The intent of this post is to address certain questions that are either often posed to me or which I desire to address but have no obvious place to speak on. This post will be continually updated.

1. In what way is adoption to be distinguished from justification?

The answer is that they are formally distinct, adoption being a part of the form of justification.

Although I think Ames to be perhaps the best practical writer there is, I almost always find myself disagreeing with him when it comes to any theoretical controversy. Here I will pick on him as this is one of his errors.

Ames claims that:

Adoption is the gracious judgment of God wherein he gives the faithful the dignity of sonship because of Christ…it is called a gracious judgment because it manifests the will of God towards men.

By adoption we are not made just, which would follow if adoption were only a part of justification itself, as some would have it. Neither is it a calling to Christ. Adoption is rather a sublime dignity following from the application of his work…

The faithful can expect heaven, so to speak, by a double title, namely, the title of redemption through justification and the title, as it were, of sonship through adoption…

It should, however, be understood that the title of redemption is the foundation of this right and adoption adds to its excellence and dignity.

The issue here is that Ames either means to think of adoption as a judicial act of God giving right to Heaven or he means to think of adoption as an effect of this right. If the first (which might be implied by his third statement above), you run into an issue because recall that the form of justification consists in “remission or absolution and the adjudication of life.” (https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/on-the-formal-and-material-cause-of-justification). The right to life that Christ won for us is one and we have a right, title, and debt to eternal life based only upon that right alone because it is that right, title, and debt alone which is made up of the matter of Christ’s obedience. However, if Ames means the second, namely, that adoption is an effect of the right to eternal life (as his comments about adoption adding an “excellence” and “dignity” to this right suggest), then I would argue he has improperly defined adoption.

Now to explain what I take to be the correct position, here is Turretin, who says that:

The other part of justification [other than the remission of sins] is adoption or the bestowal of a right to life, flowing from Christ's righteousness, which acquired for us not only deliverance from death, but also a right to life by the adoption with which he endows us. For on this account, he is said to have been made under the law (hypo nomon) by an economical subjection that he might redeem us from the bondage of the law and confer upon us the adoption or the right of sons (Gal. 4:4, 5). On this, the right to life depends because "if children, then heirs" (Rom. 8:17). John says "to them who received him," i.e., "who believed on his name, he gave power to become the sons of God" (1:12). Here exousia does not signify authority or power because it has reference here to inferiors; nor faculty or potency by which a person can make himself a son. Rather it signifies axiōma (i.e., the dignity and right of sons)...

It is taken for a juridical act of God by which from his mere mercy, he adopts into his family through faith in Christ those whom he elected to salvation from eternity and bestows upon them the name and right of sons as to inheritance.

If this is the correct definition of adoption, then adoption is equivalent to the adjudication of the right to life and is therefore a part of the form of justification. Turretin goes on to say as much:

From these positions, it is gathered that to no purpose do some anxiously ask here how justification and adoption differ from each other, and whether adoption is by nature prior to justification (as some hold, who think it is the first and immediate fruit of faith by which we are united and joined to Christ; or whether posterior to and consequent upon it, as others). For since it is evident from what has been said that justification is a benefit by which God (being reconciled to us in Christ) absolves us from the guilt of sins and gives us a right to life, it follows that adoption is included in justification itself as a part which, with the remission of sins, constitutes the whole of this benefit. Nor can it be distinguished from adoption except inasmuch as it is taken strictly for remission of sins, since in its formal conception it includes also acceptation to life, which flows from the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

Now that adoption ought to be so defined, consider the case of Adam. It is often said that he was a natural son of God and yet not an adopted son of God. What precisely do we mean when we say this? Well, just as we say that Adam was righteous in one sense and yet not righteous in another sense, so also here. Adam was a natural son of God, being created with the pure and integral natural image of God in all holiness and righteousness, enjoying sweet natural communion with him. Yet Adam was no adopted son of God, that is to say, he had no right to eternal life. Now even if Adam were to have earned the right to eternal life and yet eternal life was not to be immediately granted to him but delayed until he filled the whole earth with offspring (as for instance Mereidth Kline and G. K. Beale have argued and to which I hold to be the truth of the matter), he would then be no less an adopted son of God than he would be once glorified. The reason for this is because adoption does not denote any effect of the right to eternal life, i.e. the granting of eternal life itself, glorification, the beatific vision, etc. (although these are certainly the end of adoption, Rom. 8:23), but rather denotes the adjudication of the right to life itself to us.

