I thought it would be good to create a short commentary on certain Thomistic theses that were either disputed or rejected by the Reformed. While it seems to me that the many were accepted by the Reformed it seems by other schools in general (and thus I will not comment on most of them), some were rejected, usually in favor of the opposing Scotist and/or Suarezian position, It has not escaped my notice that the influence of Thomas upon the Reformed has been greatly exaggerated in recent years, at least and especially when it comes to metaphysics. Thomas's influence upon the Reformed, it seems to me, lies mostly in his teachings on predestination, grace, free will, moral philosophy/ethics. On metaphysics as a whole however, the Reformed were far more influenced by Scotus, Suarez, and even just Aristotle himself. There are of course, various other points not directly related to the Thomistic theses where the Reformed side with the Thomists against the Scotists (e.g. many with Zabarella on the real distinction between the soul and its powers, virtually everyone against Scotus on the negation theory of subsistence, against Scotus on Christ's human nature not being an instrument, many with Thomas on various points of virtue ethics [though I should add, not to exclusion of also siding with Scotus on various other points of virtue ethics here], all with Thomas and against Scotus on bodies necessarily being in a place, with Thomas and against Scotus on the ability to prove the immortality of the soul from reason, the majority with Thomas on physical premotion, many with Thomas on the determination of the will by the intellect) or side with Scotus against Thomas (e.g. almost the entirety of their angelology) and perhaps I will make a separate post on these miscellaneous points in the future, but for now I wish only to comment on the Thomistic Theses themselves. Here I will try to provide as much information as I can on the disputed theses and will try to update the post as I gather more information.
1. Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles
It is not so much that this thesis is wrong as that this is not the only division of being for the more Scotist/Suarezian Reformed. So Senguerdius speaks of "The first division of Being, into Infinite and Finite or God and Creature." Alsted treats the divison of infinite and finite before he treats act and potency. This seems to be the norm for the Reformed.
3. Consequently, the one God, unique and simple, alone subsists in absolute being. All other things that participate in being have a nature whereby their being is restricted; they are constituted of essence and being, as really distinct principles.
Voetius speaks of composition between essence and existence (“We are also inquiring whether He is free from composition improperly so-called—the sort that accrued from essence and existence”…”God is exempt from composition from essence and existence” https://www.cpjournal.com/contents-by-issue/the-confessional-presbyterian-15-2019/)
But note that Voetius speaks of "composition improperly so-called" which very probably is a Scotist way of speaking as Mastri and Dupasquier speak similarly. Arnold Senguerdius (see page 6 onwards) clearly takes the position of existence as a mode of essence and Burgersdijk & Alsted follow:
And I find such a construal very convincing. There are good arguments against the Thomistic real distinction such as that by Antonio Trombetta: Of being as being nothing can be really distinct, since only that which is not and nothingness can be distinguished from it. However, being belongs to being as it is being, because being signifies that which has being. Therefore, with respect to being nothing can be really distinct, and, consequently, it is not really distinguished from essence. Therefore, etc. And by Antonius Andreas: Nothing can be really distinguished from transcendental natures, since transcendentals are included in the ultimate and essential concept of all things. However, being is a transcendental, since it is affirmed of all things, as well as of all categories. Therefore, essence and being are not really distinguished.
I have found two among the Reformed who hold to the Thomistic real distinction, being Samuel Willard and Louis le Blanc who speak of them as two things.
4. A thing is called a being because of being ("esse"). God and creature are not called beings univocally, nor wholly equivocally, but analogically, by an analogy both of attribution and of proportionality.
See especially Andreas Beck here https://x.com/brandoncorley99/status/1766841503568273787?s=46 who cites Voetius, Baxter, and Junius as utilizing a univocal concept of being, and on the other side, besides Zanchi who Beck says follows Cajetan, see, of course, Muller’s Not Scotist and especially Duby’s comments in response to Dolf te Velde here https://ps.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Duby-Further-Thoughts.pdf although it seems to me that at least Muller misses here, constantly attributing to Scotus a complete univocity view and so taking rejections of this (or even more strangely, simple affirmations of analogy) as rejections of Scotus, which sadly invalidates much of the paper.
