Before I begin this review, I felt it necessary to preface it with something of a disclaimer I hope readers will keep in mind as they read it. It will become apparent that I have very severe disagreements with this book. It is deeply flawed and its implications, taken to their logical end, are dangerous. I knew that reading through it would be quite frustrating for this reason and I endeavor to treat it as fairly as possible. Quite frankly, I did not want to write this review but I felt it necessary given the circumstances. The academic work on this topic among Evangelicals in the past 150 or so years have been abysmal. I can look at virtually anything that evangelicals have written on nature/grace, original righteousness, and the donum supperadditum, etc. and can reasonably say, “there is none who understands; all have turned away, they have together become worthless, there is no one who understands, not even one.” (I should add here, lest my assessment of the secondary literature seem too dire that at least Seung-Joo Lee and Jordan Ballor have got it right). The historic disconnect on this topic, I contend, is comparable to the state Evangelicalism was in prior to Dolezal’s All That is In God as it relates to theology proper, perhaps worse. This I believe with all my heart. The REDS series is popular and will be received by many. It is only for that reason that I found this book worthy of review, as there is plenty already written on this topic that is either equally or more confused but simply does not merit addressing because nobody will ever bother reading it. This topic has more often occupied my thoughts than anything else, and so it is natural that I would have strong opinions on it. None of this, I want to be clear, is personal animosity to the author. I have no desire to exaggerate the errors of this book, but I do want to be firm about where some of its implications lead. Nevertheless, the potential that this book has to disrupt future scholarship and plunge this topic into even further darkness must not be downplayed. To prevent this from happening, the book has to be torn apart from the start. I have taken every precaution to restrain myself in this review, but the reader must know that I am only doing what I believe must be done. Much of this review will not be much else than an application of what I have already previously written to the errors of this book (see here, here, and here). I especially recommend checking out the first link at the very least lest it be questioned whether the position I am about to put forward is really representative of the Reformed as a whole. To a certain degree, a full vindication of this must await its own paper (but I assure you that this is coming soon). Because of this, I will not be able to fully demonstrate here that Junius, who I admittedly rely on to a great degree, is not an outlier. I only ask that the reader look to the sources I have already given and the ones I will give and compare the interpretation given to them by Harrison to the one given by myself and judge for themselves who gives the better account of them. The approach of this review will be more doctrinal than historical. I am concerned with the substance of the position set forth by Perkins rather than focusing on specific historical sources or debating nomenclature. Note also that the original format of this review was intended to be a running commentary, but the length has forced me to split it into chapters, so the formatting might be somewhat awkward at points. Perkins's comments will be in red.
Chapter 1
I will begin my review with the following paragraph, where, in my estimation, everything immediately goes wrong:
This book argues that God forged the covenant to our nature thereby connecting our eschatological destiny to the means to reach it. The covenant conjoins our natural orientation toward eschatological communion with God and our capacity as his image bearers for loving and reflecting him by obeying him with the way to realize that desire by acting upon that very design. Respectively, we recognize the distinction of how God oriented and ordered us toward an eschatological end. On the one hand, God oriented us by creation toward eschatological communion with him by tailoring our nature so that we have our ultimate resting point in consummate, glorified fellowship with God in the new creation. On the other hand, God ordered us toward that eschatological end by covenant, meaning that the covenant bound our nature's native principles to terms that enabled us to attain the end for which we are made." Thus, God's work of special creation naturally oriented us to that prospect of eschatological reward while his simultaneous judicial act of special providence to covenant with Adam ordered us to that end. God's covenant with Adam then encompassed our natural propensity for God in order to provide terms for obtaining it. (19)
First, I want to note Perkins’s claim that “God forged the covenant to our nature.” I assume by his singular “the covenant” he has in mind the covenant of works, but if the covenant of works is “forged to our nature” this raises all sorts of questions as this means that everybody is under the covenant of works by the very fact of their human nature and therefore nobody can escape it without losing their humanity. But setting that aside, the claim itself is simply untrue. There is nothing in the concept of human nature, that is, rational animal, that entails covenant. Covenant is no property of human nature as evidenced by the fact that humanity is conceivable apart from covenant. Such a notion that the covenant of works is natural to man is furthermore problematic as it implies that such an arrangement is due to man’s nature as such and thus implies that God cannot create man without offering him eternal life through covenant. Man is actually made to merit, he cannot do otherwise. The act of graciously condescending to offer Adam a chance to work for eternal life is now no different than the act of creation itself, a point we will return to. Second, Perkins claims that we have a “natural orientation toward eschatological communion with God.” Assuming he is using “eschatological” in reference to supernatural glory, this is the first instance of a fundamental confusion in Perkins’s thinking regarding nature and ends.