A question might be raised as to whether adoption is to be considered as a part of active or of passive justification.

In active justification it is said that a right to eternal life is given into our possession, but in passive justification it is made use of and applied to us; but better and more precisely, in active justification we are given the merit of Christ (his righteousness; the matter which makes up right to life), in passive, the reward of that merit (a formal right to life). First the meritorious cause is morally communicated to us and only then the benefit of that merit, viz. right to life, as our right to life is not groundless. Turretin says adoption is the “bestowal of a right to life, flowing from Christ's righteousness,” it’s clear from the context* that he’s thinking of adoption properly speaking as part of the form of passive justification and not active justification, so he means here that it is bestowed inasmuch as it is made use of and applied to us. Thus, here he is speaking properly of passive justification where we recieve the benefit of right to life, rather than of active justification where the merit which gives right to life is given to us. Yet just as we can distinguish active and passive justification, so we could also do the same with what we might call active and passive adoption, identifying the first with part of the form of active justification/imputation inasmuch as it involves the communication of the merit which will result in passive justification and the latter as adoption proper, part of the form of justification.

*For instance, the fact he says it flows from Christ’s righteousness (presumably imputed), and his definition does not specify “justification” as active justification, and thus I assume it should be taken in its usual sense of passive justification: “that adoption is included in justification itself as a part which, with the remission of sins, constitutes the whole of this benefit. Nor can it be distinguished from adoption except inasmuch as it is taken strictly for remission of sins, since in its formal conception it includes also acceptation to life, which flows from the imputation of Christ's righteousness.” Whether I am right or wrong in my reading of Turretin here is not important since we can distinguish active and passive adoption as I did above.

Whether justifying faith, in its use in our justification, formally has respect to Christ in his offices as prophet, priest, and king or in his office as priest alone?

This question, as far as I can tell, was agitated by Richard Baxter’s assertion that justifying faith embraces Christ formally considered as king and thus insofar as he demand obedience of us. The orthodox responded by asserting justifying faith formally embraces Christ in his priestly office alone. Leydekker mentions this as an error: “faith for justification directed to Christ as King, no less than High Priest.” Thomas Bell addresses this in his notes in Witsius’s Animadversions saying that Baxter had come around to the orthodox opinion by the end of his life: “[Baxter] made the marriage consent to Christ, as a King and Lord, the formal act of justifying faith, as being an epitome of all gospel obedience, and had thereby, as well as by his other dangerous notions concerning justification, corrupted the fountain, and endangered the faith of many; yet after all came to be of another mind, and had the humility to tell the world so much.”

It is worth quoting John Owen’s solution to this question at length:

1. Faith, whereby we are justified, in the receiving of Christ, principally respects his person, for all those ends for which he is the ordinance of God. It does not, in the first place, as it is faith in general, respect his person absolutely, seeing its formal object, as such, is the truth of God in the proposition, and not the thing itself proposed. Wherefore, it so respects and receives Christ as proposed in the promise, — the promise itself being the formal object of its assent.

2. We cannot so receive Christ in the promise, as in that act of receiving him to exclude the consideration of any of his offices; for as he is not at any time to be considered by us but 117 as vested with all his offices, so a distinct conception of the mind to receive Christ as a priest, but not as a king or prophet, is not faith, but unbelief, — not the receiving, but the rejecting of him.