Robert Baron, it seems clear enough to me, takes a Scotist position on being insofar as he speaks of the object of metaphysics as being as it comprehends both God and creatures under itself. Muller’s citations of Baron quite perplex me and I am not sure what he means to get at and must assume due to some misunderstanding of either Scotus or Baron or both sees opposition between Baron and Scotus at the cited pages. Senguerdius says there is a single formal and objective concept of all beings, thus siding with Scotus against Suarez (only formal) and Thomas. Burgersdijk also affirms one formal and objective concept of being on page 15 of book 2 of his Institutes of Metaphysics (pace Muller). Mastricht seems to imply a univocal concept of being inasmuch as he holds that "essence" applies most properly to God and interprets Damascus's "essene above essence" as meaning God's essence "exceeds theirs infinitely" (see Vol. 2, 86-87). t is hard for me to pick just one defense of the univocal concept of being to recommend, but see Krisper here:
Voetius’s limited usage of univocity should be accepted (which is really no more than Scotus's). Note also that even when Turretin advocates for analogy, he is advocating Suarez’s view and not Thomas’s (on this see the relevant chapter in A Companion to Francisco Suarez)
As to the related question of the formal distinction, it has been used recently by Dolf te Velde. His writings along with Andreas Beck’s should be consulted here. Thomas Ward has suggested there may be an attempt at reconciling Thomas and Scotus here https://youtu.be/MNiUDXvIHxo?si=dcziBnXeOqT4jGL- Some have said that the formal distinction might be thought of as a major virtual distinction. This is consistent with Voetius who wrote:
Among recent authors, Rada, bishop of Patti, subtly defends this opinion [of a formal distinction on the part of the thing] against all the Thomists. On the other hand, others, such as the Thomists and more recent Catholic theologians (which I think includes Reformed philosophers and theologians) more truly and accurately establish the distinction between the reason reasoning and the reason reasoned…These [Thomists] properly call this distinction of the reason reasoned a virtual or eminent distinction; or (to accommodate to Scotist terms) a formal distinction.
But see also his comments in Beck 262-264, especially footnote 166, which is relevant to Alsted’s comments about a formal distinction in act mentioned in Duby’s paper. At these places, Voetius and Alsted seem to charge Scotus with compromising divine simplicity by positing an "actual formal distinction" instead of simply a "virtual formal distinction" (this, by the way, I think is why Voetius at one point departs from Scotus on divine ideas in his appendix on the subject). I think this is based on a misunderstanding on their part (as was common in their time as it is in ours) likely due to the misunderstandings of Suarez. The formal distinction does not posit a strictly real distinction (it is only "real" in the sense that the formalities are distinct before the work of the mind) between two things and does not import composition. The Thomists and Scotists differ over what composition entails, but Voetius rightly sides with Scotus here when he says that it is a false hypothesis that "wherever there is a distinction, however large and whatever sort it be, there also is composition equally large and of such sort. This hypothesis, nonetheless, is false. Beyond this, compostion requires the union of distinct things and also something that has transitioned from potency to act.” Based on this, if he had rightly understood the formal disnticton, he would therefore not make such a charge against it and so was wrong in point of fact, not principle. For a more accurate understanding of the formal distinction, see especially pages 31 onwards here: https://archive.org/details/philosophicalthe0000wolt/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater (note page 33 implies that Voetius is getting his understanding from Suarez). Voetius is at least correct to see that the formal distinction is doing the same work that the Thomists make the virtual distinction do, as Wolter and Ward have pointed out. He is close to the truth, but I think his son establishes a more accurate understanding of the formal distinction.
Paulus Voet clearly accepts the formal distinction and (more accurately) does not think it to be precisely equivalent to the major virtual distinction. Here is his chart:
Note the very Scotist way he divides things:
One difference is that he places the virtual distinction of reasoned reason under that which is real in a secondary sense rather than as a rational distinction, though he only seems to do this because he recognizes that it has a foundation in reality and so in that sense is real in a secondary sense. Although Paulus Voet has a more accurate understanding than his father on the formal distinction as it relates to composition, he does say that the persons are formally distinct from each other, which would seem to reduce them to mere formalities which would certainly be wrong. This seems to indicate some sort of misunderstanding, although his other examples of formal distinctions are accurate. More accurately, it must be said that there is a major real (or real simpliciter) distinction between the persons. Paul Voet seems to be assuming separability is required for real distinction, or perhaps thinking real distinction only holds between two different beings. I lean towards the latter as he seems to equate “thing” with “being” (something Senguerdius also appears to do, however, Burgersdijk avoids this error) whereas the Scotists would say “being” is wider than “thing” and “thing” refers to that which has or is capable of receiving an entitative act, and so the persons can be “things” and so really distinct from each other, yet are not “beings.” But the persons are really distinct, there is no composition or separability between them, they are the same being, and real distinction simpliciter does not require separability. Real distinction is, according to Mastri, distinguished from other distinctions because the extremes are things, which are capable of their own existence, and can terminate physical causality; whether alone, or joined with others. The persons are subsistences and so capable of their own existence and so really distinct.
