I have translated through ChatGPT Section V of Part III from Robert Baron's disputation on venial and mortal sins. I may end up translating more of this in the future. You can find the original here: https://www.prdl.org/author_view.php?a_id=129
"Do venial sins oppose charity, which is the end of the law?"
1. Bellarmine, in Book I, "De Amissione Gratiae," chapter 11, argument 3, attempts to prove that venial sins do not merit eternal death with this reasoning: Eternal punishment is not owed to sin unless by the nature of turning away from the eternal good, which is God. However, venial sin, by its nature, does not bring about a turning away from God since it does not oppose charity, as is clear. Therefore, venial sin, by its nature, is not of such a kind as to make a person deserving of eternal punishment. The proposition of this syllogism is sound and orthodox. However, the assumption and its confirmation are utterly false, as will be evident from this section and the two following ones.
2. To the question proposed in the title of this section, we respond that venial sins truly and properly oppose charity, which is the end of the law. This is because they are in conflict with the precept of charity that commands us to love God above all, or to love Him with our whole heart. We prove this firstly from the interpretations of this precept that opponents put forward. This precept is explained by Bellarmine in "De Monachis," chapters 2 and 13, and in "De Amissione Gratiae," chapter 12, in response to objection 2. Becanus also discusses it in part 2 of the Summa Theologica, treatise 4, chapter 4, question 1, section 30, where "loving God with the whole heart" is described as loving God in such a way that nothing is preferred or added to the love of God, and that we do not desire to offend God for the love or fear of any creature. Similarly, Suarez, in "De Divina Gratia," chapter 31, section 13, describes the love of God above all as a love characterized by a willing obedience, where the will desires God not only for the goodness that He possesses but also wants to please God in all things and avoid everything contrary, solely for the sake of pleasing Him. Vazquez in "In 1am 2ae disp. 194," toward the end, states that loving God with the whole heart is equivalent to loving God with a simple heart, in which nothing contrary to love is admitted.
3. Similarly, Valentine, in volume 3, "Disputation 3, Question 41, point 2," speaking about the precept commanding us to love God with our whole being, says, "By this, it is not required of us the highest intensity of the act of love, that is, to love God more than all things, but rather to appreciate supremely loving God: that is, placing nothing before God, who is our ultimate end." In fact, Thomas Aquinas himself, in "2a 2ae, Question 24, Article 12," explains the precept of charity in the same sense: "It is by the direction of charity that a person loves God, wanting to submit oneself entirely to Him and follow the rule of His commandments in all things. For whatever is contrary to His precepts is manifestly contrary to charity." Alvarez, in "De Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae, Disputation 51, Section 5, Article 4," states that loving God according to the opinion of Thomas Aquinas means referring all things to God as the ultimate end and admitting nothing in the heart contrary to divine love.
4. Indeed, according to these explanations of the precept of charity, it is evident that countless venial sins are contrary to charity. For the person who commits even the slightest venial sin willingly and with full deliberation, seeking temporal benefit or pleasure for which they sin, prioritizes that over God and His love. Consequently, such a person does not love God supremely appreciatively. They do not care about offending God for the love of some insignificant creature; they do not strive to please God in all things and avoid everything contrary to the divine will. Such a person admits into their heart something contrary to the love of God or an illicit love for creatures. As will be evident below, they do not refer all things to God as the ultimate end. In Thomas's words, such a person does not submit themselves to God in all things, nor do they follow the rule of His commandments in all things. Every sin is, indeed, a transgression of divine law; otherwise, it would not be a sin.
5. Against this argument, opponents respond in various ways and use various means to show that those who sin only venially perfectly submit themselves to God's law and follow the rule of His commandments. Some argue that venial sins are not against but beside the law. Others claim that they are not against those precepts of the law whose observance is necessary for salvation. However, these evasions are refuted by the two preceding sections.
6. Secondly, we prove by the most evident reasoning that venial sins are contrary to the precept of charity. For anyone who loves something more than God, that is, who prefers something to Him, clearly transgresses the precept of charity. Now, the person who sins venially does prefer something to God. Therefore, etc. The major premise of this syllogism is conceded by all opponents. They argue that mortal sin is contrary to charity because the one who commits it prefers the creature to the Creator. See Vazquez in "In 1am 2ae disput. 143, cap. 4, num. 7." Therefore, to establish the minor premise, which opponents tenaciously deny, we ask from them: what is it that the one who sins prefers to the Creator? Or, does the person love it more than the Creator? In what sense do they themselves say that the one who sins mortally loves the creature more than the Creator?