Natural ends are intrinsic to the natures of beings, which is precisely why they are natural ends. Remember that natures must be defined in relation to their ends. “For what is nature?” Junius asked Arminius. Junius answered with a modified version of the definition given by Aristotle that “it is the principle, ordained of God, of motion and rest in its own natural subject, according to its own mode.” But the mode of natural things is, by definition, not supernatural. Thus it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a “natural orientation toward [supernatural glory].” Nature, in itself, has no motion towards grace. Thus Junius says that:
“For in man, even before the Fall, the intellect could not raise itself by transcending the natural limits to supernatural knowledge, nor could the will apprehend those things, except supported and sustained by supernatural help.” (Junius, Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 103).
There are certain things that nature is incapable of doing and needs an extrinsic principle, that is grace or the donum superadditum, added to it so that it may be lifted up above its natural mode and into a supernatural mode whereby it is capable of supernatural knowledge and virtues. This is normal Reformed theology (see e.g. Twisse). Supernatural acts such as supernatural faith are not in nature’s capability. No man is naturally oriented towards knowledge of the Trinity, for instance, and try as it may, nature will never come to such knowledge because it is incapable of doing so. In fact, it is not even possible for any creature to be naturally and intrinsically ordered to the supernatural, as this implies that such a creature is supernatural by essence and by nature since their end would be supernatural, but only God is supernatural by essence and by nature (for the full argument, see Diego de Caceres here) Thus, positing a natural orientation to the supernatural ends up eroding the distinction between Creator and creature.
This study distinguishes 'inherence' and 'intrinsic' precisely to keep in view the issue of contingency related to the notion of realiter. If something has realiter status, it cannot be otherwise in an absolute sense - which is why older theologians denied that we have a 'real' relation to God, since we are contingent beings rather than beings related realiter to the divine essence. Respectively, inherence means existence in another being as in a subject of being or as modification of another being.’ Particularly the last aspect of this definition shows how something can inhere in a subject without being sine qua non part of it. On the other hand, especially as we consider these issues, intrinsic means 'pertaining to the nature of a thing or person; constitutive.' In other words, intrinsic involves a sine qua non aspect and contributes essentially to the nature of a particular thing; Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, 61, 64. Regarding the issue above, the point of intrinsic is that human beings do not have the right before God to deserve a reward that constitutes what it means to be human - or even more what it means to be God - as such. The covenant of works as related to our natural capacities for supernatural realities can be said to have given Adam an inherent right, although it could in fact be modified, namely by sin in breaking the covenant of works. Some versions of Roman pure nature theology confuse this issue so that merit remains possible for sinners, meaning that this view casts the standing to deserve reward as intrinsic. (20n7).
I cite this because I want the reader to note Perkins’s definition of “intrinsic.” “Intrinsic means 'pertaining to the nature of a thing or person; constitutive.' In other words, intrinsic involves a sine qua non aspect and contributes essentially to the nature of a particular thing.” Treating Perkins’s work as a coherent whole, I will hold him to this definition of “intrinsic,” however, this causes major problems in his attempts to define original righteousness as intrinsic to human nature. Cf. pg. 83: “the gift of original righteousness to humanity…is intrinsic to human nature”, “original righteousness…is not a gift distinct from our natural constitution”...”original righteousness is created intrinsically into human nature.” Perkins is shockingly clear here. But he is also shockingly wrong. Original righteousness cannot be intrinsic and constitutive of human nature, for then it could never be lost. It was the error of Flacianism which held original righteousness, and consequently its corruption, to be of the essence of man. If original righteousness is intrinsic and constitutive to human nature in the way that Perkins claims, then either man retains original righteousness after the fall and thus Pelagianism is true, or man is no longer man and thus Flacianism is true. Of course, Perkins cannot actually believe that original righteousness is intrinsic to human nature, but this does reveal the philosophical and historical sloppiness that characterizes his thought throughout this work. The Reformed, seeing these errors, explicitly denied original righteousness to be constitutive of human nature. Thus Turretin:
"Was original righteousness natural or supernatural? The former we affirm, the latter we deny against the Romanists…Natural is used in four ways…(2) constitutively and consecutively, constituting the nature of the thing or following and flowing from the principles of nature (such are the essential part or properties of a thing which is opposed to the accidental)...The question is not whether original righteousness may be called natural constitutively a priori or consecutively a posteriori (as it if either constituted or followed the nature itself). No one of our divines asserts this." (IET, Vol 1, Topic 5, Q. 11)
And Thomas Case:
"We have to consider the manner of this endowment [original righteousness]. And as to this, ‘tis much disputed among the Schoolmen, whether it were natural, or supernatural. I shall only lay down in few words, what I conceive to be clear and indisputable. 1. If by natural, you mean essential (whether constitutively, or consecutively) so original righteousness was not natural to man, for then he could never have lost it, without the loss of his being." (The morning exercise methodized: or, Certain chief heads and points of the Christian religion opened and improved in divers sermons (1660), pgs. 110-111)
Original righteousness was denied, time and again by the Reformed to be natural constitutively or consecutively. It is not intrinsic to or essential to human nature. This they constantly asserted against the Flacians. It is a quality of the natural order to be sure, “just as straightness in a line is a quality in a bodily quantity, and curvature is preternatural. In a growing plant, for example, straightness is natural because all naturally grow upward, while curvature is preternatural,” to quote Ghent. Such a quality of rectitude belongs to the will of man in its natural state and unimpeded by sin (thus Turretin says: “the inferior part of the soul from contending of itself with the superior that on the contrary, it was born to obey and is naturally subordinated to it…Therefore, we must accurately distinguish here the appetite (which was natural and ordinate) from that which was preternatural and inordinate. The latter is repugnant to reason, but not equally the former.”), but it is a quality nonetheless and thus is accidental to human nature and so can (and has) been lost.
