I thought it would be good to create a short commentary on certain Thomistic theses that were either disputed or rejected by the Reformed. While it seems to me that the majority either were or could be accepted by the Reformed (and thus I will not comment on most of them), a few were rejected, usually in favor of the opposing Scotist position, Here I will try to provide as much information as I can on the disputed theses and will try to update the post as I gather more information.
1. Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles
It is not so much that this thesis is wrong as that this is not the only division of being for the more Scotist Reformed. So Senguerdius (who I consider the most consistently sound metaphysician among the Reformed) speaks of "The first division of Being, into Infinite and Finite or God and Creature."
3. Consequently, the one God, unique and simple, alone subsists in absolute being. All other things that participate in being have a nature whereby their being is restricted; they are constituted of essence and being, as really distinct principles.
Voetius himself speaks of composition between essence and existence rather than existence as a mode of essence (“We are also inquiring whether He is free from composition improperly so-called—the sort that accrued from essence and existence”…”God is exempt from composition from essence and existence” https://www.cpjournal.com/contents-by-issue/the-confessional-presbyterian-15-2019/)
However, note that Voetius speaks of "composition improperly so-called" which may very well be a Scotist way of speaking as Mastri and Dupasquier speak similarly. Alsted at least speaks clearly of existence as a mode of essence and Arnold Senguerdius also seems to affirm this (see page 6 onwards) and I find this construal convincing.
In short, although I have found those who have denied the real distinction, I have yet to find anyone among the Reformed explicitly affirm it.
4. A thing is called a being because of being ("esse"). God and creature are not called beings univocally, nor wholly equivocally, but analogically, by an analogy both of attribution and of proportionality.
See especially Andreas Beck here https://x.com/brandoncorley99/status/1766841503568273787?s=46 who cites Voetius and Junius as utilizing a univocal concept of being, and on the other side, see, of course, Muller’s Not Scotist and especially Duby’s comments in response to Dolf te Velde here https://ps.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Duby-Further-Thoughts.pdf
At least Robert Baron clearly takes a Scotist position on being (https://www.reformedorthodoxy.org/post/1-1-de-disciplinis-in-genere-in-specie-de-metaphysica). Senguerdius says there is a single formal concept of all beings. At the very least, Voetius’s limited usage of univocity should be accepted.
As to the related question of the formal distinction, it has been used recently by Dolf te Velde. His writings along with Andreas Beck’s should be consulted here. Thomas Ward has suggested there may be an attempt at reconciling Thomas and Scotus here https://youtu.be/MNiUDXvIHxo?si=dcziBnXeOqT4jGL- I noted here https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/on-the-formal-distinction that the formal distinction might be thought of as a major virtual distinction. This is consistent with Voetius who wrote:
Among recent authors, Rada, bishop of Patti, subtly defends this opinion [of a formal distinction on the part of the thing] against all the Thomists. On the other hand, others, such as the Thomists and more recent Catholic theologians (which I think includes Reformed philosophers and theologians) more truly and accurately establish the distinction between the reason reasoning and the reason reasoned…These [Thomists] properly call this distinction of the reason reasoned a virtual or eminent distinction; or (to accommodate to Scotist terms) a formal distinction.
But see also his comments in Beck 262-264, especially footnote 166 where he seems more strongly against the formal distinction.
Paulus Voet clearly accepts the formal distinction and does not think it to be equivalent to the major virtual distinction. Here is his chart:
It does seem, however, that he makes an error in placing the virtual distinction under that of a real distinction, contrary to his father and to Scotus. It is also a question whether the virtual distinction may exist along with the formal; see Lukas Novak in Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition. Were Voet convinced of this, I wonder whether he would reject the formal or the viral distinction (that is, assuming Novak is even correct).
7. A spiritual creature is wholly simple in its essence. Yet there is still a twofold composition in the spiritual creature, namely, that of the essence with being, and that of the substance with accidents.
As noted here https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/samuel-willard-on-angleic-matter although in an extreme minority, not only among the Reformed but also among all theologians of his time, Samuel Willard at the least holds to the existence of angelic matter. The best recent defense of this position can be read here https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2021/02/22/how-do-angels-change-an-introduction-to-the-spiritual-matter-debate/ and here https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/43342/print
The best overview of the issue can be read here https://cuislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/etd%3A11/datastream/PDF/view and as noted, although Scotus defended it’s possibility, he later abandoned it since other metaphysical developments of his rendered it superfluous. It seems to me that if the 3rd and 9th Thomistic theses are rejected in favor of the Scotist position, one need not adopt spiritual matter.
