Miscellaneous Corrections of Errors

It has too often happened that I am reading something published recently and I come across errors that seem glaringly obvious to me but aren't important enough for me to write something dedicated to it. So I decided to create this post as an outlet for that.

1. Garrett Walden confusing virtual justification with the virtual distinction and affirmation of fundamental justification with affirmation of justification as an immanent act:

In his otherwise helpful article which very rightly aligns John Gill's doctrine of justification from eternity with that of those like Thomas Goodwin, Walden makes an error on pages 185-186 by confusing virtual justification with the virtual distinction. Virtual justification is opposed to formal or actual justification. Here it signifies that actual justification will infallibly occur at a future point due to something that makes it "as good as done" (thus theologians often refer the decree to justify, Christ's appointment as mediator, the fundamental justification of believers in Christ's death and resurrection, etc. to virtual justification). It is called virtual justification because in virtue of some cause, justification is infallibly secured as an effect. This distinction belongs to theology. The virtual distinction is opposed to a real distinction. This distinction belongs to metaphysics. It is well-defined in Walden's paper, but is nothing to the point of anything relevant to the rest of the paper. It is called virtual because the same reality can, by virtue of its active powers, signify different formal concepts. Thus, e.g. rationality and animality in man; and thus we say the rational soul virtually contains the sensitive and vegetative powers and yet there is but one soul in man, not three. Walden writes that "Gill affirms a virtual distinction of this nature, not a real distinciton, between justification as immanent and transient acts." That this makes no sense, consider that an immanent act is ad intra. It is not distinct from God Himself. A transient act is ad extra. It is a creature. For Gill to affirm that there is a virtual, rather than a real distinction between an immanent act and a transient act would mean that he is saying that there is no real distinction between an ad intra work of God and a creature. This, clearly, is not what Gill holds. Walden means to say that Gill holds to virtual justification from God's decree as an immanent act. But this is much different from holding to a virtual distinction between God's decree as an immanent act and its transient effects! It is not the vitual distinction of metaphysics that Gill says is "unintellegible" to him, but rather "virtual justification" (the reason for this apparently being that justification, for Gill, is eternal, properly an immanent act, and therefore improperly referred to as "virtual" since it doesn't result in justification, but simply is justification) Walden has confused categories simply on the basis of both distinctions including the word "virtual."

Walden's alignment of Keach with Gill is also misleading. He bases this on Keach's use of representative/fundamental justification in Christ. But this distinction (which is by no means unique to Keach or Gill) does not necessitate that one view justification as an immanent act as Gill does. In fact, Keach's distinction between virtual justification in Christ's fundamental justification and the actual discharge of the sins of believers upon faith indicates that for Keach "justification" is properly a transient, not an immanent act. It is one thing to affirm fundamental or virtual justification in Christ (as does, e.g. Owen); it is another thing to identify justification as an immanent act (as does, e.g. Goodwin, though Owen and Keach do not). Nor does affirmation of a union qua esse representativum necessitate justification properly be referred to an immanent act. Writers on all sides grant multiple ways in which union and "justification" may be understood; the relevant question is whether they take justification to properly refer to an immanent act or not. Van den Brink's chapter in Puritan Theology should be consulted for more.

2. Kevin McClure's undistributed middle definite atonement syllogism:

This syllogism is from his 2023 SBTS Journal article on definite atonement. It runs as follows:

Christ died for his sheep (John 10:11, 15)

Christ's sheep are coterminous with all of those given to him by the Father (John 10:29; 6:37, 39, 65)

All those given by the Father are coterminous with all who ultimately look to the Son and savingly believe (John 6:39-40)

Many do not ultimately look to the Son and savingly believe, demonstrating that they are not Jesus's sheep (John 6:66; 10:26)

Therefore, Christ did not die for all, but only for his sheep.

This syllogism commits the fallacy of the undistributed middle. To see this, consider the following logically parallel syllogism:

(1) Brandon likes cats.

(2) Cats are coterminous with felines.

(3) All felines are coterminous with those who have whiskers (assume this premise is true for the sake of the argument).

(4) Many animals do not have whiskers, demonstrating that they are not cats.

Therefore (5), Brandon does not like all animals, but only cats.

In order for the conclusion “Brandon does not like all animals, but only cats” to be drawn, premise 1 would have to say that “Brandon only likes cats.” Likewise, McClure’s first premise has to read “Christ died only for his sheep” in order to conclude that “Therefore, Christ did not die for all, but only for his sheep.” The syllogism as rewritten for validity would look like this:

1. Christ died only for his sheep.

2. Christ’s sheep are coterminous with all those given to him by the Father.

3. All those given by the Father are coterminous with all who ultimately look to the Son and savingly believe.

4. Many do not ultimately look to the Son and savingly believe.

5. Therefore, Christ did not die for all, but only for his sheep.

3. Bradley Green misunderstanding Owen's point

Covenant and Commandment page 95, Green reads Owen as distinguishing between legal and evangelical righteousness and sees Owen as affirming “the Lord Christ is as much our evangelical righteousness as he is our legal." While Owen readily grants the point that Green interprets Owen as making regarding the duplx gratia, this unfortunately reads Owen out of context and misses a key part of his argument by doing so. Owen is running an internal critique at this point, pointing out that the distinction between legal and evangelical righteousness (a distinction made by his opponents in this treatise) is improper on their own terms. The opponents maintain "He [Christ] may be said to be our legal Righteousness, but our Evangelical Righteousness he is not." Owen responds,

"I answer. (1) According to some Authors or Maintai∣ners of this Opinion, I see not but that the Lord Christ is as much our Evangelical Righteousness as he is our Legal. For our Legal Righteousness he is not in their Judgment, by a proper Imputation of his Righteousness unto us, but by the Communication of the fruits of what he did and suffered unto us. And so he is our Evangelical Righteousness also. For our Sanctification is an effect or fruit of what he did and suffered for us. Eph. 5.25, 26. Tit. 2.14."

Owen's point is that his opponents, who maintain that Christ is only our legal righteousness by the imputation of his righteousness as to effect (rather than in se), thereby render their own distinction between legal and evangelical righteosuness null since in the same way he would be our evangelical righteousness. This, I take is a crucial part of Owen's argument in the treatise and thus to read him as Green has is to miss quite a bit; tragic.