Question: Is there a distinct contemplative life, as indicated by the Pontiff in the preceding chapter? Also addressed by Thomas in his Summa Theologica (Part II-II, Question 127, Articles 1-2 and Question 182, Response). Response: No.
Because the contemplation of divine things, constant meditation on divine precepts, and the resulting love of God are essential aspects of the contemplative life, which are common to all believers, as Scripture affirms (Psalms 1, Philippians 1:9-10, 1 Peter 2:3, Colossians 3:1-2), particularly evident in the busy lives of figures like David (Psalms 16 and 19) and Joshua (Joshua 1:7-8).
The active life cannot be separated from the contemplative; for all are commanded to practice love for one's neighbor and maintain a blameless conscience towards all people (1 Timothy 1:3-5, Matthew 22:37-38, Colossians 1, 1 John 3:21). The love of God, which contemplatives often boast of as their own, should not be separated from the love of one's neighbor (as noted by Belarmine and Azorius). Both should be exercised and enhanced jointly and intensively by every faithful person, as wisely advised by Claudius Spineus in the Epitome of Lombard's Sentences.
Because the specific distinction between the contemplative and active life also establishes two distinct theological perspectives. This contradicts Christian theology, whose end is not only theoretical but especially practical (1 Timothy 1:3-5, James 1:22 and following). More on this can be seen in Polanus's Syntagma, book 5, chapter 134 and onwards.
Because, by this reasoning, the noble acts of loving one's neighbor are disregarded, such as instruction, encouragement, correction, consolation, setting a good example, and mutual consideration (Romans 15:1, 1 Thessalonians 5:11, Hebrews 3, Matthew 5:19, Hebrews 10). Service through love (Galatians 5:13) encompasses these acts, which are explained elsewhere explicitly. Contemplatives neither provide examples nor receive them, etc.
Because those who follow them wants to be wiser and more perfect than Christ and the Apostles, who were not engaged in such a contemplative life.
To all of this, I want to add something of my own. The thing that has kept me in doubt here as to whether it is correct to deny an abstract superiority of the contemplative life over the active considered in themselves is the argument that the direct object of the first, being God, is superior to the direct object of the second, being our neighbor, even as it would seem love of God is superior to love of neighbor. However, when I go to read how Thomas attempts to make this argument, observe:
As stated above (I-II:114:4), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (II-II:25:1), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (II-II:27:8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3182.htm#article2
To my mind, this argument seems to be incorrect. Loving one’s neighbor for the sake of God is greater than loving God alone. Something of a comparison might be made here to Augustine's statement that although the higher things are better than the lower things, the sum of all creation is better than the higher things alone. Of course, there is disparity here in that the "lower things" in this case would be love of neighbor completely divorced from love of God, which is always illicit. But Thomas is not thinking of love of neighbor divorced from love of God here but instead very clearly specifies he has in mind love of our neighbor for God's sake.
In another place https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3027.htm#article8 Thomas himself says:
Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other. On this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 John 4:21).
The relevant comparison he is trying to make in the first quote is, as we have said, between love of God and “love of our neighbor for God’s sake” but as we see in the second quote, “love of one’s neighbor for God’s sake” is clearly more perfect than loving God alone. Thus, unless the active life pertains only to love of neighbor to the exclusion of love of God, Thomas has made an invalid inference in his first argument.
Perhaps Voetius has misunderstood Thomas here. It is not quite clear to me why the distinction cannot be accepted as two aspects of life all are supposed to have and the contemplative aspect held to be intrinsically superior while nevertheless there having to be a golden mean sought between the two. Regardless, I'm still skeptical about the distinction itself, as in my reading, it seems the concept is rather convoluted historically speaking and there doesn't seem to be a whole lot of consistency between thinkers as to what we're even talking about here. Indeed, here https://core.ac.uk/reader/223025150 it is argued that earlier thinkers like Philo and Augustine are thinking of stages within the lives of the faithful when they speak of the two lives, which is quite different than how the medievals are thinking here. I don't know. I need to do more reading.