Note also his final comment at the bottom, "To this, Scotus adds formal actual. But if the intention of Scotus is to say that on the part of the thing there are two different things, not only in virtue, it must be referred to the real strictly spoken". This further supports what I have said regarding Voetius and Alsted being hesistant to take the Scotist position on the formal distinction because of the way they have understood it from Suarez. Suarez thinks that any distinction ex parte rei must be between two different things and would entail composition. Since this is in point of fact not Scotus's intention (as the formal distinction is between formalities and not things), then the formal distinction may be accepted in the way that Voet incorporates it. That is to say, it seems Voetius and Alsted are getting their understanding of the formal distinction from Suarez insofar as they are speaking of an “actual formal distinction” in contrast to “virtual formal distinction”, which Wolter has pointed out in his Philosophical Theology finds its origins in Suarez. Since they are following Suarez, they think that Scotus posits an actual formal distinction which entails real distinction between two things and composition of them, and this is why they're hesitant to accept the formal distinction (against Suarez's interpretation, see the recommended works by Wolter and Mastri below). Paul Voet’s final note on his chart of distinctions makes this point explicitly when he says that if Scotus posits what he calls an actual formal distinction (the meaning of this being derived from Suarez), then it would be strictly real (but he, more accurately, sees that this is not so and so he accepts it as a distinction with a foundation in reality). To be sure, Mastri will use the term "actual formal distinction" taken from Suarez in his defense of the formal distinction, but the important thing to note is that Suarez takes such a distinction to be strictly real and between thing and thing, whereas Mastri will argue this is not so. Matthew Baines's dissertation, when published will argue that Voetius moves closer to the formal distinction later on (although, as I will explain, he is still not quite there), so I do not think I am simply speculating about what Voetius would do had he had access to Mastri's explanation, especially given Voetius's comments regarding what true composition entails and why the divine persons, though really distinct, are not composed. I contend that though he does not explicitly take it, the formal distinction, as understood by Mastri, is the fulfillment of Voetius's thought. In defense of the Reformed, the formal distinction was not well understood in their time outside of Scotist circles, and using Suarez as a source on the matter could only have led to further confusion.
As a result of the Reformed having a hard time seeing how formalities can be said to be real even before the operation of the mind, to the extent that they use the formal distinction, they reduce it to a merely mental distinction. This is why, for instance, Turretin, quite contrary to Scotus, relegates the formal distinction to a merely mental one:
Hence it is evident that this distinction is neither simply real between things and things, nor formal (which is only in our manner of conception)
Thus Senguerdius, quite like Voetius, admits of a formal distinction between the attributes, saying:
in the formal sense, or as understood by our concepts, the Divine Attributes can neither be predicated of the divine essence nor of each other. So in the formal sense, it is not correctly said, the Intellect of God is the will of God: the justice of God is the Divine mercy.
But note that here he is using “formal” only to refer to a ratio/concept in our mind, not the objective content (formality) behind that ratio/concept. Thus, he is not really using the Scotist formal distinction per se (and neither does Voetius when he calls the attirubtes formally disitnct). This is why guys like Burgersdijk and Senguerdius deny that formal unity is real, e.g. take Burgersdijk:
“Thesis VIII: In the meantime, we do not agree with Nominalists who think that universals are purely nominal. For not only do we admit that things exist before the operation of the mind, which are called universals, as they also concede, but we also admit that there is in things the foundation of universality without the operation of the mind, namely, that exact similarity of many individuals of the same species in formal unity, which they do not concede.