3. In the receiving of Christ for justification formally, our distinct express design is to be justified thereby, and no more. Now, to be justified is to be freed from the guilt of sin, or to have all our sins pardoned, and to have a righteousness wherewith to appear before God, so as to be accepted with him, and a right to the heavenly inheritance. Every believer has other designs also, wherein he is equally concerned with this, — as, namely, the renovation of his nature, the sanctification of his person, and ability to live unto God in all holy obedience; but the things before mentioned are all that he aims at or designs in his applications unto Christ, or his receiving of him unto justification. Wherefore, —

4. Justifying faith, in that act or work of it whereby we are justified, respects Christ in his priestly office alone, as he was the surety of the covenant, with what he did in the discharge thereof. The consideration of his other office is not excluded, but it is not formally comprised in the object of faith as justifying.

5. When we say that the sacerdotal office of Christ, or the blood of Christ, or the satisfaction of Christ, is that alone which faith respects in justification, we do not exclude, yea, we do really include and comprise, in that assertion, all that depends thereon, or concurs to make them effectual unto our justification. As, — First, The “free grace” and favour of God in giving of Christ for us and unto us, whereby we are frequently said to be justified, Rom. iii. 24; Eph. ii. 8; Tit. iii. 7. His wisdom, love, righteousness, and power, are of the same consideration, as has been declared. Secondly. Whatever in Christ himself was necessary antecedently unto his discharge of that office, or was consequential thereof, or did necessarily accompany it. Such was his incarnation, the whole course of his obedience, his resurrection, ascension, exaltation, and intercession; for the consideration of all these things is inseparable from the discharge of his priestly office. And therefore is justification either expressly or virtually assigned unto them also, Gen. iii. 15; 1 John iii. 8; Heb. ii. 14–16; Rom. iv. 25; Acts v. 31; Heb. vii. 27; Rom. viii. 34. But yet, wherever our justification is so assigned unto them, they are not absolutely considered, but with respect unto their relation to his sacrifice and satisfaction. Thirdly. All the means of the application of the sacrifice and righteousness of the Lord Christ unto us are also included therein. Such is the principal efficient cause thereof, which is the Holy Ghost; whence we are said to be “justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God,” 1 Cor. vi. 11; and the instrumental cause thereof on the part of God, which is the “promise of the gospel,” Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 22, 23. It would, therefore, be unduly pretended, that by this assertion we do narrow or straiten the object of justifying faith as it justifies; for, indeed, we assign a respect unto the whole mediatory office of Christ, not excluding the kingly and prophetical parts thereof, but only such a notion of them as would not bring in more of Christ, but much of ourselves, into our justification. And the assertion, as laid down, may be proved, —

I will not quote the entire thing. You can read this at the end of chapter 3 of his Doctrine of Justification.

Now, when the question is understood as it was between Baxter, Owen, Leydekker, etc., the priestly office respecting that which Christ has done for us, I grant that Witsius/Owen/Leydekker are correct and to them I give my full assent in this. However, I want to suggest that a different, non-contradictory, but more precise answer could be given here. I say this because it seems to me that Christ’s merit and active obedience is more properly connected to his office of king than that of priest, to which the Reformed usually connected it. Consider for instance, the typology of active obedience throughout Scripture: Adam would merit by his defeat of the serpent, Abraham topologically merited by his defeat of the kings, these martial conquests being closely tied to their kingly characters (an exception to this is Phineas whose merit that benefits his descendants is related to the priestly office). The king of Israel would merit blessings for the land by meditating on the law day and night. His obedience would be reckoned to the people. So also Christ merited a Kingdom for himself by his defeat of Saran on the cross. His merit is the merit of king for eternal life for himself and his people. So it seems to me that we can say that faith embraces Christ formally as king, not however formally as he is a king over us, but as he is a king for us. I’m sure this distinction can be put in a variety of different ways, but I think we can say that faith formally embraces Christ in all 3 offices, but only formally as those offices are related to the Gospel strictly taken rather than the Gospel widely taken. On that distinction, here is Voetius:

