All these things deal with absolute possibility (God's absolute power/right), not with what is fitting for God. Edits deal with my current answers.
I do not know whether man could have been created without original righteousness. I know the Reformed charge Rome with making God the author of sin for affirming this (Turretin 1:471) but at the same time they hold that God does in fact create men destitute of original righteousness and is not the author of sin since to infuse unrighteousness and not to give righteousness differ. Therefore I am unsure whether this charge holds. As such, I cannot use the author of sin argument against Rome.
Edit: Man cannot in his original state be created without original righteousness because it is due to him *in his original state* though not simply because he is man. However, this answer applies only to His ordained power, but the question is asking about His absolute power.
Regarding original righteousness, the Reformed hold that the absence of it is itself sin. They furthermore hold that God does even now actually create souls destitute of original righteousness.
The common answer given to avoid making God the author of sin is something like the one given by Van Mastricht:
that in this reasoning God would become the author of sin, if namely it [original sin] were something besides a privation or absence of original righteousness; for although he be the author of a corrupt habit, yet he is not the author of the corruption and lawlessness itself, which is added to the habit by the creature through original unrighteousness.
But it may be thought thatif this reasoning holds good in avoiding making God the author of sin in His ordained power as He currently creates souls destitute of OR, then it also holds good in His absolute power. So in the beginning, in His absolute power, God could have created man destitute of OR and thus unrighteous since the same reasoning would apply (that “although he be the author of a corrupt habit, yet he is not the author of the corruption and lawlessness itself, which is added to the habit by the creature through original unrighteousness”.)
I know there might be an objection made by looking at something like Turretin’s answer in 1:642, that God can only withhold OR on the basis of it being a punishment for a previous sin. But this seems to 1) ignore that the same reasoning that is sufficient for excusing God would likewise apply to the hypothetical 2) have in view God’s ordained power by which He wisely and fittingly decrees not to withhold OR from anyone except on account of the first sin; so this response is irrelevant as we’re speaking of what God can do in His absolute power.
The conclusion I’ve come to here is very very strange to me. But perhaps I’m not that far off, as in reading through Voetius’s Syllabus of Theological Questions recently, he asks “An Deus potuit hominem ethice non bonum condere?” to which he very interesting, does not answer with a negation, but simply “Question Curious”, which at least shows there isn’t an obvious contradiction here for him.
However, to throw one more wrench in here that may decide that the two are indeed unlike and so God can't create man with such a privation in the original state: I can't articulate this perfectly yet, but the Book of Causes, Theses 1 and 19 likely argue against this in that Adam is created directly from uncorruoted matter, but we are not. Corrupted human nature remains an instrumental cause in our generation and so this seems to create the difference.
I don't know whether God could torment an innocent creature eternally in Hell. I know Turretin says this necessarily has the relation of penal evil, but I am unsure because I am unsure whether physical evil always only follows moral evil. So Mastricht says God could prick a man's finger and therefore reasons God could even kill an innocent man and reasons that the blind man who Jesus said did not sin shows this. Yet Turretin holds that since physical evil necessarily follows moral evil, the blind man must have been being punished for his own sin and thus it seems Turretin cannot hold even that a man's finger could be pricked. I know Mastricht holds God cannot punish eternally in Hell, but I don't see what reason he can hold that God can prick a finger and kill yet not eternally torment. Just keep intensifying the torment. Where does it stop? Can he torment only physically forever yet not spiritually and physically? I know Turretin affirms God can annihilate because this is to take back what He gave, but why does this same reasoning not apply to killing (as Aquinas holds that it does)? In fact, why not apply this to all quality of life? He has given quality of life, why not take it away in torment? As such, I cannot use the "Jesus bled, therefore, He must have borne our sin" argument, or the "infants die, therefore they must be sinful" argument, or the argument against theistic evolution from creaturely death.
Edit: I lean toward saying He can torment in Hell an innocent man, however, Voetius brings up the issue that a rational creature, seeing such endless torment, would sin and thus not be innocent. Yet his reasoning seems to assume that despair in the damned is sin. With Thomas Aquinas, I can't see how this is so since despair has relation to promises and to hope there are no promises or hope to be given to those in Hell and thus it seems that in their situation despair would not be sinful (this line of thinking actually led Maccovius to deny that there even is despair in Hell, but I think this to be a wrong conclusion). Turretin is right that all evil is from sin (either original or actual) since all pain of loss and sense are either chastisements or punishments. Thus there are natural evils that are not punishments for sin. The infant death argument ought to be seen only as a probabilistic argument. Likewise, Jesus bleeding is only probabilistic (I add here that in order for His sufferings to be satisfactory, they must be of the essence of eternal punishment which is of loss and sense, so mere bleeding is not satisfactory).
I do not know whether God could annihilate man, but I think it likely.
Edit: I don't know what I meant when I wrote this. Obviously I know God can in His absolute power annihilate man, even an innocent man, but I think this may have been related to a reading of Turretin where he seems to say that natural life should continue to Adam upon obedience. To this I say, yes, it should as something congruent and fitting, but not in strict justice and so God can still annihilate even an obedient man.