In this, we also differ from Scotus, who wants that exact similarity of many individuals in formal unity to be true unity, and thus, universal unity itself.
However, we assert that, as singular individuals are per se one thing, and this not only by numerical unity but also by formal unity, we genuinely deny that the natures of many individuals without the operation of the mind are one nature. We acknowledge some similarity and agreement but not unity.”
Because Burgersdijk doesn’t have a category for real formalities, the objective content of a ratio, he’s left only with ratios in the mind and therefore formal unity can only be an agreement in ratio, but not in reality.
In conclusion, while it’s not accurate to say that the Reformed in general held to the Scotist formal distinction, it should also be noted that they did not properly understand it. Besides Paulus Voet, the only theologian among the Reformed, as far as I’ve been able to tell, who was able to understand: (1) the formal distinction as between real formalities before the operation of the mind, and (2) that this did not create composition in God’s case, is Richard Baxter, who accepted the distinction. Baxter has the best understanding of the formal distinction that I have come across among the Reformed. Thus, once again, I do not think I am entirely engaging in futile speculation to suggest that if the Reformed had a better understanding of the distinction they would have accepted it. One might argue that my suggestion is invalid because the Reformed simply reject (2) because they hold the formal distinction implies composition; in other words, the Reformed are simply and knowledgeably committed to the Thomist position here. But I would respond that most Thomists who rightly understand the formal distinction today do not make this argument against it, but rather reject it as unnecessary due to prior commitments such as their position on objective concept of being (which is why I treat the formal distinction here) and its division. But since the Reformed agree with the Scotists in these other matters, if they had more accurate knowledge of the formal distinction, it seems they would side with the Scotists, not the Thomists here. For his part, Voetius seems simply to be assuming the formal distinction involves a strictly real distinction, saying that "if you add, along with Scotus, the actual distinction between them and their essence and among themselves, necessarily these two absurdities would follow: first, the essence of God infinitely perfect, perceived through attributes distinct from Him. Then, the essence of God not being simple, but composed of many essential predicates distinguished by the nature of things. The first concern can be addressed with a correct apprehension of the formal distinction inasmuch as it holds formalities to be really identical with God and with radical infinity identifying all formalities with Him. The second, again, can be addressed by Voetius's own requirements for composition.
I should also note as an aside that some have questioned whether the virtual distinction may exist along with the formal; see Lukas Novak in Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition. But I think Wolter and Mastri far more accurately establish the formal distinction as the foundation of the virtual in line with what I conceive to be Scotus's true intent (see page 19 of Wolter's Transcedentals and Grajewski The Formal Distinction, 53 for this). Though the virtual distinction might be able to give us different concepts, it is insufficient to account for the reality of our concepts, and so the two are not to be opposed (see also 39:30 onwards here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RONPB0C-Vy0 which following Wolter suggests that Thomas himself saw this, and so I do not think there needs to be controversy here). See again Wolter's Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus and his book on the Transcedentals as well as Mastri here:
7. A spiritual creature is wholly simple in its essence. Yet there is still a twofold composition in the spiritual creature, namely, that of the essence with being, and that of the substance with accidents.
As noted here https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/samuel-willard-on-angleic-matter although in an extreme minority, not only among the Reformed but also among all theologians of his time, Samuel Willard at the least holds to the existence of angelic matter. Alsted also defends angelic matter in his Compendium of Harmonic Logic. I have also heard that Zanchi does this as well, but I was not given a source. The best recent defense of this position can be read here https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2021/02/22/how-do-angels-change-an-introduction-to-the-spiritual-matter-debate/ and here https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/43342/print
The best overview of the issue can be read here https://cuislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/etd%3A11/datastream/PDF/view and as noted, although Scotus defended it’s possibility, he later abandoned it since other metaphysical developments of his rendered it superfluous. It seems to me that if the 3rd and 9th Thomistic theses are rejected in favor of the Scotist position, one need not adopt spiritual matter.
In its favor, see also Franziska van Buren’s Aristotle and the Ontology of St. Bonaventure, especially pages 44-45. The possibility of it being present in Aristotle's De Anima (as Brendan Case has mentioned) is perhaps the most interesting point in its favor. But against this is Burgersdijk’s argument that quantity is not really distinct from matter.
