Question: Is there a distinct contemplative life, as indicated by the Pontiff in the preceding chapter? Also addressed by Thomas in his Summa Theologica (Part II-II, Question 127, Articles 1-2 and Question 182, Response). Response: No.
Because the contemplation of divine things, constant meditation on divine precepts, and the resulting love of God are essential aspects of the contemplative life, which are common to all believers, as Scripture affirms (Psalms 1, Philippians 1:9-10, 1 Peter 2:3, Colossians 3:1-2), particularly evident in the busy lives of figures like David (Psalms 16 and 19) and Joshua (Joshua 1:7-8).
The active life cannot be separated from the contemplative; for all are commanded to practice love for one's neighbor and maintain a blameless conscience towards all people (1 Timothy 1:3-5, Matthew 22:37-38, Colossians 1, 1 John 3:21). The love of God, which contemplatives often boast of as their own, should not be separated from the love of one's neighbor (as noted by Belarmine and Azorius). Both should be exercised and enhanced jointly and intensively by every faithful person, as wisely advised by Claudius Spineus in the Epitome of Lombard's Sentences.
Because the specific distinction between the contemplative and active life also establishes two distinct theological perspectives. This contradicts Christian theology, whose end is not only theoretical but especially practical (1 Timothy 1:3-5, James 1:22 and following). More on this can be seen in Polanus's Syntagma, book 5, chapter 134 and onwards.
Because, by this reasoning, the noble acts of loving one's neighbor are disregarded, such as instruction, encouragement, correction, consolation, setting a good example, and mutual consideration (Romans 15:1, 1 Thessalonians 5:11, Hebrews 3, Matthew 5:19, Hebrews 10). Service through love (Galatians 5:13) encompasses these acts, which are explained elsewhere explicitly. Contemplatives neither provide examples nor receive them, etc.
Because those who follow them wants to be wiser and more perfect than Christ and the Apostles, who were not engaged in such a contemplative life.
Perhaps Voetius has misunderstood Thomas here. It is not quite clear to me why the distinction cannot be accepted as two aspects of life all are supposed to have and the contemplative aspect held to be intrinsically superior while nevertheless there having to be a golden mean sought between the two. Book X of Aristotle's ethics seems to establish such a distinction. I think perhaps Voetius could accept such a thing in principle. Nevertheless, I think perhaps the difference lies in working out what pertains to each life? For instance, Voetius might argue that one might be able to engage in the contemplative life as a plumber as much as or perhaps even more than one might be able to as a professor. This here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A11070.0001.001/1:13?rgn=div1;view=fulltext strikes a good balance and I can't imagine Voetius disagreeing, although I do not think it to be much different from Thomas himself.
Regardless, I will add that the common argument used by the medievals based upon this point, to prove that celibacy is intrinsically better than marriage seems to fail: https://x.com/BrandonCorley99/status/1743453827456741714 at best one can argue from it a relative and limited superiority insofar as it might be more ordered to the contemplative life (but I'm unsure if even this is rightly said since it is only a help for it considering that a married man who lives rightly ought to be just as contemplative as the one who is celibate and the celibate just as active) , but certainly, in itself and absolutely considered, marriage is are much superior to celibacy as form is to privation.
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