The language of 'dualism' distorts our discussion because it lacks exact clarity. Does it imply a mere distinction? Well, nature in the sense of original creation is distinct from grace as the free mercy of God to sinners. Does it intend an antithetical relationship? In that case, grace is antithetical to sin not nature, since (as this book argues) grace renews and consummates nature as it stands after the fall rather than completes nature as such. This point would then be partially well-taken. Does it imply a bifurcation between humanity's natural and supernatural capacities? This issue requires careful parsing; hence it is our historical investigation's main focus. (35)
Here I just wish to quickly focus on Perkins’s claim that grace is antithetical not to nature but only to sin and only renews nature as it stands after the fall rather than “completes nature as such.” First, I’ll just say that it isn’t really our claim that grace “perfects nature as such" as though nature stands as incomplete in itself without it. Nature can reach its own natural end without grace and is only perfected as to an obediential potency, but I’ll set that aside for now. Secondly, nobody would say that grace is “antithetical to nature” (for again, there is an obediential potency of nature to grace, as we will soon discuss) but we do affirm a relative opposition between the two. Grace is not nature, faith is not reason, charity is not natural love of God, the beatific vision is not natural happiness in God. These things are not antithetical to one another, as grace actualizes the obediential potency of the things of nature for the things of grace, but they do belong to different orders and so operate in different modes. The point of the Reformed’s use of “grace perfects nature” cannot be limited to a state of sin; it cannot simply be addressing the restoration of human nature from a state of sin as the very point of the maxim is to address “nature” as such. Thus Junius says of Adam’s knowledge prior to the fall:
"This was the state of natural theology in Adam, when nature was intact: that from principles shared, veiled, and imperfect, it had to be nurtured and caused to grow by reasoning, and then perfected by grace." (True Theology, Thesis 17).
At page 279n170, Perkins admits that Burgess held as much. Burgess is worth quoting at length here as his words are very destructive to Perkins’s thesis:
"First, The nature of them is different from all meer humane actions. The acts of faith, love, and other graces, are above the whole sphear and power of nature; Jannes and Jambres were able to do some wonderfull things, as well as Moses, but there were others again, in which they had no power at all. Thus there are many humane actions of prudence and justice, that make men very lovely and admirable in the eyes of others; but then there are other actions, such as the operations of habitual graces, and to this they can no more reach, then a dwarf can touch the heavens. Hence the Scripture sometimes addeth the word Spirit, when it would difference grace from humane actions, 2 Cor. 4. 13. Having the same Spirit of faith, Ephes. 6. 18. Supplication in the Spirit. Phil. 3. 3. Which worship God [p94 the Spirit. Col. 1. 18. Your love in the Spirit. Now this addition [in the Spirit] implieth that there are many actions that are done by us, but unlesse they be performed in the Spirit, they come short of that divine and excellent nature, which God looketh at. Gratia non tollit, sed attollit naturam, Grace doth not destroy the natural faculties and actions of the soul, but it elevateth or sublimateth them to a more noble consideration; and this is the reason why a natural man can do nothing that is truly and theologically good, because of the transcendent excellency of it's nature, but this is hardly discerned; and if there be many, yea most things in nature, whose essence we perceive not, it is no wonder if we be so dull in supernatural" (Spiritual Refining, 93-94).
Burgess is clear that there are certain actions (namely, the theological virtues) which are not in nature’s power. If this is so, then man needs outside help given to him if he is to exercise these virtues. That outside help is grace, a quality that orients man to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. The Holy Spirit, Burgess equates with grace (recall that habitual grace is the form by which we are indwelt by the Holy Spirit) and set in opposition to “[natural] human actions.” The “nature-grace dualism” Perkins intends to oppose is found in full force here in Burgess.
I could add the comments of William Secker who could not be clearer:
"Grace not only makes a man more a man, but it also makes him more than a man. A gracious person once hearing how far a hypocrite might go, said "Let hypocrites proceed as far as they can in that which is laudable; and when they can advance no further—I will go beyond them. A true Christian not only does more than others will do—but he also does more than others can do. Whatever is not above the top of nature, is below the bottom of grace. There are some who pretend to believe—but work not; there are others who work—but believe not. But a saint does both, he so obeys the law, as if there were no gospel to be believed; and so believes the gospel, as though there were no law to be obeyed. Religion consists not singly in believing or doing—but in both." (The Nonsuch Professor, 1660, 8-10).