9. Neither the matter nor the form have being of themselves, nor are they produced or corrupted of themselves, nor are they included in any category otherwise than reductively, as substantial principles.
Paulus Voet “defends a version of the Scotistic view that matter is endowed with a metaphysical or entitative act and that it has an essence on its own” (https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_DF7E28DEADC5.P001/REF.pdf). Senguerdius (“This matter is not properly nothing or non-being but has its own essence and existence, distinct from the essence and existence of form.”) and Burgersdijk also follow, the latter explicitly arguing that this was Aristotle’s intent as well. Burgersdijk, however, clarifies that matter has "from itself a partial and incomplete essence and existence" and concludes from this that matter cannot be without form. Alsted says that "prime matter has an act by which it denies being nothing." The best defense of matter having its own essence can be found in Thomas Ward’s John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism, which I find very convincing.
10. Although extension in quantitative parts follows upon a corporeal nature, nevertheless it is not the same for a body to be a substance and for it to be quantified. For of itself substance is indivisible, not indeed as a point is indivisible, but as that which falls outside the order of dimensions is indivisible. But quantity, which gives the substance extension, really differs from the substance and is truly an accident.
Two things may be said here. First, as noted in the previous link, not all of the Reformed agreed that quantity is a a really distinct accident of matter, but held, as Turretin says, that “A body cannot be granted which does not have quantity and extension, since quantity and extension do not differ really from the material substance, but are identified with it.” Burgersdijk held that quantity is a either a property flowing from the essence of matter or its essential mode. Second of all, the thesis may be materially accepted by the Reformed as it is (as Gilbert Jack who thinks that quantity is really distinguished from matter), yet nevertheless, it must be said that (part of) the reason that this thesis is here (to secure transubstantiation) does not work. The reason is that, as Burgersdijk noted, even if quantity is a really distinct accident, it is nevertheless not separable, as no accident is (because actual inherence is an essential mode of accidents). Arnold Senguerdius argues against this here: https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/senguerdius-and-aristotle-contra-transubstantiation See also Calvinist Metaphysics and
the Eucharist in the Early Seventeenth Century by Giovanni Gellera. Section 4 here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dietrich-freiberg/#QuidQuid may also be helpful. But see especially the four disputations on the power of God by Voetius/John Carre, to which I cannot do justice: https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/gisbertus-voetius-select-disputations-translated-by-onkuoh see also Burgersdijk here: https://x.com/BrandonCorley99/status/1883336288264237271
11. The principle of individuation, i.e., of numerical distinction of one individual from another with the same specific nature, is matter designated by quantity. Thus in pure spirits there cannot be more than individual in the same specific nature.
This thesis, by and large, was rejected by the Reformed, who commonly held to haecceity, or something quite like it, as the principle of individuation. This includes Franco Burgersdijk who wrote, “We judge that one must not weary himself concerning the principle and foundation of individuation, but rather, concerning the principal of universality. For every thing, insofar as it exists, is individual; and therefore, the principle of individuation is nothing besides the essence of each individual thing." (Institutionum Metaphysicarum) Bartholomew Keckermann answered similarly (see https://x.com/jordancostanti2/status/1567876558672613382?s=46) and as we noted here https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/on-the-principle-of-individuation-against-matter so did Martin Schoock as well as Senguerdius who says that "The truer opinion seems to be the one that acknowledges no principle of individuation other than the singular essence of each thing." Alsted rejects matter as the principle of individuation and says that "form in matter, either numerical and individuating, is the proclaimed principle of individuation of material substances." Petrus Van Mastricht at the very least does not hold matter as the principle of individuation (to which I add Voetius from his Syllabus of Theological Questions since he similarly inclines against the view that every angel is it’s own species and in his Select Disputations speaks of haecceity at multiple places). Rejection of this thesis may be discerned in any among the Reformed who affirm angels belong to one species. As we noted in the post on individuation, the theory that matter is the principle of individuation finds its origins in a false interpretation of Aristotle. The best and most thorough defense of the Scotist position, by Mastri and Belluto, can be read here:
Timothy Noone’s article here https://academia.edu/resource/work/37432994 should also be read.
16. This rational soul is united to the body in such a manner that it is the only substantial form of the body. By virtue of his soul a man is a man, an animal, a living thing, a body, a substance and a being. Therefore the soul gives man every essential degree of perfection; moreover, it gives the body a share in the act of being whereby it itself exists.
