Does every angel differ in species? (Inclined to no/No)
Voetius: Do all angels differ in species? Not clear and inclined to the negative [Note that Voetius holds to haecceity of the principle of individuation]
Van Mastricht: In it they [angels] differ not as species, as the Thomists among the papists suppose, from the fact that individuals are not constituted except through materia signata, "designated matter", which is not present in angels, but as singulars, because they partake of the common nature of a spirit—a distinction that is especially evident in separated souls.
2. Are they composed of matter and form? (No)
Voetius: Are they composed from matter and form? No
Turretin: Spiritual faculties and operations are atrributed to them which cannot proceed from a corporeal nature and which, therefore, necessarily demand a spiritual and immaterial cause...Body...denotes what is material
Senguerdius: Matter from which, more properly the material cause, can also be termed physical matter, because it is part of a physical body, from which it is understood that matter is not given in spiritual beings.
Van Mastricht: They are acknowledged to be immaterial substances
3. Are they in place by essence? (Yes)
Voetius: Are angels in a place through external operation alone? No.
Voetius: Are they local or non-local in their essence, and are they in a place? Distinguish
Van Mastricht: The place of their existing, which they occupy not only by reason of their operating, but by coexistence; nor by circumscription, as if they were bounded extrinsically, like bodies; nor by repletion, or infinite coexistence; but by delimitation, whereby on account of the finitude of their essence, they are so restricted to this place that they may not be in a different one. Thus it is said that in one man there was a legion (Luke 8:30).
Van Mastricht: They are finite spirits, not because they are limited by the area of a body, but because they are limited by the intrinsic limits of their essence.
Van Mastricht: The common opinion of the Reformed is that angels, because they are substances different from their thoughts, as they are from their actions, by reason of that substance are truly and properly in a place, although only in a delimited manner, in one place in such a way that at the same time they are not in another.
Turretin: Whatever is finite, for that very reason, ought to be bounded by its own certain "where," i.e., may be so here as not to be there. Nor can virtual presence be separated here from substantial, since the former necessarily supposes the latter as its principle. For as to operate supposes existence, so every cause ought to be where it operates. However, although the presence of angels may be known a posteriori from their operation, it does not follow that the whole relation of presence consists in operation alone, since it is not always necessary for it to operate at least outwardly. Nor is it more absurd for an angel to be somewhere by essence than by operation, since both are spiritual. Now although contact between body and spirit cannot be conceived, yet we can well understand that there may be a relation between them (as between two things mutually coexisting with each other) which suffices for founding the relation of presence or whereness (ubietatis) in a spirit. As therefore an angel does not by essence have a relation to place, as if it occupied and was coextensive with it, still it does not cease to have a relation (schesin) to the locality in which it is by the finiteness of its essence (indivisibly and without the extension of itself).
Turretin: In vain, however, is it objected here by some that motion cannot be ascribed to an angel, except insofar as it changes in operation. Since it cannot operate except where it is, it cannot change its operation without a change of its substantial locality. Scripture clearly intimates this when it speaks concerning the advent and departure of angels. Indeed they could not descend to earth without leaving heaven, nor go up to heaven without departing from the earth (and so changing their previous "where"; otherwise they would be everywhere).
Senguerdius: From the finiteness of the angels's essence, it follows that they are not omnipresent but exist in a specfic and definite space or pplace, which is termed being in a place definitively. This space or place seems to vary in size, for the same rational soul is contained in a smaller or larger body. They change this space or place when they are sent from heaven to earth.
4. Do they move instantaneously? (No) And do they pass through the middle? (Yes)
Voetius: Do they move in time or in an instant? Distinguish prior, deny latter
Voetius: Do they move from place to place by passing through a medium? Affirmative
Voetius: Is the movement of an angel discrete in an instant? No
Voetius: Can the movement of an angel be continuous? Distinguish
Van Mastricht: A local motion by which they pass from place to place, which although it is most rapid, since no medium resists it...yet it occurs not in a moment but successively.