It should also be noted that Perkins’s comment on page 279 that “the Reformed tradition contains precedent for limiting the maxim to the redemptive order,” which is itself somewhat ambiguous, characteristic of Perkins’s use of terminology throughout the book, if intended to mean that grace only “perfects” sinful nature by restoring it, is not supported by the citations Perkins puts forward. Apart from Burgess who even Perkins admits contradicts this, here is the citation Perkins gives from Clarke:
"Affections are the materials of grace: the main work of grace is the ruling of [VII] the affections aright: It takes them off from things on the earth, and lifts them up to things in heaven. So that when grace converts a man, it doth not take away the affections, but rules and rectifies them. It takes not away anger, but turnes it against sinne, and the dishonour of God. It takes not away cheerfulnesse, but makes us merry in Gods service; and to rejoyce in the Lord. It takes not away sadnesse, but makes us mourn for our deadnesse, barrennesse, &c. Gratia non tollit sed attollit naturam: It takes not away nature, but lifts it up. Therefore Saint Paul calls our affections members, Rom. 6.19. Because by them grace worketh."
Clarke’s point here is that nature is the material which grace acts upon, grace by introducing a new accident into the matter of nature does not destroy nature as such, but this only further supports the point that grace perfects nature as such, not as it is infected by sin.
Here is the citation Perkins gives for Calamy:
"Religion doth not destroy naturall affections, but onely regulates them, and sanctifieth them; Gratia non extinguit sed ordinat affectiones, saith Aquinas, Non tollit sed attollit naturam, Grace doth not destroy, but elevate nature. It doth not dry up the stream of selfe-seeking, but onely turnes it into the right channell. Religion doth not pluck up, but weed the garden of Nature. As Musitians when their instruments are out of tune, will not break but tune them. So Religion doth not abolish, but onely tune and order our selfe-seeking."
Calamy clearly does not have sin in mind here. He again is applying the maxim to the perfection of nature as such.
I could multiply examples like these from Perkins’s citations on pages 278-279, but it would be pointless. Even if Perkins was correct that these citations address grace perfecting nature insofar as it restores it from a state of sin, this would not be evidence for the Reformed “limiting the maxim to the redemptive order.” That’s not how evidence works. Applying the maxim to sin does not exclude it from being applied to nature as such. Perkins needs to marshall evidence that some among the Reformed applied it only to sin and positively denied it to be applied to nature as such. He has not and cannot do this.
Nevertheless, the notion of a sharp, separable, or antithetical divide between humanity's natural and supernatural ends does not properly account for the eschatological nature of our human constitution or of God's first covenant with us. In arguing for covenantal merit, this book aims to overturn the concept of 'pure nature,' which posits that God must ontologically elevate our nature and our natural capacities as such in order to orient us toward eschatological existence. As Lawrence Feingold stated, 'One of the pillars of Catholic theology is the distinction of the natural and supernatural orders. The natural and supernatural orders are two parallel tracks of sorts running alongside one another on its own course toward its own distinct and appropriate fulfillment. Thus, the notion of pure nature entails that human nature lacks 'any consideration of grace or of a supernatural end' and is not naturally - intrinsically and as such - oriented toward a supernatural end of eschatological enjoyment of God. Even Roman theologians have noted that the doctrine of pure nature entails that Adam could fulfill his natural duties and attain to a natural end with no relationship to God (35).
Here Perkins tips his hand and reveals, as I predicted, that he is being influenced by de Lubac. To whatever degree people are aware of this issue today, sadly, they only know of it through de Lubac and thus the errors that apply to him must be addressed in Perkins as well. Given his commitment to de Lubac, it is no surprise he misrepresents Feingold here, but it is nonetheless inexcusable and egregious. Neither Feingold nor the concept of pure nature itself entails that Adam would “attain to a natural end with no relationship to God.” In fact, quite the opposite, man’s natural end entails a relationship to God insofar as man’s natural end is a natural happiness in God in a natural mode. “It is impossible to rightly understand man’s supernatural end without first considering man’s natural end” writes Feingold. Unlike irrational creatures which seek only particular goods, humans are rational and thus:
“The human intellect, on the contrary, grasps universal concepts, including the universal good. The movement of the will naturally follows on the intellect, in that it loves and desires the goods conceived by the intellect. Since we naturally grasp good in a universal and unlimited way, we naturally desire to possess the good in all its breadth and extension. Hence no particular finite good can ever fully satisfy the human will, just as no knowledge of finite creatures alone can ever fully satisfy the human intellect.
