/descriptive distinction to answer this objection, though it is certainly somewhat helpful and I think Knox makes a good argument here. At the present, I think that Deborah's judging and authority was not in itself sinful, but it was clearly not ideal, brought about only by necessity and the positive decree of God and therefore I would not compare it to blatant sins like polygamy and theft. However, I could very well be wrong here and may not be thinking through this all correctly. Perhaps Knox will convince me fully one day. I would like to see how the church has handled this issue historically and I hope to devote time to study the issue more if I ever get the chance. What did the Puritans have to say? What about Augustine and Aquinas? What about other church fathers like Chrysostom? What about other Reformers? It can be hard to tell sometimes for such specific issues as this because some simply did not write on the topic. For now, I put forward John Knox's position as a well-thought-out, historically significant, and probable position on the issue.
Edit: there is a Voetius quote somewhere that represents my own view on the issue somewhere. I believe he is correct and will link the quote when/if I find it again.