I therefore distinguish the term "Gospel" and "evangelical preaching," which is sometimes broadly understood as the entire saving doctrine preached under the New Testament; sometimes strictly for the doctrine containing the promises of the covenant of grace, which is specifically and perpetually distinguished from the law of commandments; sometimes very strictly for the doctrine containing the promises of the covenant of grace after the manifestation of Christ. If the Gospel is taken in the second and third meanings, it is asked: Does it prescribe any precepts, either old or new? Response: No. Or at least, is that one commandment strictly or very strictly understood, "Believe in the Gospel," or "Believe in Christ," prescribed? Response: No. Therefore, you might ask: Is only this prescribed by the law, specifically by its first commandment? Response: Yes. For the duty of faith, or believing everything revealed by God, is prescribed by the law alone. But the object of this faith, or the things to be believed, namely, those special ones, which are the promises of the Gospel, or Christ the Savior, or salvation through Christ, are revealed and presented by the Gospel alone, not by the law, whether commanding or promising. Therefore, the law has faith as its immediate and direct object among other duties and prescribed acts of man, and the Gospel, strictly speaking, has faith that is believed, or things to be believed, or the very truths of faith, or those credenda, which are the promises of the covenant of grace, or the Evangelical ones.

So what I am suggesting is that in order to answer the question regarding whether faith formally embraces Christ in his office of priest alone or in more respects, we can safely answer that while justifying faith formally embraces Christ in all 3 offices, it embraces these 3 offices only formally insofar as they are related to the Gospel strictly taken. In this way, in the act of justifying faith, we embrace Christ formally as a king who merited for us, and not formally as a king who demands obedience of us. And we embrace him as a prophet who reveals salvation to us, but not as a prophet who obligates belief from us. This solution avoids the issue Baxter fell into and also provides what, by my lights, is a necessary reformulation given that I see the right to life won by active obedience, and included as part of the form of justification, as more properly belonging to Christ’s office as king rather than that of priest. Therefore, while faith embraces all 3 offices, it does not embrace all 3 offices completely. This solution is also entirely consistent with the distinction Owen is trying to make when he explains that “we assign a respect unto the whole mediatory office of Christ, not excluding the kingly and prophetical parts thereof, but only such a notion of them as would not bring in more of Christ, but much of ourselves, into our justification,” although I have ultimately formulated the answer differently so that we need not say that justifying faith, in that act or work of it whereby we are justified, respects Christ in his priestly office alone, but can instead have it respect all offices, but with limitation.

3. What is sufficient grace and what is the point of it?

I’ve received this question a few times and so I thought it good to address in a post. I will start by answering the second question first and by doing so give an answer to the first question. And I will answer this question by recounting my own discovery of the matter.

In order to learn the nature of things, I often play certain games in my mind where I try to stretch something to its breaking point and to force it into absurdity in order that I may better understand it. This method has been very, very fruitful to me throughout my life as it has allowed me to understand the properties, natures, and causes of things in a deeper way than I am otherwise able to do. In fact, most of the posts you read on this site are simply the fruit of my labors in doing this.

Once I had come to the realization that original righteousness was to be distinguished from the donum superadditum as natural rectitude and supernatural grace and that upon this basis the theological virtues were not natural to man, but definitionally supernatural, their natural analogs being what is natural to man, I tried one of these mind games.

I imagined a scenario in which God created Adam in a state of pure nature, that is, with original righteousness and without the donum superadditum. Next I imagined that in this state, God commands Adam to believe in him with supernatural faith, love him with supernatural charity, etc. Finally, I imagined that despite this command, God decided not to grant Adam supernatural grace, which I supposed God was able to do even in spite of the command because I reasoned that grace is always given freely. Here, I perceived there was an issue, because God would be commanding something of Adam that was not morally, but naturally impossible to him (for this common distinction, see Charnock). In this scenario, I reasoned, Adam would not be morally deficient; he is in a state of perfect natural uprightness and righteousness. But without grace, he is simply unable to obey the command to perform a supernatural action. This, I saw, was quite unlike the usual problem with sinners: they are morally unable to obey that which they are naturally able to obey. But here there was not only a moral inability, but a natural inability. As Increase Mather says, “There must be a Supernatural light to direct the Soul into this way, 1 Cor. 2.14. The natural man receiveth not the things of God, neither can he know them. And after a man doth see this way, there must be a Supernatural work of the Spirit to cause him to venture on in it; yea, it is not only above nature, but against corrupt nature.” How then, I reasoned, could God command any man to believe (a supernatural action) and not give him the grace to do so?

