What follows are the comments of Duns Scotus arguing against matter as the principle of individuation taken from here: https://archive.org/details/five-texts-on-the-mediaeval-problem-of-universals-porphyry-boethius-abelard-duns-scotus-ockham Charles Johnson has shown that at least Martin Schoock (professor of philosophy at Leiden) among the Reformed sided with Scotus against Thomas on this issue (https://delatinized.wordpress.com/2023/04/17/are-the-reformed-philosophically-thomist/). I would add to this that Van Mastricht appears to implicitly deny matter to be the principle of individuation when he says that:
“In it [the number of the angels] they differ not as species, as the Thomists among the papists suppose, from the fact that individals are not constituted except through materia signata, ‘designated matter,’ which is not present in angels, but as singulars, because they partake of the common nature of a spirit—a distinction that is especially evident in separated souls” (Theoretical-Practical Theology 3:184).
But more than this, there is very strong evidence that matter as the principle of individuation was not the view of Aristotle himself. Charles Johnson linked one defense of this here: https://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/trf/n38/n38a2.pdf to which I add https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281319379_ARISTOTLE'S_PRINCIPLE_OF_INDIVIDUATION which states that:
An interesting line of argument has been introduced by Charlton and endorsed
by Regis to attack the orthodox view. It rests on a distinction that is drawn
between two sorts of questions which may be asked when people say that matter
is Aristotle’s principle of individuation. The one sort reflects a conception of the
problem as mainly an epistemological one, for example (a) How do we
distinguish one individual from another? The other sort, however, discloses a
conception of the problem as a metaphysical one: (b) What makes one individual different from another of the same kind at the same time?
Charlton and Regis argue that proponents of the orthodox view have confused
these two sorts of questions. This issue is: To which of these two questions is
Aristotle supposed to have found an answer in matter?
And concludes that,
in my view, Charlton’s insightful distinction between the epistemological and
metaphysical aspects of questions of individuation, represents a signal
contribution to the literature on the subject; for once we are freed from the
shackles of that vexatious passage, 1034 a, which, on its face, seemed literally to
be saying that matter differentiates Callias from Socrates, we can find no other
supportive evidence for the claim that matter is the principle of individuation.
With all of that said, we will now enter Scotus:
Is a material substance a
“this” and individual through matter?
Fifth, I ask whether a material substance is a “this” and individual through matter.
[Argument for the affirmative]
Yes. For according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics V, the chapter on “one,” “Those of which the matter is one are one in number.” Therefore, etc.
[Argument for the negative]
To the contrary, Metaphysics V, in the old translation: “In the foundation of a nature, there is nothing distinct.” Now what is not in itself distinct or diverse cannot be the primary reason for the diversity or distinction of anything else. But matter is the foundation of a nature, a foundation altogether indistinct and indeterminate. Therefore, it cannot be the primary reason for the distinction or diversity of anything else.
[Other people’s theory]
Here it is said that yes. This is held especially on account of many passages from Aristotle that seem to sound like this.
One of these is in [Metaphysics] VII.: that the generator generates something else on account of the matter. “Callias,” he says, “and Socrates are diverse on account of their matter (for that is diverse), but the same in species. For the species is individual.”
Again on the same basis, [Metaphysics] VIL, the chapter on the parts of a definition: “The ‘what-it-was-to-be’ and the thing are the same in some substances. But what are in matter or are taken with matter are not the same.” And again it appears in [Metaphysics] VIII. 3: “For soul and being a soul are the same, but man and being a man are not the same unless being a soul is also called a man.” Therefore, it seems matter is outside the notion of the quiddity and of anything primarily having the quiddity. So since matter is something found in the realm of beings, it seems to be a part of the individual—that is, the individuation of the whole. Whatever in the individual is entirely incompatible with the notion of the quiddity can be posited as the primary reason for the individuating. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore, in Metaphysics XIL., Aristotle proves there cannot be several heavens. “For if there were several heavens as there are several men, the principle for each one will be one in species but many in number. But whatever,” he says, “are many in number have matter. Now the primary ‘what-it-was-to-be’ does not have matter. For it is an actuality. Therefore, the first immobile mover is one both in notion and in number.” This reasoning, by which the unity of the heaven is concluded from the unity of the mover and the unity of the mover (not only in species but in number) is concluded from the fact that it does not have matter, would not seem to be valid unless numerical distinction arose through matter. Therefore, etc.
Moreover, On the Heaven and the World 1: “When I say ‘heaven’ I indicate the form; when | say ‘this heaven’ I indicate the matter.”
[Against this theory]
Against this I argue first from the texts of the same Aristotle.
According to the Philosopher, Metaphysics VII, the chapter on the parts of a definition: “It is plain that the soul is the primary substance, but the body is the matter. Now man or animal is what is made up of both soul and body as taken universally. But Socrates and Coriscus”—add ‘are made up of these’—“as taken singularly, if ‘soul’ is said in two senses.” And later on he adds: “But if this soul and this body [are what make up Socrates or Coriscus], then as the universal [is a composite], so is the singular.”
Earlier in the same chapter: “Man and horse and whatever are in singulars in this way are, taken universally, not the substance”—that is, the form “but a certain whole”—that is, a composite-—“made up of this matter together with this structure.” Here by ‘this’ he does not mean uniform and singular matter, but determinate matter. Otherwise he would be contradicting himself. Thus he adds in the same passage: “as taken universally.” And he adds later on: “Socrates is already made up of the ultimate matter,” etc.
The same point ts also clear through the same Aristotle in [Metaphystes] XII., where he says that the principles are the same, just as what are derived from those principles are also the same. “And the principles,” he says, “of what are in the same species are diverse, not specifically but because they are the principles of singulars. Your matter and mover and species are not mine. But yet they are the same in universal notion.” Therefore, he grants the distinction of form in the particular, just as of matter. And he grants the unity of matter in general, just as of form. Hence one must still ask what it is by which matter is a “this.”
Furthermore, as is proved from many passages in [Metaphysics] VI, the chapter on the parts of a definition, matter belongs to the essence of the composite substance—say, of man—and so such a composite is not precisely the essence of the form. Therefore, just as the composite cannot of itself be a “this” (from the first question [(29)]), so neither will matter—which is its part—be of itself a “this.” For the composite cannot be common and of the same kind in what are diverse unless everything belonging to its essence could be of the same kind as they are.
Furthermore, I argue from reason. Matter is the same in the generated and the corrupted. Therefore, it has the same singularity in the generated and the corrupted.
If you reply that it is not of the same species in the generated and the corrupted, I argue as I did before [(100)], against the theory of indeterminate dimension. So there will be a circular generation: first, of fire from water, and second, of water from fire. The water corrupted in the first instance and the water generated in the second have the same matter and are of the same species. Therefore, they are really “this water.” Therefore, the first water naturally returns, the same in number. This counts against [those who hold that matter is the principle of individuation].
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