7. For when they say that the one who sins mortally loves the creature more than the Creator, they either understand that the person formally and expressly regards the creature as a superior good, or they understand that the person does this virtually and interpretatively—that is, behaves as if the creature were a more excellent good than God, and therefore, to be preferred to Him. The former cannot be said, for Christians committing fornication consistently believe that God is the highest good for humans. In fact, they are often so affected that they are ready to expose their lives, honor, and all their possessions to danger for the glory of God and the defense of true religion, as necessary, as Gregory Martinez teaches in "In 1am 2ae, Question 1, Article 5, Doubt 2, Response to Argument 3," and Vazquez in the same article, "Disputation 5, Chapter 1, Response to Argument 3." Furthermore, this is more confirmed by the example of those who sin mortally out of gross and willful ignorance, thinking they are offering an acceptable service to God, as Paul did during the persecution of the Church. They either do or at least seem to do what they do out of genuine love for God, and therefore, they do not formally and expressly prefer the creature to the Creator. Therefore, as Alphonso Curiel well observed, they do this only virtually and interpretatively—namely, because they dare to offend God and injure Him for the love of the creature. But the one who sins venially also does this virtually and interpretatively, because for the sake of the creature, they do not hesitate to transgress the will and command of God and thus behave as if the creature were to be preferred to the Creator. For to transgress the command and disregard the will of the Creator for the sake of the creature is to behave as if more should be attributed to the creature than to the Creator.
8. Opponents argue that there is an unequal comparison between those who sin mortally and those who sin venially in transgressing the commands of God for the sake of some creature. Firstly, they assert that the one who sins venially does not prefer the creature to God in such a way as to willingly commit a serious offense against God for its sake, as the one who sins mortally does. Secondly, they argue that the one who sins venially cannot be said to prefer the creature to divine friendship because they know that venial sins do not dissolve the friendship we have with God, as mortal sins do. However, these arguments are inept and clearly beg the question.
9. As for the first argument, it presupposes as true and certain what is precisely under dispute, namely, that venial sins are simply and absolutely speaking, light offenses. We have demonstrated the falsehood of this assumption in section 2 of this third part. Secondly, from this argument, it only follows that we willingly concede, namely, that the person who sins venially does not prefer the creature to the Creator as much as the one who sins mortally does. But what does this have to do with the matter at hand? For if in any way they prefer it, our argument stands firm, and it concludes that those who sin venially love the creature more than the Creator, virtually or interpretatively.
10. Regarding the second argument: those who commit venial sins with full deliberation, thinking that through them our friendship with God is not dissolved, or considering them to be so trivial that they do not deserve the dissolution of divine friendship, or believing that they do merit the dissolution of divine friendship but that God deals graciously with us, so He does not exclude us from His friendship. If they think that these sins do not deserve the dissolution of divine friendship, they are clearly in error, indeed, seriously sinning against God by declaring their sins to be trivial and setting limits and boundaries to the justice of God, as if God were not allowed to punish such sins with more severe penalties. The absurdity of this error is evident from the entire second part of this disputation and the preceding sections of this part. Therefore, opponents clearly beg the question when they say that these sins do not deserve the dissolution of divine friendship. If, however, they think that these sins do merit the dissolution of divine friendship and that it is by the grace of God that those who commit them are not excluded from His favor, then it follows that those who offend God by these sins for the love of creatures prefer creatures to the favor and friendship of God. For the one who, for the sake of some creature, does something that could justly exclude them from God's favor, is to be said to prefer the creature to God's favor. The contempt for divine friendship, of which they are guilty, does not excuse or mitigate in any way but, on the contrary, aggravates, especially since they know that these sins do not, in practice, exclude the justified person from the favor or friendship of God. For since it is solely and uniquely by the grace of God that venial sins do not exclude the sinner from God's favor, certainly those who abuse this mercy for the license to sin flagrantly disdain the friendship of God, transferring His grace into a license for lasciviousness.
11. From the arguments we have effectively refuted in the opponents' defenses, it is clear that Vazquez is mistaken in Disputation 143 in 1am 2ae of Thomas Aquinas, Chapter 4, Number 7. He follows Alexander of Hales, who asserts that the one who sins venially loves the creature apart from God, but not above God or equally with God. Even though the righteous person, sinning venially, loves God above all, as long as they sin venially, they prefer the creature to God and, therefore, love the creature above God, as we have already demonstrated. This is confirmed by Vazquez's own words in this passage where he states that loving the creature apart from God is like loving it as if the love for the creature were separated from the love for God. However, this assertion that loving the creature apart from God is like loving it without opposing the divine law of charity is erroneous. For the love of creatures in venial sin directly contradicts the law of divine charity, as explained by the Pontiffs themselves, as abundantly evident from the citations of their testimonies above.