In its favor, see also Franziska van Buren’s Aristotle and the Ontology of St. Bonaventure, especially pages 44-45.
9. Neither the matter nor the form have being of themselves, nor are they produced or corrupted of themselves, nor are they included in any category otherwise than reductively, as substantial principles.
Paulus Voet “defends a version of the Scotistic view that matter is endowed with a metaphysical or entitative act and that it has an essence on its own” (https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_DF7E28DEADC5.P001/REF.pdf). It is not yet clear to me how widely this position was favored among the Reformed. The best defense of it can be found in Thomas Ward’s John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism, which I find convincing.
10. Although extension in quantitative parts follows upon a corporeal nature, nevertheless it is not the same for a body to be a substance and for it to be quantified. For of itself substance is indivisible, not indeed as a point is indivisible, but as that which falls outside the order of dimensions is indivisible. But quantity, which gives the substance extension, really differs from the substance and is truly an accident.
Two things may be said here. First, as noted in the previous link, not all of the Reformed agreed that quantity is an accident of matter, but held that matter is per se extended (so Burgersdijk and Paulus Voet). Note also Turretin: A body cannot be granted which does not have quantity and extension, since quantity and extension do not differ really from the material substance, but are identified with it. Second of all, the thesis may be materially accepted by the Reformed as it is (as Gilbert Jack and Senguerdius might so do, who take matter and quantity to differ, and which I follow), yet nevertheless, it must be said that (part of) the reason that this thesis is here (to secure transubstantiation) does not work. The reason is that, as Burgersdijk noted, even if quantity is an accident, it is nevertheless not separable, as no accident is. The best argument for this comes from Arnold Senguerdius: https://x.com/brandoncorley99/status/1773763922329534879?s=46 note too that inherence is an act and an act (quite obviously) cannot be divided into actual and potential (that is, aptitudinal).
11. The principle of individuation, i.e., of numerical distinction of one individual from another with the same specific nature, is matter designated by quantity. Thus in pure spirits there cannot be more than individual in the same specific nature.
This thesis, by and large, was rejected by the Reformed, who held to haecceity, or something quite like it, as the principle of individuation. This includes Franco Burgersdijk who wrote, “We judge that one must not weary himself concerning the principle and foundation of individuation, but rather, concerning the principal of universality. For every thing, insofar as it exists, is individual; and therefore, the principle of individuation is nothing besides the essence of each individual thing." (Institutionum Metaphysicarum) Bartholomew Keckermann answered similarly (see https://x.com/jordancostanti2/status/1567876558672613382?s=46) and as we noted here https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/on-the-principle-of-individuation-against-matter so did Martin Schoock as well as Senguerdius who says that "The truer opinion seems to be the one that acknowledges no principle of individuation other than the singular essence of each thing." Petrus Van Mastricht at the very least does not hold matter as the principle of individuation (to which I add Voetius from his Syllabus of Theological Questions since he similarly inclines agaisnt the view that every angel is it’s own species). As we noted in the post on individuation, the theory that matter is the principle of individuation finds its origins in a false interpretation of Aristotle. The best and most thorough defense of the Scotist position, by Mastri and Belluto, can be read here: https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1125648914725474384/1221977334874247168/Mastri_and_Belluto_-_Individuation.pdf?ex=66148a13&is=66021513&hm=3ad23361217393fca1e12d0c58d4d5363859a39fa6586aeef61bc279042fe41d& Timothy Noone’s article here https://academia.edu/resource/work/37432994 should also be read.
16. This rational soul is united to the body in such a manner that it is the only substantial form of the body. By virtue of his soul a man is a man, an animal, a living thing, a body, a substance and a being. Therefore the soul gives man every essential degree of perfection; moreover, it gives the body a share in the act of being whereby it itself exists.
The extent to which the Reformed held to the unicity of substantial form, I cannot yet determine. It seems that at least Turretin held to it (arguing for one sense of Scripture: “from the unity of form—because there is only one essential form of any one thing”). On the other hand, since Willard granted angelic matter, it seems he would reject the unicity thesis assuming he is consistent in giving the human soul spiritual matter as well. In favor of plurality, one should consult Trifogli’s chapter in Interpreting Duns Scotus and https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/788d82_9ddafef6441a40b6bc851469cb37a148.pdf?index=true Thomas Ward’s book on hylomorphism should again be consulted here. I will say that I find the Scotist position rather strong here, but I am not yet certain.