Sengueridus: The movement of angels from one place to another occurs very quickly, as they encounter no resistance from the medium, but not instantaneously, as the distance between termini makes instantaneous movement impossible.
5. Do they have discursive knowledge? (Unclear/Yes)
Voetius: Is the angelic intellect discursive? Not clear, inquiry permitted.
Turretin: The knowledge also is not intuitive and cognizable by the intellect, but discursive and rationcinative.
Van Mastricht: Whatever they know, they understand through intelligible species, whether implanted in them through creation or revealed by God, or derived from things by perceiving or discursive knowledge.
Senguerdius: Not only apprehensive but also judicative and discursive cognition is given in angels, by which they conclude one thing from another.
6. Do they have both an agent and patient intellect?
Voetius: Do angels have both an agent and patient intellect? No [this denial is perhaps related to Burgersdijk’s position on the human intellect that: “It does not therefore seem necessary to imagine an agent intellect whose task is not indeed to understand, but to illuminate phantasms so that in them universal natures appear, and to concur with the illuminated phantasms to produce intelligible species; whether it is imagined to be a substance which is separated from the soul, or a faculty which is really diverse from that intellect which receives intelligible species and understands through them. Against Coimbra commentators On the Soul book 3, chapter 5, questions 1, 2, 5, and 6. Toledo there questions 13 and 14. Zabarella On the Agent Mind. The intellect can however be called agent insofar as, the species having been received, it actually understands and forms in itself a concept or mental word. Toledo cited book, question 22. Nor does anything else seem to follow from the argument of Aristotle On the Soul book 3, chapter 5. For it is not absurd that agent and patient are not distinguished in reality in an immanent action.”]
7. Do they know through their own essence? (No)
Voetius: Do angels know through their essence, or is the essence of an angel its own intellectual power? Is the understanding or knowledge of an angel inherent in its substance? No.
Van Mastricht: Although that intellect is much more perfect than ours...yet it does not know by its own essence, because it is by no means the exemplar and cause of all things.
Turretin: Angels do not understand by their own essence; for thus the angelic essence would contain all things and be the cause and image of them. Rather they understand by certain representations and ideas or similitudes.
Senguerdius: The principle of angelic intellect is the essence of angels themselves, just like in us, it is the rational soul. However, they cannot be said to understand things other than themselves through their essence if it is understood that by understanding themselves, they understand things other than themselves, for other things are not contained in the essence of angels. Nor can it be said that the knowledge of angels is the essence of angels, for many knowable things that they previously were ignorant of, they later often know. Lastly, it should not be said that angels understand what they know through their essence if it is taken to mean understanding immediately without species; for the object of the intellect must be united in understanding, and since the very things understood do not unite with the essence of angels (for they understand even things absent), they are united through species, and thus they understand through species.
8. Why are the evil angels obstinate and did the angels obtain glory in the first instant?
Voetius: Are the angels who have sinned naturally inflexible and can the devil no longer wish to repent? Affirmative
Voetius: Why is grace given to humans but not to devils? If there is anything beyond pure divine will, it seems inadequate and curious.
Voetius: Could the devil have repented if God had granted him time and grace? Question curious.
Voetius: Did angels immediately after the first instant obtain glory? Not clear and question curious.
Voetius: Did they have beatitude immediately after one meritorious act? Question absurd and curious
Turretin: Thomas Aquinas, Cajetan and others are deceived, who think that they could not (if it so pleased God) be restored to their former state because they are inflexible in their own nature. For what is in its own nature inflexible (if it seems proper to God) can be bent by the powerful efficacy of divine grace.
Turretin: That some interval occurred between the creation of angels, the work of God and their defection (the action of demons) is asserted with reason. If their first operation is maintained to be vicious, it does not seem that the cause of the vice should be charged against God, the Creator, as the nearest efficient. Nor is it very likely that they fell before the work of creation was finished because then all that God had created was still very good (Gen. 1:31).