This means that only God can fully and properly satisfy the unlimited aspiration of the human will. Therefore, God must be the objective final end of every human being, in which alone true beatitude can be found. This means that beatitude must consist in the greatest union with God that we can attain.” https://www.hebrewcatholic.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/09.01-Mans-Supernatural-End-pdf.pdf
The natural end of man, then, is described by Feingold like so:
“Natural and philosophical contemplation of God consists in knowing and loving God through His works of creation. By analogy with the things He has made, we can know something of God, while acknowledging that He is infinitely greater and more beautiful than His greatest works. This kind of loving contemplation, if possessed in a stable and uninterrupted way after this life (freed from the constraints of this mortal life in a state like that of Eden), in the company of friends who share this contemplation, would be the highest kind of happiness that unaided human nature can achieve.”
Man’s natural end is not divorced from God. It is not, as Perkins says, an end with no relationship to God, but is entirely defined in relation to God! The end of our nature is, as Junius says, “that it should approach very near to the Divine.” This is certainly an end distinct from the supernatural end God leads us through by grace (the beatific vision), but it is nonetheless an end with God as its object, just in a natural and not a supernatural mode.
The formal object of natural happiness is God formally considered as the source and end of our nature whereas the formal object of supernatural happiness is God formally considered as the object of supernatural beatitude. Our nature is only intrinsically oriented to the first and we would be able to obtain it were we in a state of original righteousness unmarred by sin. There is a natural faith, a natural hope, and a natural love that have God as their object (on this, see Thomas Goodwin, Works, Volume 7, Chapters 5 and 7). These virtues are not supernatural because the formal object is God considered as source and end of our nature. These virtues can, however, be raised by grace to a supernatural mode whereby they become what we know as the theological virtues (supernatural faith, hope, and charity), which have a supernatural formal object. Thus, both our natural and supernatural ends have “God” as their object and end in a broad sense, but accurately speaking (since “God” is not a formal object), they have different formal objects because they are two different modes of happiness.
Thus when Junius states that “To undepraved nature, pertained its own future natural happiness, though it was afterwards, so to speak to be absorbed, by the grace of God, in supernatural happiness,” he would never have imagined that the happiness of man’s natural end consisted in anything other than God, it is just that this would not have been a supernatural happiness in God. Junius affirms that man was created in a state of pure nature (see the many quotations here https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/propsitions-on-nature-and-grace-drawn-from-franciscus-junius) and yet is clear that the natural end of man is entirely defined in relation “to the Divine.” Adam, when he was created in a state of pure nature, was not without relation to God. He was not some irrational animal or some heathen without a principle of spiritual life rendering his acts pleasing to God:
"Your [Arminius’s] statement, that "supernatural grace is the cause of spiritual life in man," we believe to be most certainly true, and we avow the same thing. Yet there was one mode of spiritual life in Adam, and there is another mode in us, in whom supernatural grace alone produces this life, while Adam had, together with this grace, the image of God unimpaired and uncorrupted, and therefore had spiritual life in both modes, the natural and supernatural. But these things will be introduced, appropriately, in another place." https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xvi.html
Adam, while in a state of pure nature, had spiritual life in a natural mode. He was related to God and pleasing to Him even apart from grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. His end was that natural happiness which pertained to his nature, and that end was happiness in God in a natural mode. Adam, upon receiving grace/the donum/the Spirit, had spiritual life “in both modes, the natural and supernatural.” His pure and uncorrupt nature which included the accidental qualities of original righteousness and the spiritual life flowing from it was elevated above itself to a supernatural mode:
"To this particular principle of his nature [Adam’s will] was added (superadditus) a singular principle of grace for Adam, by which his intellective will was acting, singularly moved, above its natural mode. Hence, those words of Genesis 2:23 announced by that prophetic spirit: "This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Hence also in the same place, verse 20, the imposing of names to every single animal and many other things, which the intellect would never have been able to exert by its own insight or by the powers of its natural will" (Junius, Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 103).
God willed to guide Adam to a supernatural end, far surpassing anything his nature was capable of attaining. To do this, God gave Adam the means suited to this end: supernatural grace to reach a supernatural end. I will return to this point later on, but I just wish to get the idea of the distinction between man’s natural end and man’s supernatural end, each corresponding to the orders to which they belong, nature and grace, into the reader’s head. Man’s chief end, even in a purely natural state, is “to glorify God and enjoy Him forever,” he would just be doing so in a natural, rather than a supernatural mode.
