I recently published an article with American Reformer, arguing that Baptists need not, in principle, reject the establishment of their own denomination. This, as far as I can tell, seems to be the main point which needs to be argued in order to show that the Reformed political tradition is not contrary to Baptistism and may be embraced by us. I definitely wrote the article with American Reformer’s audience in mind and so freely assumed broad familiarity with the tradition. Most of the feedback I have gotten has been surprisingly positive, but I have realized that I was not explicating certain assumptions from the tradition which might make my article more understandable. The article is concerned, of course, only to establish principles, which are the only things that are going to create a substantial difference between “Baptist political thought” and “Reformed political thought” if such a difference actually exists. As such, I was not at all concerned with particulars and with application (indeed, as I noted at the end, I do not think my article very applicable) but only to establish theory. I do want that article to stand-alone in that sense, as an independent argument proving the one point it set out to prove. In this post, I want to step back even more to consider some broader political principles upon which my argument rests.
Before I dive into that, I do, however, want to say a quick word about application. If we were to consider America right now, then, at least on the national level, it seems to me you need a broader toleration even beyond Savoy and more along the lines that Althusius suggests insofar as at the moment you need a toleration of various religions so that the well-being of the commonwealth may be upheld. But if I were to speak ideally, I would hope that we would work toward a Savoy-esque pan-Protestant America on the federal level and just go back to allowing each state to choose a particular established church if they so desire [Edit: I wanted to add that if we were to follow the original intent of the Constitution, then it is actually the case that everything I justified in principle in my article can already legally be done on the state level in the USA] (and even then, at least for the near-future I would hope such establishments would be operating at a very limited level, e.g. state funding or requiring that state officials be members of this denomination, establishment and support of theological universities, perhaps even a limited censorship etc.). This I think is the correct application of the following principles that I will soon address to the present circumstances in the USA, and I hope it makes things more concrete and understandable. But again my concern is only to establish the rules of the discipline and then let the particulars determine what ought to be done and so I will say no more on this.
The first thing I wish to speak on is the difference between what the magistrate can do in principle and what he ought to do in any given situation. All of my arguments in the AmRef article are constructed so as only to prove what the magistrate can do in principle. This, of course, is intentional as I have already said that this is the only way that a difference in principles between Baptists and the Reformed may be established or denied. The power of the civil magistrate is vast. It is the highest power on earth and in that respect he certainly comes closest to God out of all human offices. What the magistrate may do in principle, I have already established in my article. But it must be known that simply because the magistrate may do something in principle, this does not mean he must do so now in practice. Quite the contrary, many things that he can do in principle, he cannot do in practice since such things would upset the well-being of the commonwealth. And this is the basis upon which I argued that the English Congregationalists were justified in their disestablishment position (while at the same time recognizing that, in a different context, the American Congregationalists were justified in their establishment). Just as the civil magistrate has the right to punish murder for instance, so also it may in principle punish e.g. gluttony by which men slowly kill their own bodies. But this is not to say that the civil magistrate must punish gluttony or that it would be prudent to do so at any given time. The civil magistrate has a duty to uphold the good name, honor, and reputation of its citizens and so it may punish defamation, but it also, in principle, may punish the insult you hurl at your neighbor on your morning walk if there is sufficient reason to do so. But the entire ability for the civil magistrate to do so rests precisely in that final clause, “if there is sufficient reason to do so.” If the civil magistrate lacks sufficient natural warrant, if something is not sufficiently detrimental to the well-being of society, or if the act of punishing such a thing is itself detrimental to the well-being of society, then the government cannot do such a thing (such a law would be reasonless and so void). And a Baptist establishment (or an establishment of any one denomination) with penal backing in our time is much more akin to this (I only remind you that an establishment need not include penalties against dissent and can be something as simple as financial support, which would be much more viable in our time). Many errors in worship are not sufficiently scandalous to the public peace and well-being of the nation. This can be applied to all manner of false worship at the moment, and of course the English Puritans themselves recognized this and so were willing to tolerate many miscarriages in worship since they were not sufficiently scandalous/damaging to the well-being of the nation to justify any laws against them. And of course, if and when any laws against things are put in place, they must be proportional to the effect that such things have on the commonwealth. And this is exactly how you get to the particularism that I have argued for, since on this way what might be justified in one place and at one time is not so justified at another place and in another time since the rationale has changed with the particular circumstances.
With that, I come to the difference between the natural law and the common law. Thomas Aquinas explains that: human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. (https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2096.htm)
It is ridiculous to think, and indeed, no one among the Reformed has thought, that all evil outward works must be punished by the civil magistrate. The common law limits, contracts, and narrows the natural law so that the society might be preserved, lest the vast majority of a commonwealth constantly be under civil sanction. And I hope that my quote from Althusius showed this well in application to religious matters. The laws of each particular nation must be tempered to the virtue of the peoples, and because of this, there are many things that the civil government could almost never do in practice that it could in fact do in principle. Or, there are many things that a government is able to do with one group of people that it would not be able to do with another. And again, there are even many things that a government is able to tolerate among one people that it ought not in ordinary circumstances to tolerate among another.
This leads directly to my next point. Thomas Aquinas defended the toleration of whore-houses upon the following basis:
Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust."
As a historical point, the Reformed disagreed with his application here, but the principle that he argues this upon is sound. Indeed, he sounds very much like Althusius, who I will quote again:
The magistrate who is not able, without peril to the commonwealth, to change or overcome the discrepancy in religion and creed ought to tolerate the dissenters for the sake of public peace and tranquility, blinking his eyes and permitting them to exercise unapproved religion, lest the entire realm, and with it the household of the church, be overthrown. He shall therefore tolerate the practice of diverse religions as a skilled navigator bears with diverse and conflicting winds and clashing waves. Just as amidst these winds and waves the navigator brings his ship safely into the harbor, so the magistrate directs the commonwealth in a manner that keeps it free from ruin for the welfare of the church.