I do not know whether God could create man without binding Him to work for eternal life or permanent natural life.
Edit: If to work for eternal natural life is taken in the sense that such a life is congruent to his working and continued existence, then yeah of course God must create man to continue living natural life as long as He wills to keep him in existence. A right to natural life can be established, yes, but only by covenant. When it comes to eternal life, yes, God could have created man void of supernatural gifts or even with supernatural gifts and not given him eternal life, but if supernatural gifts are given, it is congruent that God lead man into covenant with Himself so that he might have a chance to earn eternal life.
I do not know whether God could have given the right to eternal life or permanent natural life apart from any works.
Edit: Yes, He could have, but He does not usually operate this way but instead has man work to obtain his final end.
I do not know whether perfect obedience to the law is necessary for justifying ex pacto merit for eternal life or permanent natural life, atonement being assumed.
Edit: This is a good question. I wish to say that it is not absolutely necessary, but fitting. God, absolutely speaking, could decree any good work insofar as it is good to merit eternal life, even a purely natural one. But it is fitting and congruent that He decrees only perfect and supernatural obedience to merit eternal life as He did in the case of Adam and Christ. That God can constitute any act (or a series of acts/habits) to be meritorious towards any reward can be proven because there is no inherent proportion between our works and any reward. Merit is solely ex pacto and so the relation between any act(s)/habits and a reward is solely set by God in covenant. Thus Christ and Adam (or us) both could have merited eternal life any number of ways. Because of this, I think it's impossible to say exactly what acts of Christ constitute the matter of His obedience (as well as what acts of Adam would have) but I would assume it is the entire obedience of Christ at the very least from the time He was baptized and would also assume that even His habitual righteousness is imputed to us, but I cannot prove this.
As a result of the above 3, I do not know whether the active obedience of Christ was absolutely necessary for justification.
Edit: Absolutely necessary, no. God could have decreed that we merit through imperfect works. Again, merit is whatever a certain covenant says that it is. He could have decreed to simply give us the right to life. It is also doubtful whether passive obedience itself is absolutely necessary (Rutherford, Norton).
This post was made from my notes on doing a possible Thd dissertation at PRTS. At present, my notes are as follows:
In Systemic Theology: Do a dissertation on the relation between the CoW and the moral law and merit (specifically ex pacto) seek to answer this https://www.1689federalism.com/forum/index.php?threads/question-on-the-nature-of-merit.68/, put simply can the necessity of perfect (in quality and degree) active obedience in ex pacto merit for eternal life simpliciter (and therefore even assuming atonement) be proven to be a part of, not only God's free knowledge, but of His natural knowledge? Or again, how necessary and precisely in what sense is meritorious active obedience necessary for a right to life?
Or more broadly, on the rights of creatures on God. Put negatively,
Can He annihilate? Can he inflict torture (though not penal and spiritually eternal) on an innocent creature even forever and physical during natural life (cf Mastricht about being poked with a needle, it seems Turretin logically must deny He can do this; could a man even do this without sin for no reason to an animal?) and therefore be non-penal suffering (could He kill, not annihilate, but kill an innocent creature; Aquinas appears to affirm)? What of eternal torment in Hell if we allow the prior things (Twisse)? Is not quality of life also given by God so it can be taken? Turretin all suffering caused by either imputed or inherent sin, what of Job and the man Jesus said neither his parents or him sinned or childbirth pain before sin? If we follow Mastricht, how argue for lifelong passive obedience? How argue infants must be sinful just from the fact they die? Supposing a perfectly innocent creature, apart from any consideration of sin, what is God able to or not able to do?
Can He:
1. Prick their finger?
2. Inflict torment on them?
3. Inflict permanent physical torment on them in life?
4. Inflict permanent physical and spiritual torment on them in life?
5. Take their life/kill them?
6. Inflict eternal spiritual and physical torment on them in Hell?
Put positively,
Could God have just given us the legal right to life apart from perfect obedience by us or Christ (if he could do so for Adam and did so for angels, why not atoned for sinners; unless we posit an angelic CoW)?, Or, if one sins, is atoned for, then made righteous perfectly, can they then merit (Turretin 2:454:XXX seems to say no)? How does he reward unbelieving nations for outward obedience (see Turretin on rewards of good works)? Could he likewise grant eternal natural life to outward sinful obedience?, what Turretin mean when he say one cannot be given remission without first given imputed righteousness when he admits that absolutely speaking the atoned for Adam could (if this is just how it is, isn't this a bad argument since it is what needs to be proved?; or does he include passive obedience in that righteousness in which case he's obviously correct but still proves nothing?); what he mean when he says that God demands a "satisfaction" when referring to necessity of perfect righteousness; could christ die immediately for sin, how do all people know of the final judgment, "natural" desire to merit, and deal with larger questions of "desert", connection between moral and physical good, "award me according to my righteousness", distributive justice, how do we account for all men being "under the law" in something of a CoW sense when Adam is only the one who could merit (Taking a view contra Turretin) does any of this help answer whether eternal rewards are ex pacto merited?; Turretin 2:447:IX "one action alone cannot be meritorious" how make sense on ex pacto merit and what about angels if we hold they had to merit too or Adam which I hold would only have to kill the serpent (or at least all things until then) I want to say that strictly speaking all of Christ's life did not have to be imputed to us for righteousness but it is more likely that it is? Likewise 452:XXV seems to assume he had to do literally everything the moral law required in order to merit but the moral law does not require one perform every single possible act; Turretin, since he denies Adam's righteousness would be imputed, appears to think that we all are currently under the CoW to merit (2:452:XXVI)
Can we even make another distinction and say that He could grant a never-sinful being the right to eternal life apart from works, but not a once sinful being?