Perkins’s language of an “sharp” and “antithetical” divide between man’s natural and supernatural ends, again characteristic of de Lubac’s portrayal of the traditional position, is, once again, misleading. Nature is not indifferent, completely closed off to, or completely unrelated to grace. We hold that nature has an obediential potency towards grace. The concept of obediential potency would have saved Perkins much trouble in this book, although it, of course, would have fundamentally changed the book’s thesis. Obediential potency, as defined by Utrecht professor of metaphysics Arnold Senguerdius (1610-1667) is:
"Obediential potency is that by which a creature, raised by a superior agent, effects something beyond its nature. This potency includes the ability to perform miracles, granted to humans by God. While only God can perform miracles through His own potency, Moses, the Prophets, and the Apostles are also said to have performed miracles. Thus, they can also be said to have had the potency to perform miracles (since acting presupposes being able to act), not that they had the potency to perform miracles of which they were the principal causes, but that in the performance of miracles, they had the role of a moral instrument and, in this respect, had the obediential active potency to perform miracles." https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/arnold-senguerdius-on-general-and-special-metaphysics
Natural things have no power to effect supernatural things in themselves (for recall that nature “is the principle, ordained of God, of motion and rest in its own natural subject, according to its own mode”), but they do have an obediential potency whereby they are capable of being “raised by a superior agent” to effect that which is supernatural. The example Senguerdius gives of men performing miracles is a perfect illustration of why Perkins’s thesis is at base incoherent and contradictory. Nature has no capability or natural orientation to that which is supernatural. It cannot be intrinsically and naturally oriented towards something like splitting the red sea or multiplying bread because these are acts above nature’s powers and require an external and superior agent to raise nature to be able to perform such acts. Likewise, nature cannot be intrinsically, naturally, and essentially oriented towards the beatific vision. Nature and grace, creation and glory, are as different from one another as the natural acts of man and the miraculous acts of man, for one is natural and the other supernatural. Yet the fact that man is not by nature able to perform supernatural acts does not mean that performing miracles is “antithetical” to man’s nature. Ed Feser, in his response to David Bentley Hart, excellently explains the concept of obediential potency in this way:
"The traditional Thomist response to this sort of objection is to say that human beings are not, by nature, completely closed off to the beatific vision. They do by nature have what is called an “obediential potency” for it, a built-in capacity to have a supernatural end added to them. But Hart dismisses this notion as doubletalk. If we really have such a capacity, he says, then this would after all amount to a natural orientation toward the beatific vision; whereas if it would not amount to that, then we are back to the problem that, by raising us to that end, God would be replacing us with some other kind of creature rather than transforming us. The notion of an “obediential potency” is supposed to be a middle ground between these options, but, Hart insists, there is no such middle ground.
Yet that Hart is wrong about this is clear even from simple analogies drawn from everyday modern life. Consider the laptop computer on which you might be reading this. There is an obvious sense in which it is complete all by itself, with its operating system, other software installed in the factory, built-in Wi-Fi capability, and so on. Yet it has the capacity to have added to it all sorts of new software and accessories (via download, or through USB and HDMI ports and the like)—including, if it is old enough, some that had not even been invented at the time the computer was designed and manufactured. Since software and accessories of the latter sort were not even in view when the computer was designed, they cannot be said to be ends for which the computer was made. All the same, they are ends that might be added to it, because it does at least have the inherent capacity to have such ends added to it.
This is analogous to the notion of an “obediential potency,” and it indicates the sense in which there is indeed a middle ground of just the sort Hart claims is impossible. In what Thomists call a state of “pure nature,” human beings would not have the beatific vision as an end to which they are directed, any more than a computer is oriented toward running some application that did not even exist when it was manufactured. But just as a computer does nevertheless have a capacity to have such applications added to it, so too are human beings made in such a way that an orientation toward the beatific vision might be imparted to them." https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2022/03/80430/
Nature, in its own power, can reach the end proper to it and is “complete” even without grace. It is not defective for not being able to do that which is by definition above it. But it also possesses the capacity to receive grace and be raised above itself to a greater end. We must remember that man’s supernatural end is referred to as an end because it is the end which God has decided to guide men to in His providence, not because it is the intrinsic and natural end of human nature as such, which would imply that man is an essentially supernatural being and so supernatural grace is connaturally owed to his nature such that without it he loses his constitution as man. I am ordered to glory, to the beatific vision, only because grace has been added to my nature. Those who lack grace are, quite obviously, not ordered to glory. They are making no progress toward the beatific vision, and to hold otherwise is, once again, to court Pelagianism.
The Roman distinction of natural and supernatural orders then entails that God did not tailor our nature as such to be oriented toward eschatological consummation. (35-36)
That’s true, but it’s more accurate to say God did not “tailor our nature to be oriented toward eschatological consummation” because it is simply not possible for this to be done in the way Perkins is suggesting. Again, refer back to Diego de Caceres or the Aristotelian definition of nature provided by Junius.