Senguerdius holds to a plurality of substantial form (see page 46). Franco Burgersdijk says "that multiple forms, even substantial ones, are subordinated to this [the specific form] in living things, is not impossible" and cites Zabarella for support. Due to his position on the 9th Thomistic thesis, this could imply Paulus Voet also held to plurality. Since Willard and Alsted grant angelic matter, it seems they would reject the unicity thesis. On the other hand, it seems that Turretin, following Suarez holds to the unicity of substantial form and so would accept the Thomistic thesis here (arguing for one sense of Scripture: “from the unity of form—because there is only one essential form of any one thing”) and while it is true that Voetius cites Suarez positively saying that “of one thing there is only one form” in his De creatione, part 9, it isn’t clear to me that he isn’t just describing what Suarez defends in this place while merely agreeing with his conclusion that there is one soul in man (plus, other comments of his seem to suggest he holds to plurality). It would at least be strange for Voetius to disagree with Senguerdius and Burgersdijk here. Furthermore, both may be referring only to specific form. In favor of plurality, one should consult Trifogli’s chapter in Interpreting Duns Scotus and https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/788d82_9ddafef6441a40b6bc851469cb37a148.pdf?index=true Thomas Ward’s book on hylomorphism should again be consulted here. The argument for it is very convincing.
21. The will does not precede the intellect but follows upon it. The will necessarily desires that which is presented to it as a good in every respect satisfying the appetite. But it freely chooses among the many goods that are presented to it as desirable according to a changeable judgment or evaluation. Consequently, the choice follows the final practical judgment. But the will is the cause of it being the final one.
See especially the works of the Utrecht school such as Reformed Thought on Freedom as well as Richard Muller's Divine Will and Human Choice. Voetius would accept the thesis (see 151-152, 168 there) and would, it seems, go a bit ruther with Gregory of Valencia, Burgersdijk, John Cameron, Maccovius, and Rivet in holding that the intellect determines the will also as to its specification. Turretin would also accept the thesis. But it seems not all even among the Reformed would agree (as the cited pages show, Van Mastricht and William Ames are notable exceptions). Gomarus, in responding to the same passage from Bellarmine as Turretin, takes the opposite approach and denies the intellect determines the will, although I think it should be noted that he may have only intended to deny it efficaciously does so (Gomarus wrote this disputation in 1602, however, the dispute between the Jesuits and the Dominicans was likely not known in the Netherlands until 1604, see Franco Burgersdijk: Neo-Aristotelian in Leiden, 49-50).
On the somewhat related issue of physical vs moral premotion, some Reformed (such as Burgersdijk) followed Scotus in holding to moral premotion, but the best arguments for physical premotion come from Voetius and Heereboord (who directly responded to Burgersdijk). See also Volume 4 of Theophilus Gale's Court of the Gentiles. Against the Scotist view of the will as a self-mover see: https://philarchive.org/archive/BROTMP-13
And, if you can get it, see 3.1.1 in Francisco Tourinho’s Calvinism Explained.
Here are Voetius's comments on the matter (credit to the legend himself, @OnkuOh on X for the translation):
22. We do not perceive by an immediate intuition that God exists, nor do we prove it a priori. But we do prove it a posteriori, i.e., from the things that have been created, following an argument from the effects to the cause: namely, from things which are moved and cannot be the adequate source of their motion, to a first unmoved mover; from the production of the things in this world by causes subordinated to one another, to a first uncaused cause; from corruptible things which equally might be or not be, to an absolutely necessary being; from things which more or less are, live, and understand, according to degrees of being, living and understanding, to that which is maximally understanding, maximally living and maximally a being; finally, from the order of all things, to a separated intellect which has ordered and organized things, and directs them to their end.
Part of the intent of the thesis is clearly to stand against the ontological argument. The argument has been used by the likes of Voetius, Stephen Charnock, and Benedict Pictet (the latter no doubt being influenced by Descartes). Turretin at least seems to allow it at 3.1.XVIII. Bonaventure in his Disputed Questions on the Trinity and Scotus in his De Prima Principia gave the best renditions of the argument and it seems to me that all objections to the argument (especially as Scotus articulated it) fall flat.