9. Do they naturally love God more than themselves?
Voetius: Does an angel naturally love God more than itself? Question absurd and curious [I must say that I find this an especially strange answer].
Senguerdius: they love God most of all, because their love cannot be disordered.
I draw here from Voetius's Syllabus of Theological Questions, and the relevant sections on angels in Turretin's Institutes, Van Mastricht's Theoretical-Practical Theology, and Senguerdius's On General and Speical Metaphysics. I have selected a few questions touched on by them which seemed interesting to me or which are debated among different philosophical schools and will continue to add more to it.
Now, if I could give my own thoughts on these matters, as I do not know when else I would do this, they are as follows:
To the first question, Voetius is correct that technically and absolutely speaking, each angel could be its own species (that is, granting that hacceity is the principle of individuation, God nevertheless still could have chosen not to create one angelic species) and so he only inclines against this opinion and calls the matter unclear. But given that Scripture seems to describe all these beings as falling under the category of "angel" and there would not seem to be any good reason for God not to create an angelic species, then I strongly incline to Van Mastricht's position with the Franciscans as the most probable opinion and interpretation of Scripture.
To the second question, with Senguerdius, I strongly incline to deny matter to angels. The main reason in mind is due to quantity being a property of matter, as Burgersdijk argues for. But there is much to be said in favor of spiritual matter, as Alsted holds to. See especially Franziska Buren's Aristotle and the Ontology of St. Bonaventure, pages 44-45.
To the third question, the Reformed are correct that angels are in place via essence along with the Scotists. See here.
To the fourth question, they are correct on this as well. See Senguerdius, Turretin, Voetius in his disputations on the power of God as well as on demons and Scotus in the Ordinatio http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_II/D2/P2Q5#n314 and against Thomas here http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_II/D2/P2Q7#n489 and http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_II/D2/P2Q8
To the fifth question, I think, with especially Scotus and Senguerdius, discursive knowledge ought to be given in angels. See https://www.academia.edu/en/37433009/Noone_2012_Duns_Scotus_on_Angelic_Knowledge_pdf
To the sixth question, I am inclined to follow Voetius, assuming I correctly understand that he is following Burgersdijk here and so applying this to the case of angels. But anything beyond that, I am uncertain of and need more study.
To the seventh question, Senguerdius suffices.
To the eigth question, against Thomas's position on demonic obstinancy, is this excerpt from Tobias Hoffman's book on free will and the angels:
In Aquinas’s De malo, then, the explanation of demonic obstinacy rests on the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order. But while he claims in Article 5 that before their choice, the angels are in potentiality only regarding the supernatural order, in Article 4 he admits that they have some potentiality in the natural order. Based on his theory of undivided thinking, he stresses that the angels cannot consider their habitual knowledge all at once, but only successively, since only one intelligible species can actualize their intellect at a time (DM 16.4c., p. 299 ll. 335–45). So we may wonder why, on Aquinas’s own premises, the fallen angels cannot change their volition by changing the focus of their attention. Giles of Rome, in his lectures on the Sentences, makes precisely this objection against Aquinas’s De malo account. In his own solution, Giles returns to the idea of the Summa Halensis, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure, according to which demonic obstinacy is grounded not in angelic psychology, but solely in the divine decision to end the angels’ status viae after their first choice.
It must also be said that Turretin misunderstands the argument of Thomas, since what Turreitn is suggesting would mean that grace would turn an angel into something of another nature on Thomas's assumption that an angel naturally only gets one choice (that is, if by divine power, an angel's will is made flexible, then that angel is no longer an angel). But as to which position is actually true, I prefer learned ignorance here.
To the ninth question, in case you cannot already tell my opinion, it must certainly be said that angels naturally love God above themselves. See Thomas https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1060.htm#article5
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