This rule could, at least in principle, be applied to any crime, though of course there are some crimes to which it hardly ever could be applied in practice (murder). But even then, we can consider the contemporary example of abortion. On the one hand, recognizing this principle ought not to make one lax or unwilling to suffer some civil unrest in hope of change. Vermigli, considering the pure worship of God says that “Wherefore for as much as the one or the other is to be chosen, the whole and uncorrupted worshipping of God ought rather to be wished for than the commodity of outward peace. For the end of cities and public-wealths is to obey God and rightly to worship God, that is by his word and prescribed rule. For to have a city or public-wealth quiet and peaceable, is not by itself necessary, but to obey God, to believe his word, and to worship him as he hath prescribed is the sum and end of all human things, and therefore it is to be preferred above all good things.” This principle that Thomas has touched on ought not to be used to stifle the will for change when such things are possible and prudent, but on the other hand, you have issues to be considered which are similar to concerns in relation to e.g. abolitionism where seeking to outlaw what ought in ordinary circumstances to be outlawed would not actually be for the well-being of society at this particular point in time since passing such laws would lead to the destruction of society and so seeking further civil reformation in such matters would actually be doing something wrong. If passing a law will cause the destruction of your nation, you have done something wrong. Thus, one may at times even have a duty to uphold the toleration of evil. Now, which approach is the correct one at this or that particular point in time in this and in this or that particular place requires a great deal of prudence. And I must say that I am not quite sure that evangelicals are yet ready to think this way as the mere suggestion that it might not actually have been prudent to e.g. abolish slavery at a certain point in time tends to provoke quite a reaction. My point here is merely that it can (and even often does) happen that even very heinous crimes must be tolerated by a civil government in order to uphold the well-being of society (we can surely think of polygamy or rampant idolatry here). And if this is so, then we can easily see how a Savoy-esque toleration will often be the ideal in Protestant nations, while at the same time recognizing that it is not the only way. Toleration is a matter of degree, not of kind. There is no substantial line between “heavier” and “lesser” matters just as there is no substantial difference between running and running well and so no principle can be established by which one must in principle be tolerated and the other must in principle not be tolerated, but rather each error must be tolerated or borne with in accordance with what is best for the well-being of each particular state at each particular time.
Furthermore, we must remember that there is often a trade-off that happens in politics where you allow certain vices a degree of liberty in order to foster other virtues (e.g. clemency) and I think Gillespie even speaks this way in Wholesome Severity when he talks about how a magistrate might "in Christian pity and moderation, he forbeareth so far as may not be destructive to the peace and right government of the Church, using his coercive power with such mixture of mercy as createth no mischief to the rest of the Church. I speak not only of bearing with those who are weak in the faith, Rom. 15.1, but of sparing even those who have perverted the faith."
With all of that said, I think we might consider a test-case to explain what I have been saying. When I tweeted out my article, I linked to Timon Cline’s article on the 1596 True Confession, one which charges the magistrate with the duty to ““root out…false ministries, voluntarie Religions, and counterfeit worship of God…Images…Altars, Vestments, and all other monuments of Idolatrie and superstition.” This, of course, includes precisely the sort of legislation in secondary matters that I argued is not in principle inconsistent with Baptistism. The men who wrote this Confession argued for laws against these smaller points of practice (e.g. vestments), and not simply against the gross idolatry of the Papists. If we are to consider what is going on in this legislation, observe: 1) such legislation could be passed because such things were extremely offensive and scandalous to the Puritans at the time and comprise false worship, which is able to be rooted out, it not being from God. 2) nevertheless, even while the men who wrote this confession were arguing against toleration in these specific secondary errors, they were not against tolerating other errors in other secondary matters (episcopacy, presbyterianism) since such could be borne with without any sufficient harm to the well-being of the commonwealth (and/or, put another way, because such things could not be legislated against without harming the well-being of the commonwealth). They were able to outlaw the first, but not the second, and they did not sin by doing the first nor by not doing the second.
Politics is not hard because its principles are difficult to know; quite the contrary, they are grasped with relative ease. Politics is hard because it deals with an unwieldy number of particular factors on a grand scale that have to be put into a practical syllogism in order to be applied. As Keckermann says, “Political Discipline moves from the universal to the particular much more than any other discipline. Hence, political matters are more numerous and abundant, and the method of this discipline is more difficult than that of all others.” Once this is grasped, you can see why such universalizing, such in-principle disallowance, such never-ing with regard to a Baptist establishment sounds quite confused and naive to my ears. And this, by the way, is the reason I think that churches ought to mostly stay out of politics. They are very ill-equipped to deal in this discipline and do not even realize how ill-equipped they actually are.
This is by far my biggest gripe with modern evangelical leaders and perhaps the main reason I wrote the article. It is not that they come to different conclusions than me. It is that they are bad political theorists. They do not understand the discipline. And because they cannot even establish the right principles, this leads them (surely unwittingly) into countless absurdities and inconsistencies. This is why they constantly commit two-kingdom violations, misunderstand the Reformed position in the ways I mentioned in my article, universalize what ought to be seen as particular, and collapse politics into theology. These things ought not to be done and they were not done by the Reformed Orthodox. If we wish to avoid errors in the most difficult of all disciplines, I strongly suggest that we look to them to get our principles in order first before we even think about making any particular judgment at all.
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