21. The will does not precede the intellect but follows upon it. The will necessarily desires that which is presented to it as a good in every respect satisfying the appetite. But it freely chooses among the many goods that are presented to it as desirable according to a changeable judgment or evaluation. Consequently, the choice follows the final practical judgment. But the will is the cause of it being the final one.
I will not comment much on this other than to direct you to the works of the Utrecht school such as Reformed Thought on Freedom. Voetius would accept the thesis (see 151-152, 168 there), as would Turretin, but it seems not all even among the Reformed would agree (as the cited pages show). Gomarus rejects the thesis.
22. We do not perceive by an immediate intuition that God exists, nor do we prove it a priori. But we do prove it a posteriori, i.e., from the things that have been created, following an argument from the effects to the cause: namely, from things which are moved and cannot be the adequate source of their motion, to a first unmoved mover; from the production of the things in this world by causes subordinated to one another, to a first uncaused cause; from corruptible things which equally might be or not be, to an absolutely necessary being; from things which more or less are, live, and understand, according to degrees of being, living and understanding, to that which is maximally understanding, maximally living and maximally a being; finally, from the order of all things, to a separated intellect which has ordered and organized things, and directs them to their end.
Part of the intent of the thesis is clearly to stand against the ontological argument. The argument has been used by the likes of Stephen Charnock and Benedict Picet (the latter no doubt being influenced by Descartes). Turretin at least seems to allow it at 3.1.XVIII. Bonaventure in his Disputed Questions on the Trinity and Scotus in his De Prima Principia gave the best renditions of the argument. Nevertheless, there are a few truths that this thesis is rightly concerned with defending. First is the rejection of ontologism. We ought not to hold that God is the immediate first object of the intellect and so confound the beatific vision with nature. All of our knowledge of God is mediated by way of creatures. Bonaventure has been misinterpreted and abused here, but a good explanation as to what he means when he may comes close to sounding ontologist can be read here https://x.com/_bonaventurian/status/1762401752928891100?s=46 We may affirm in this sense that God is the implicit first object of the mind (see https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/bonaventures-critique-of-thomas-aquinas/) Second, precisely because all of our knowledge of God begins with creatures, the ontological argument ought not be called “a priori” (as Voetius noted) strictly speaking since it is only possible after an examination of creatures under the notions of “good”, “greater”, etc.
But as to the related quesiton of whether we ought to say that God’s existence is self-evident to us, see first here: https://x.com/brandoncorley99/status/1748099638916440221?s=46 but note also Scotus’s objections in the appendix of De Prima Principia.
There seems to be an issue with the affirmative position, as best I can put it, with some introduction from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/ :
Bonaventure therefore explains what makes a proposition “self-evident”, which in turn opens the way for deducing God’s existence out of God’s essence.
Principles are “self-evident” (cf. Aristotle, Topics, 100a31–b21). In the second of Aristotle’s modes of per se (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 73a34–b3), the essence of the subject causes the predicate. This provided Bonaventure with an ingenious explanation of why principles are self-evident:
We know principles to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the cause of the predicate is included in the subject.
If the essence of the subject term is what connects it to the predicate term in a self-evident proposition, then the essence of God must be what makes “God exists” self-evident. The positive ontological argument contains an inference to the existence of God that runs through the divine essence.
Bonaventure is correct, of course about what makes something to be self-evident, namely, that the essence of the subject causes the predicate. But the issue, as Thomas and Scotus are quick to point out, is that nobody has knowledge of the subject in this case (God's essence) except those who are enjoying the beatific vision. Therefore, although the proposition that God exists is self-evident in itself once somebody knows the terms, it is not self-evident to us since one of the terms is not known by anybody on earth (God's essence).
Perhaps the next paragraph gives us something that could provide Bonaventure with a response:
Most descriptions of the divine essence are inappropriate for the ontological argument, but the transcendentals are the right terms because they do not imply imperfection, can be predicated non-metaphorically of God, and are primordial, the “first notions falling into the mind” (Journey 3.3 [Quaracchi V: 304a]; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysica 1.5). All more specific concepts presuppose transcendental notions, and Anselm’s own formula was no exception to this rule. In his Commentary on the Sentences Bonaventure used the transcendental “true” as the middle term of his positive ontological argument; in the disputed question On the Mystery of the Trinity he used “good”, and in the Journey of the Mind to God he used “being”.
Perhaps it is sufficient for self-evidence that the transcendental be used as the terms? I am very uncertain here.