Nevertheless, there are a few truths that this thesis is rightly concerned with defending. First is the rejection of ontologism. We ought not to hold that God is the immediate first object of the intellect and so confound the beatific vision with nature. All of our knowledge of God is mediated by way of creatures. Bonaventure has been misinterpreted and abused here, but a good explanation as to what he means when he may comes close to sounding ontologist can be read here https://x.com/_bonaventurian/status/1762401752928891100?s=46 We may affirm in this sense that God is the implicit first object of the mind (see https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/bonaventures-critique-of-thomas-aquinas/) Second, precisely because all of our knowledge of God begins with creatures, the ontological argument ought not be called “a priori” (as Voetius noted) strictly speaking since it is only possible after an examination of creatures under the notions of “good”, “greater”, etc.
But as to the related quesiton of whether we ought to say that God’s existence is self-evident to us (as it seems Polanus held), see first here: https://x.com/brandoncorley99/status/1748099638916440221?s=46 which might indicate Voetius held to it (see also below on him affirming it as a natural principle). but note also Scotus’s objections in the appendix of De Prima Principia which powerfully argue against it being self-evident.
There seems to be an issue with the affirmative position, as best I can put it, with some introduction from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/ :
Bonaventure therefore explains what makes a proposition “self-evident”, which in turn opens the way for deducing God’s existence out of God’s essence.
Principles are “self-evident” (cf. Aristotle, Topics, 100a31–b21). In the second of Aristotle’s modes of per se (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 73a34–b3), the essence of the subject causes the predicate. This provided Bonaventure with an ingenious explanation of why principles are self-evident:
We know principles to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the cause of the predicate is included in the subject.
If the essence of the subject term is what connects it to the predicate term in a self-evident proposition, then the essence of God must be what makes “God exists” self-evident. The positive ontological argument contains an inference to the existence of God that runs through the divine essence.
Bonaventure is correct, of course about what makes something to be self-evident, namely, that the essence of the subject causes the predicate. But the issue, as Thomas and Scotus are quick to point out, is that nobody has knowledge of the subject in this case (God's essence) except those who are enjoying the beatific vision. Therefore, although the proposition that God exists is self-evident in itself once somebody knows the terms, it is not self-evident to us since one of the terms is not known by anybody on earth (God's essence).
Perhaps the next paragraph gives us something that could provide Bonaventure with a response:
Most descriptions of the divine essence are inappropriate for the ontological argument, but the transcendentals are the right terms because they do not imply imperfection, can be predicated non-metaphorically of God, and are primordial, the “first notions falling into the mind” (Journey 3.3 [Quaracchi V: 304a]; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysica 1.5). All more specific concepts presuppose transcendental notions, and Anselm’s own formula was no exception to this rule. In his Commentary on the Sentences Bonaventure used the transcendental “true” as the middle term of his positive ontological argument; in the disputed question On the Mystery of the Trinity he used “good”, and in the Journey of the Mind to God he used “being”.
Perhaps it is sufficient for self-evidence that the transcendental be used as the terms (can one do it with “infinite being” or “truth”. Scotus at least denies the second can be done. But what about “necessary being” or necessary existence”)? I am very uncertain here.
On the other hand, Senguerdius sides with Scotus here, saying:
That God exists, or that there is a first independent being, is not indeed known from the term or word “God” itself: for if a person, who knows nothing at all of God, is explained what is understood by that term, he will not therefore assent that God exists, but further proof will be required. Indeed, the truth of some complex principles is known from their terms; if someone understands the words of this principle, “the whole is greater than its part,” from their understanding, they also recognize the truth of the principle. But the existence of simples is not so recognized from the knowledge of the word, since the existence of simples does not precisely denote their essence, which is understood by the word.
Burgersdijk also denies that God’s existence is self-evident.
Voetius and Junius say that “God exists” is a natural principle, which does not make much sense to me at all since they recognize that principles are supposed to be indemonstrable and both of them grant that the existence of God can be demonstrated. It seems much better to call it a natural conclusion along with “God must be worshipped.” This at least indicates that Voetius and Junius might see the proposition as self-evident.
If I may contribute to the article, on point 7, Alsted defended angelic matter in the Compendium of Harmonic Logic.