I posed this scenario to a relatively knowledgeable Roman Catholic who rebuked me in such a way that I immediately understood the root of my error. God does not in fact command men to believe without giving him the grace to do so. In fact, every time that God commands man to perform a supernatural action, He also gives man supernatural grace to perform this action. This, I saw, was the only answer that could be given to preserve the justice of God and human responsibility in terms of the distinction between natural and moral ability. At the time, however, I had no name for what this grace was. I understood that it was an elevating grace given to all who received the Gospel and its commands. I only called it “resistible grace” since that was the terminology I was familiar with from the Puritans once I realized that this was exactly what they meant by the term. It was only after a very short conversation with Michael Lynch that things started to click for me. I had asked a question relating to this matter and he told me that Davenant held that everyone who hears and understands the Gospel, always receive illuminating grace. This led me to look more into this from Davenant and I was led to Gaetano’s chapter in Beyond Dordt which showed me how Davenant was drawing on Banez. After looking more into Banez, I finally put the right name on the grace I was referring to: sufficient grace.

One of the big realizations I had after discovering this and then re-reading the Reformed with this in mind, is that I had been assuming that the Reformed denied all internal workings of supernatural grace to the unregenerate. It is probably true that the vast majority of Reformed people today already assume this, and to be fair, there is some justification for this as not all theologians were equally clear on this (e.g. Le Blanc erroneously says that the Reformed hold only to sufficient grace in terms of outward means, but deny it in terms of inward supernatural grace). This assumption, I realized, was completely incorrect. Here are some rather clear instances of sufficient grace among the Reformed:

Matthew Poole on Hebrews 6:6:

"If they shall fall away; a falling away, or apostatizing, in proportion like Adam, such a παράπτωμα as his was, Rom. 5:15–17, whereby they are totally unchristianed, as he was turned into a sinner; perfidiously revolting from all those supernatural workings of the Holy Ghost, whereby their natural spirit was elevated, but not changed, unto their old swinish and canine temper of spirit and course of life that they led before they professed themselves Christians, as 2 Pet. 2:18–22. They

freely forsake their professed Christian state, and make shipwreck of all, Jude 4, 10, 16, 18, 19.

To renew them again unto repentance; they cannot renew and bring themselves to the same state they enjoyed, and from which they fell; nor can the Christian ministry do it by their exhortations or counsels, thunders or comforts; the offended, wronged Spirit withdraws, and will not assist or elevate theirs to act above nature again, Gen. 6:6; Isa. 63:10; but leaves them justly to themselves, so as he will neither by himself, nor by others, suffer it to be done, having limited his power by his will in it. They shall neither have a new principle infused into them, nor their minds or hearts changed by him to repentance, because they have undervalued his lower operations and motions on their souls, revealing Christ to them through the gospel, and have by their sinful negligence not improved them to seek from him the better and higher ones which he mentions, ver. 9, 10, and were to be effected by the exceeding greatness of his power."

Poole speaks here of a supernatural elevating grace whereby those who are yet unregenerate are made capable, by the power of the Holy Spirit, to perform supernatural actions. Their natures are “elevated,” but because they resist this grace, they are “not changed” and return to their previous course of life. The only thing I would disagree with in Poole here is his seeming denial of sufficient grace after it has been rejected. It seems to me rather that God continues to offer sufficient grace as long as the Gospel offer and its commands are understood, even though continually rejected; but I would not try to hold this point too tightly.

