Things I do not know (now updated cuz I do know)

All these things deal with absolute possibility (God's absolute power/right), not with what is fitting for God. Edits deal with my current answers.

I do not know whether man could have been created without original righteousness. I know the Reformed charge Rome with making God the author of sin for affirming this (Turretin 1:471) but at the same time they hold that God does in fact create men destitute of original righteousness and is not the author of sin since to infuse unrighteousness and not to give righteousness differ. Therefore I am unsure whether this charge holds. As such, I cannot use the author of sin argument against Rome.

Edit: Man cannot in his original state be created without original righteousness because it is due to him *in his original state* though not simply because he is man. However, this answer applies only to His ordained power, but the question is asking about His absolute power.

Regarding original righteousness, the Reformed hold that the absence of it is itself sin. They furthermore hold that God does even now actually create souls destitute of original righteousness.

The common answer given to avoid making God the author of sin is something like the one given by Van Mastricht:

that in this reasoning God would become the author of sin, if namely it [original sin] were something besides a privation or absence of original righteousness; for although he be the author of a corrupt habit, yet he is not the author of the corruption and lawlessness itself, which is added to the habit by the creature through original unrighteousness.

But it may be thought thatif this reasoning holds good in avoiding making God the author of sin in His ordained power as He currently creates souls destitute of OR, then it also holds good in His absolute power. So in the beginning, in His absolute power, God could have created man destitute of OR and thus unrighteous since the same reasoning would apply (that “although he be the author of a corrupt habit, yet he is not the author of the corruption and lawlessness itself, which is added to the habit by the creature through original unrighteousness”.)

I know there might be an objection made by looking at something like Turretin’s answer in 1:642, that God can only withhold OR on the basis of it being a punishment for a previous sin. But this seems to 1) ignore that the same reasoning that is sufficient for excusing God would likewise apply to the hypothetical 2) have in view God’s ordained power by which He wisely and fittingly decrees not to withhold OR from anyone except on account of the first sin; so this response is irrelevant as we’re speaking of what God can do in His absolute power.

That God cannot even in His absolute power do this, I point you to the Book of Causes, Theses 1 and 19 likely argue against this in that Adam is created directly from uncorruoted matter, but we are not. Corrupted human nature remains an instrumental cause in our generation and so this seems to create the difference. Only good can come directly from God and so without any corrupt matter, He could not create a soul devoid of OR.

I don't know whether God could torment an innocent creature eternally in Hell. I know Turretin says this necessarily has the relation of penal evil, but I am unsure because I am unsure whether physical evil always only follows moral evil. So Mastricht says God could prick a man's finger and therefore reasons God could even kill an innocent man and reasons that the blind man who Jesus said did not sin shows this. Yet Turretin holds that since physical evil necessarily follows moral evil, the blind man must have been being punished for his own sin and thus it seems Turretin cannot hold even that a man's finger could be pricked. I know Mastricht holds God cannot punish eternally in Hell, but I don't see what reason he can hold that God can prick a finger and kill yet not eternally torment. Just keep intensifying the torment. Where does it stop? Can he torment only physically forever yet not spiritually and physically? I know Turretin affirms God can annihilate because this is to take back what He gave, but why does this same reasoning not apply to killing (as Aquinas holds that it does)? In fact, why not apply this to all quality of life? He has given quality of life, why not take it away in torment? As such, I cannot use the "Jesus bled, therefore, He must have borne our sin" argument, or the "infants die, therefore they must be sinful" argument, or the argument against theistic evolution from creaturely death.

Edit: I lean toward saying He can torment in Hell an innocent man, however, Voetius brings up the issue that a rational creature, seeing such endless torment, would sin and thus not be innocent. Yet his reasoning seems to assume that despair in the damned is sin. With Thomas Aquinas, I can't see how this is so since despair has relation to promises and to hope there are no promises or hope to be given to those in Hell and thus it seems that in their situation despair would not be sinful (this line of thinking actually led Maccovius to deny that there even is despair in Hell, but I think this to be a wrong conclusion). Turretin is right that all evil is from sin (either original or actual) since all pain of loss and sense are either chastisements or punishments, but this is not to say that it absolutely must be this way (for God could inflict evil on an innocent creature). The infant death argument (in order to show them sinful) ought to be seen only as a congruent argument. Likewise, Jesus bleeding (in order to show our sins imputed to Him) is only congruent (I add here that in order for His sufferings to be satisfactory, they must be of the essence of eternal punishment which involves both loss and sense, so mere material bleeding is not satisfactory. Yet I also say that these things do not have to happen at the same time, so that we may say that both loss and/or sense may be considered as satisfactory).

I do not know whether God could annihilate man, but I think it likely.

Edit: I don't know what I meant when I wrote this. Obviously I know God can in His absolute power annihilate man, even an innocent man, but I think this may have been related to a reading of Turretin where he seems to say that natural life should continue to Adam upon obedience. To this I say, yes, it should as something congruent and fitting, but not in strict justice and so God can still annihilate even an obedient man (though it would not be congruent of Him to do so, yet this is not to say that it is impossible per His absolute power).

I do not know whether God could create man without binding Him to work for eternal life or permanent natural life.

Edit: If to work for eternal natural life is taken in the sense that such a life is congruent to his working and continued existence, then yeah of course God must create man to continue living natural life as long as He wills to keep him in existence. A right to natural life can be established, yes, but only by covenant. When it comes to eternal life, yes, God could have created man void of supernatural gifts or even with supernatural gifts and not given him eternal life, but if supernatural gifts are given, it is congruent that God lead man into covenant with Himself so that he might have a chance to earn eternal life.

I do not know whether God could have given the right to eternal life or permanent natural life apart from any works.

Edit: Yes, He could have, but He does not usually operate this way but instead has man work to obtain his final end.

I do not know whether perfect obedience to the law is necessary for justifying ex pacto merit for eternal life or permanent natural life, atonement being assumed.

Edit: This is a good question. I wish to say that it is not absolutely necessary, but fitting. God, absolutely speaking, could decree any good work insofar as it is good to merit eternal life, even a purely natural one (and Scotus affirms this explicitly). But it is fitting and congruent that He decrees only perfect and supernatural obedience to merit eternal life as He did in the case of Adam and Christ. That God can constitute any act (or a series of acts/habits) to be meritorious towards any reward can be proven because there is no inherent proportion between our works and any reward. Merit is solely ex pacto and so the relation between any act(s)/habits and a reward is solely set by God in covenant. Thus Christ and Adam (or us) both could have merited eternal life any number of ways. Because of this, I think it's impossible to say exactly what acts of Christ constitute the matter of His obedience (as well as what acts of Adam would have) but I would assume it is the entire obedience of Christ at the very least from the time He was baptized and would also assume that even His habitual righteousness is imputed to us, but I cannot prove this.

As a result of the above 3, I do not know whether the active obedience of Christ was absolutely necessary for justification.

Edit: Absolutely necessary, no. God could have decreed that we merit through imperfect works. Again, merit is whatever a certain covenant says that it is. He could have decreed to simply give us the right to life. It is also doubtful whether passive obedience itself is absolutely necessary (Rutherford, Norton, Twisse), and I am inclined to say it is not.