Can we say the CoW principle is a moral positive law similar to sabbath? See Norton Discussion of that Great Point, Part II above page 190. How does it get positively changed after Adam's sin? Unbelievers under obligation to merit yet also to forsake merit? If we take this do we have to abandon 7.1? How do Christians relate to this positive moral law?
There are some things that can be conceptually hypothetical but can never actually exist/happen in reality (think Bonaventure on angels being pure form that are frozen), where exactly am I forgetting to apply this in these questions?
If condemnation is being under a penalty, and Christ was under penalty for our sins, satisfying them his whole life, can we say he was condemned His whole life?
if Christ is not raised, are we damned with Him or does (or can) Turretin's hypothetical result? (it seems to me the "you are still in your sins of Christ is not raised" is to bring attention to the fact He was judicially condemned in death and his resurrection validates Him yet technically speaking He was not condemned by God while in Sheol but did fully expiate sins at Golgotha)
(and while i'm there doing other classes, just ask about nature/grace, "pure nature", donum, natural desire beatific vision, faculty psychology, the faith/love issue, michael lynch HU and the Turretin argument I think fails https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/question-on-turretin-contra-hypothetical-universalism.109092/, and ryan hurd on atonement/wrath; Turretin 1:471 Roman pure nature makes God the author of sin, but we hold that He actually does create souls destitute of OG righteousness, which is sin, so how can we accuse them of this?; how does the same principle not still apply? Saying it is punishment doesn't get to the principle because in any event He cannot infuse impurity because He would be the author of sin, but He can create w/o OG righteousness and not be the author of sin; the question is not what is He bound to create while creating an intact nature or one made in His Image perfectly, but what is He bound to create as man simply?)
Perhaps an argument can be made along the following lines: remove eternal life from the equation, think only of permanent natural life. It seems that an imperfect work (even considering the sin being forgiven) is in itself not proportionate to permanent natural life since it is naturally defective so it is not commensurate to the reward. If this is so, then how much more are imperfect works improportionate to eternal life?
When Turretin denies our works are proportionate to eternal life this can be counted true but only in the sense that it is accidentally so both because 1) they are sinful so imperfect and 2) we have no promise of eternal life given to us so it isn't as if they have some proportion to eternal life in that sense (though if we had such a promise, it would be proportionate if our obedience was perfect because then they would have inherent proportionality in another sense).
So we can indeed grant that works have to be proportionate to the reward in themselves in a certain sense. Thus for example, Israel's obedience was proportionate to their earthly blessings (as it seems God often rewards generally obedient nations with outward blessings anyways).
When Aquinas affirms that God could have created man and angels perfect in glory, this can be understood in the absolute sense of God's power in that there is nothing inherently undoable on the part of God in this specific action. He can through His absolute power do this. But perhaps He cannot actually do this because of other reasons (a moral positive covenant of works principle). Perhaps similarly, God can (and does) create souls destitute of OG righteousness, but it being posited that He created man for the first time, He had to create him with it due to His holiness.
And finally a suggestion: as we see from the example of OG righteousness, God can have a specific obligation to the first creature. Why not say that the moral positive law of the works principle is limited to the first man?
When Aquinas talks about the angels meriting his reasoning that creatures must perform an operation to reach their final end may be helpful here (though he probably applies it to humans wrongly with merit; instead Christ's operation is imputed to us)
Going off this idea of proportionality, can we say that good works ex pacto merit eternal rewards? Can we say perfection is needed for the substance of eternal life, but the degree of it does not require perfection just as the spiritual good we do is in some measure proportional to our eternal state (I mean that the grace of our good works is glory begun)? Or ought we to say they cannot merit it in substance or degree and so there is no merit with our eternal rewards?
^ Ground the necessity of active obedience not in absolute necessity, but in the wise disposing of God which normally operates by making creatures work by merit to obtain their supernatural end by grace (whether that be our works or Christ’s imputed to us)
Note: ordering people to eternal life is a natural duty of government; it seems then that obtaining eternal life is built into man (see Wolfe 293). Not necessarily, no, because grace orders one towards it but is not necessarily obtained by it even if in whatever situation government exists in (before the fall under law, or after the fall under the gospel) eternal life has actually been able to be obtained (whether by works or by faith)
Going back to mortal/venial sins, if we say that all sins are contrary to charity/the last end, then it becomes hard to see how anything short of perfection can be proportionate to eternal life. So maybe that helps.