Here is Turretin:

Still we do not deny that in a certain sense the division [of sufficient and efficacious grace] can be admitted if a sufficiency, not absolute and simple is meant, but a relative sufficiency both with regard to external means and internal illumination for a knowledge of the truth and temporary faith (Heb. 10:26; Lk. 8:13) and for conviction and inexcusability (anapologian, Jn. 15:22). But for conversion, we recognize no sufficient grace which is not equally efficacious.

Importantly, Turretin says that sufficient grace applies not only to “external means,” contra Le Blanc and the majority assumption of today, but also to “internal illumination for a knowledge of the truth and temporary faith.” Furthermore, Turretin even specifies the purpose of sufficient grace in the first place. It is “for conviction and inexcusability.’ The second point is what is relevant to the thought experiment I cooked up. Sufficient grace comes in so that man may be held accountable for not responding to the demands of the Gospel, which while being above his natural abilities, are made possible to man’s powers by virtue of it.

For another clear example of inward, supernatural, sufficient grace, see the section on the Synopsis of Purer Theology at the previous link.

Sufficient grace is a type of prevenient grace, being grace given prior to human action, that enables a person to be able to perform supernatural actions, not however, infallibly giving the effect. Sufficient grace gives the ability to act, yet not the act itself. It should be remembered that such a distinction even still applies to the lives of Christians. Here is a section from John Owen's Mortification of Sin that makes this point:

As there are three sorts of lives, we say, — the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational or intelligent, — some things have only the vegetative; some the sensitive also, and that includes the former; some have the rational, which takes in and supposes both the other. Now, he that hath the rational doth not only act suitably to that principle, but also to both the others, — he grows and is sensible. It is so with men in the things of God. Some are mere natural and rational men; some have a superadded conviction with illumination; and some are truly regenerate. Now, he that hath the latter hath also both the former; and therefore he acts sometimes upon the principles of the rational, sometimes upon the principles of the enlightened man. His true spiritual life is not the principle of all his motions; he acts not always in the strength thereof, neither are all his fruits from that root. In this case that I speak of, he acts merely upon the principle of conviction and illumination, whereby his first naturals are heightened; but the Spirit breathes not at all upon all these waters.

4. What exactly is the “principle of spiritual life in a natural mode” that you often speak of?

I’ve been asked this question a few times. I have been hesitant to give a definitive answer to it as I am still working through it in my own mind. But I will speak on this as much as I am able to here in case it is helpful to somebody.

In my Propositions on Nature and Grace Drawn from Franciscus Junius, I briefly mentioned that I think that the natural analog of faith either is prudence or at least is very similar/closely related to it (a). Following men like Peter Martyr Vermigli and Bartholomew Keckermann, I tend to think of faith as supernatural prudence. Since faith is the principle of supernatural spiritual life in us, when I look for the principle of natural spiritual life, it seems natural for me to attribute this to prudence. In fact, I think this aligns very nicely with what Thomas Aquinas is talking about when he talks about how unbelievers lack prudence in that they don’t refer everything to God as the final end in their lives. That is all I will say for now. Regardless, whatever this principle of natural spiritual life is, it is that principle out of which we refer all of our acts to the glory God, which is necessary for a morally whole act. Adam in a state of pure nature possessed this spiritual life in a natural mode, that is to say, he was able to refer all of his acts to God's glory even though he lacked supernatural grace. Thus although Adam had no supernatural grace and no possession of the Holy Spirit while he existed in a state of pure nature, he was not therefore spiritually dead and unable to please God. Fallen men completely lack this principle of spiritual life. Believers have spiritual life restored to them in a supernatural mode through the grace of the Holy Spirit such that we are now able to refer all of our actions to God's glory through supernatural faith. I am drawing very heavily on this statement from Junius here.

(a) I think that there is even a certain level of support for this in Romans 14:23 when Paul says that “whatever is not of faith is sin.” Certainly, he does not mean that “whatever is not of a supernatural habit assenting to propositions of divine revelation is sin,” but rather whatever is done with a practical doubt is sin which is in some way a privation of prudence.