Traditionally, this distinction of orders mainly concerns the issue of proportionality, addressing whether human nature is intrinsically fit for and ordered to supernatural life in obtaining the beatific vision. Alternatively stated, in the Roman paradigm, grace is elevating, elevans, "bridging" the gap between the natural and supernatural and raising the person to a transcendent order of existence." The question at stake is if ordering human nature naturally to eschatological existence is like trying to pour a massive jug of orange juice into an eight-ounce glass or like asking a mouse to leap from earth's surface to the moon. Is there even capacity for this goal? The suggestion is that the glory of consummate life with God is beyond the natural proportions of human capacity to have and ability to achieve. Feingold explains: However, by faith we know that God has destined man for an end exceeding the proportionality of human nature or any nature which has been or could be created, and which is proportionate only to God Himself. In order for man to achieve this end, it is not enough for God simply to give man the means requisite for attaining it .... A new proportionality needs to be given to man's nature, by which he will be proportioned to the end of eternal life.... The new proportionality is given by sanctifying grace, the new inclination by the theological virtue of charity, and the acquisition or meriting of the end is given by means of the other infused virtues which are directed by charity.45 Everyone must reckon with the proportionality problem concerning what any creature could achieve and the glory that God offers in eschatological life. We address it from multiple angles by the end of this book. Mainstream Roman Catholic thought does so through a particular implementation of distinguishing the orders of nature and grace. The more specific issue with which this book tangles is how Roman theology distinguishes the natural and supernatural orders as it posits grace as the necessary bridge between these disproportioned spheres. In other words, for Rome, grace elevates nature as such so to reproportion it to the supernatural order. This reproportioning is, then, essentially issue of ontological change. In the Roman view, grace raises nature so that it is inherently suitable for and able to merit supernatural life. In that paradigm, grace is necessary because our nature itself lacks what we need to obtain new creation life.* On that view, we are not ordered toward new creation life at all unless we are reoriented toward that higher end, which was not imbedded in us in our condition of pure nature. In the Roman system, grace addresses nature as such, not sin as a corruption of nature. God had to supplement human nature (donum superadditum) to fit us with capacity for the supernatural. This book uses covenant theology, specifically covenantal merit, to explain how we are oriented by nature toward supernatural communion with God and equipped to obtain it. (36-37)
Skipping down to my comments on merit and proportionality in chapter 2 may make my subsequent comments here clearer. Even granting that covenant merit is somehow natural to man and man is oriented toward supernatural communion in the sense outlined below (proportion of merit to right of reward), this remains insufficient to make our nature proportionate to eternal life in the way it must be made proportionate to by grace. If Adam was to receive the beatific vision as the reward for his merit, even just in the reception of the beatific vision, being made capable of direct mental sight of the essence of God, grace is perfecting/elevating nature. So you can’t get around the “ontological reproportioning” issue by way of “covenant theology” like Perkins wants to. Grace has to come in to elevate nature at some point. We face a metaphysical and natural issue that cannot be solved by means of a contingent and historically-based solution like covenant theology (and revisionism like making covenant natural to man, which we will address later, is no help here). Unless Perkins wants to deny that the beatific vision requires supernatural grace by which our natures are elevated to the vision of God (a denial that would make Pelagius blush!), his solution cannot work, even in principle.
This book defends the Reformed view of original righteousness as a donum concreatum - a concreted gift built intrinsically into Adam’s nature as such. (39)
At this point, Perkins’s alternative to the donum superadditum shifts from questions of proportion to end to the question of original righteousness. What Perkins thinks is the problem with the idea of the donum superadditum is somewhat unclear throughout the book. Throughout much of it, he seems concerned with its suggestion that our nature is not intrinsically ordered to grace. We’ve already addressed this concern, but it should be noted that nowhere do the historic Reformed take issue with the donum for this reason (and, their common Aristotelian assumptions in place, we should not expect them to). At other times, Perkins’s concern with the donum echoes the Reformed’s own concerns with it. But at these places, Perkins fails 1) to critique it in the way that the Reformed did by instead asserting that original righteousness is “intrinsic” to human nature, an error we have already addressed 2) to apprehend that the Reformed are critiquing the Roman version of the donum and not the concept of the donum itself. This confusion on Perkins’s part, I believe arises, because he has, ironically enough, granted Rome’s view of an equation between the donum and original righteousness. The common Roman view is that original righteousness is above the power of man’s nature and thus is a gift of grace as much as the theological virtues are. Original righteousness is supernatural and provided by the donum. The Reformed, however, hold that original righteousness is natural to man (again, as quality of the natural order due to it in its natural state, not as something intrinsic to or constitutive of human nature). Thus, when e.g. Turreitn goes to critique the Roman conception of the donum, he is concerned, not that Rome holds that nature is incapable of performing things of grace in its own power (Turretin is not Pelagian), but rather with the fact that Rome makes original righteousness (that is, the rectitude of the will which frees it from concupiscence) a supernatural gift.
On the Reformed view then, original righteousness is distinct from the donum superadditum. The former belongs to the order of nature, the latter belongs to the order of grace. It is precisely for this reason that the Reformed can speak of a state of pure nature, for the only thing they are criticizing when they criticize pure nature is Rome’s version of it in which man’s nature lacks integrity. Thus Turretin grants this sense in which we can speak of pure nature:
It is true that all are not of this opinion and that there are some who, according to Medina, "by man constituted in pure naturals, understand man constituted in innocent nature, with a gifted and vigorous healing nature, so that he might remain in good and the practice of virtue, and perseverance if he wished." https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/further-notes-on-nature-grace-and-original-righteousness
Man can be created in a state of pure nature in which he would have the original righteousness due to him in his natural state and yet still lack the superadded gift of grace.