5. Does man have a natural desire for the beatific vision?

We must distinguish between an innate natural desire and an elicited natural desire. The difference between the two an easily be gathered from here: https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2022/03/28/the-natural-desire-to-see-god/ and here: https://www.academia.edu/6570466/Lawrence_Feingold_on_the_Natural_Desire_to_See_God and those who want to read more should check out Feingold's The Natural Desire to See God, which I have repeatedly recommended. To explain the difference between the two, an innate natural desire may be thought of as equivalent to the intrinsic end of a given nature. The first link says it is:

"The natural appetite placed by God in things without knowledge has come to be referred to as innate appetite or natural inclination. It flows from the very essence of a thing in a constant, immutable, and unconscious way, and inclines each thing to its proper and proportionate end. Innate appetite or inclination is common to all beings, each of which is inclined to its end, whatever it may be."

An elicited desire, on the other hand,

"is a particular conscious movement of the will or sense appetite attracted by some object known either by the senses or the intellect. If it is an object pleasing to the senses, there will follow a movement of the sense appetite; if the object is grasped as good by the intellect, there will follow a movement of the rational appetite, which is the will. Here we are interested only in the will. The desire is said to be “elicited” in that it is “drawn out,” as it were, by the desirability of the known object. All the conscious movements of our sensitive appetites and our will are said to be elicited and not innate."

For our purposes, what is relevant here is a movement of the will.

The natural desire that man possesses for the beatific vision must be elicited, and not innate. This is contrary to De Lubac, Cornelius Jansen, Michael Baius, and Duns Scotus. The first three's position on this is well known and so I will not cite a source on this. Scotus concedes that "man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore, he is naturally ordered to that end; therefore from such ordering can that end can be concluded as from knowledge of the nature ordered to it" and affirms that "God is the natural end of man, but as not to be attained naturally but supernaturally." One can see how Scotus anticipates those who would come after him.

For proof of this thesis, I have effectively already given this in especially my first and sixth reviews of Harrison Perkins. This effectively boils down to a failure to understand the principle of proportionate causality, the way that ends work, and a failure to consider the category of obediential potency.

An elicited natural desire for the beatific vision occurs when man, understanding the first cause through its effects, reasons that, if it were possible, it would be desirable to have an immediate intellectual sight of the first cause. Importantly, this desire is conditional. Man cannot know, apart from divine revelation, that the beatific vision is in fact possible. Nor would this desire leave man unfulfilled if he were in a state of pure nature precisely because of the conditional nature of the desire. Man can achieve natural beatitiude apart from grace as this desire remains nothing more than a conditional wish for that of which he has no knowledge of its possibility. We can see this elicited natural desire, and even its conditional nature, exhibited in Plato in the Convivium when he says:

What if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?

Andreas Beck in his otherwise excellent book on Voetius, attempts to tie Voetius to De Lubac's theory under the section he has titled "Voetius and the 'Two-Level Theory.'" "Two-Level Theory" is referring to the same thesis that I have been putting forth, together with Feingold, reagrding the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders. Beck thinks that Voetius rejects this theory, associated with "medieval scholasticism" in favor of the "Augustinian theory," which again, is susbtantially De Lubac's position. Much can be said about this section that stands in need of corrction (his historical work for dividing things this way relies, unsurprisingly, entirely on De Lubac), but I wish to comment on only two points here. In footnote 36, when Voetius denies that man was created in a state of pure nature, I take this to mean either 1) Voetius is denying that man was, in point of fact, created in a state of pure nature (i.e. he is affirming man received grace in the first moment of his creation); yet he does not deny its possibility. Or, more likely, 2) Voetius is denying "pure nature" in the Roman sense of it in which natural rectitude is not included. Furthermore, Beck's comment that even those who advocated for pure nature only did so as "a hypothetical possibility" is clearly untrue as I have documented at length in my reviews of Perkins. See for instance Junius or Scotus or Bonaventure.