Thus Zanchi:
"Adam was created in justice and true holiness, which is rightly called original; and he was endowed with the grace of God and the Holy Spirit. There are two parts of this proposition: one concerning the creation of man in justice and holiness; the other concerning the gift of grace and the superaddition of the Holy Spirit. By the name of superadded grace of God, we understand both the favor with which God embraced and held Adam dear above all other things, and a certain supernatural brilliance of the Holy Spirit, shining down on Adam like the sun. With the help of this, he could persevere in his integral nature, holiness, and innocence...Hence, among doctors, by the name of original justice, not only the integrity and perfection of that nature are understood but also the grace of God, which has always been conjunct to that integrity since the creation of man." https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/en/view/bsb11059660?page=670,671
Zanchi clearly distinguishes two principles in Adam: a natural integrity and a superaddition of the Holy Spirit/grace.
Junius affirms clearly that Adam’s will was created in a state of rectitude:
"This principle in the creation being right, holy, not contaminated by any stain of inordinate desires, voluntary followed the judgment of the intellect (which could not be deceived because of the innate light of truth), in such a way that under its guidance, both angels and mankind, in accordance with the order that is congruent to their nature and in an intelligent way, were willing the ends and the objects shown by reason, and performed them by acting: although the angels acted in a more excellent way than mankind, because of the excellence and simplicity of their nature." (Junius in Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 102).
And affirms all the same that to this rectitude, the donum was added so that it may be raised to things of grace:
"For this reason [that “man, even before the Fall, the intellect could not raise itself by transcending the natural limits to supernatural knowledge, nor could the will apprehend those things, except supported and sustained by supernatural help”], to this particular principle of his nature was added (superadditus) a singular principle of grace for Adam, by which his intellective will was acting, singularly moved, above its natural mode. Hence, those words of Genesis 2:23 announced by that prophetic spirit: "This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Hence also in the same place, verse 20, the imposing of names to every single animal and many other things, which the intellect would never have been able to exert by its own insight or by the powers of its natural will."
Lucas Trelcatius Jr. distinguishes original righteousness from superadded grace and affirms them both:
"The testimonies of the fathers, which are alleged, deny not that that integrity in Adam was natural: but testify that grace was added to nature, which indeed we confess and teach very gladly." (A Brief Institution of the Common Places of Sacred Divinity, Berith Press, pg. 292).
In fact, it was a common slanderous accusation against the Reformed that in affirming original righteousness to be natural, they thereby denied superadded gifts of grace. Take the following from Louis le Blanc’s theses on original righteousness (see https://reformedbooksonline.com/1100-pages-of-le-blanc-in-english/):
"Similar sentiments can be found in Tilenus. He says, "They falsely and slanderously attribute to us the opinion of the Pelagians, as if we contend that there were no supernatural gifts in the first man. Although we ascribe to him theological virtues, such as faith, hope, and charity."
Or, to take from the Lutherans, here is Johann Gerhard:
"Though we deny that original righteousness was a supernatural gift, Bellarmine foolishly infers that we acknowledge no supernatural gifts at all in the first man. Before the fall, Adam was certainly a beautiful temple of the Holy Spirit and a dwelling place of the entire Holy Trinity...and this indwelling of the Holy Spirit and of the entire Holy Trinity was not a part or property of man's nature but a supernatural gift." https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/further-notes-on-nature-grace-and-original-righteousness
Perkins has, strangely enough, unironically taken the position that Rome slanderously charged the Reformed with. The Reformed do not deny the donum. We simply deny Rome’s conception of it, which entails that original righteousness is a supernatural gift given by the donum. Perkins would have done far better to focus his critique on Rome’s supernaturalizing of original righteousness (though oddly, he never brings up the main issue with this: the problem of natural concupiscence) rather than denying what all the Reformed affirmed: that an external principle of supernatural grace is necessary for man to perform supernatural actions and reach his supernatural end.
I’ve addressed most of Perkins’s statement of his argument on pages 48-49 already, but I wish to comment on his third point:
God wove the covenant of works innately into our natural obligation to keep the moral law, attaching an eschatological destiny as its reward and thereby ordering our natural strength toward supernatural communion with him in the new creation. (49)
Were this true, no man can escape the covenant of works. Of course, this is against the Reformed Confessions, which affirm that I am still under the moral law, but not under the covenant of works. But in Perkins's stated view I must still be under it right now since it is “innate” to my “obligation to keep the moral law.” And what’s worse, I am under obligation to merit something supernatural from my natural strength—God has obligated all men to be Pelagians, and he has done so by weaving this obligation into our very obligation to keep the moral law! Merely to explain such a view is its own refutation.
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