But more importantly for this question is Beck's comments in footnote 37. Voetius here asks: "Whether man has a natural, innate appetite for beatitude or the beatific vision? Denied with a distinction." Since Beck is assuming that Voetius is setting forth substantially the same view as De Lubac, he says that "the distinction seems to be decisive here and probably refers to the meaning of the term 'naturalis': If the term refers to the Baroque scholastic understanding of nature springing from the 'two-level theory,' the question has to be answered in the negative. Not so, however, if the term derives its meaning from the medieval Augustinian tradition."

Of course, since I completely reject the framing of this historiography in the first place, I wish to offer what I take to be a much more natural reading of Voetius. Here, he specifcally denies an innate natural appetite/desire for the beatific vision, but does so "with a distinction" in order to affirm a natural, elicited desire for the beatific vision. Voetius is here siding with the Thomists. In this light, Voetius's words in footnote 38, in which he evidences that he is aware of Scotus's view that the beatific vision is formally man's natural end, should be taken to mean that Voetius rejects this position, although I grant to Beck that this is not entirely clear from his words at this point.

Futermore, it is very unlikely that Voetius in particular thought that men could have an innate natural desire for the beatifdic vision. The reason for this is because Voetius rejects the beatific vision according to essence, holding rather that it will be by an efflugence of God's glory, and therefore by a creature freely created by Him. Now, although in any case it is beyond my power to conceive how someone could hold there to be an innate natural desire for the supernatural, in the case of Beck's Voetius, it is doubly so, as men would then have an innate natural desire for a creature of the supernatural order that possesses an entirely contingent existence.

What were Richard Baxter’s errors with regard to justification?

I have received this question from a few people who have encouraged me to write on this. I think this will be helpful to show not only where his errors are, but also where they are not.

Here I will ignore points debatable among the orthodox such as Baxter’s hypothetical universalism, his ordering of repentance and remission, and real distinction between the covenant of redemption and grace. For readers who are interested in those issues, on the first I recommend reading Owen’s Of the Death of Christ (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A90278.0001.001?view=toc), his appendix to Vindiciæ Evangelicæ (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A90295.0001.001/1:10?rgn=div1;view=fulltext), and most especially Garry Williams’s second chapter in From Heaven He Came and Sought He (and subsequent response to Lynch, pg. 20). I will probably write a post on this in the future as I have long thought that Williams has touched on a very under-appreciated aspect of the debate, in my estimation, not yet sufficiently addressed by either side. In fact, I think Garry’s argument to be the only argument from the nature of the thing that there is against Davenant’s version of HU, which I think is otherwise possible in God’s ordained power. I will add, however, that Garry’s argument happens not to apply to Baxter’s view because Baxter takes a consequentialist view of the atonement. For this, see 416-426 of Van den Brink’s The Transfer of Sin (also dealt with by Lobb here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A48860.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext; John Brown here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29752.0001.001/1:4.2?rgn=div2;view=fulltext; and of course, Owen above. This, by the way, as far as I can tell, is the only genuine error of Daniel Williams, who otherwise denied all of Baxter's positions below, except perhaps the third. I think that Lobb especially was not entirely wrong in detecting Williams's view here seemed to imply Baxter's second error below, but it seems to me that Williams was simply inconsistent here, holding one but not the other) which, although I will repeatedly reference (as it is relevant to some of Baxter’s positions here), I do not include it here as a distinct error only because it isn’t directly related to justification per se, even though it’s a very clear departure; on the second issue, I will eventually write on this, but for now see Jeremiah Burroughs (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A30582.0001.001/1:7.3.9?rgn=div3;view=fulltext ), Thomas Gilbert (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A42736.0001.001?view=toc), and Benjamin Keach (https://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/sdg/keach/A%20Short%20Confession%20of%20Faith_Benjamin%20Keach_PDF.pdf); on the third issue see Samuel Petto’s The Differences Between the Old and New Covenant Stated and Explained, Keach’s The Everlasting Covenant, and William Strong/Theophilus Gale’s A Discourse of the Two Covenants.

Here I will limit myself to Baxter’s departures from the Orthodox as a whole.

That faith is ex pacto condignly meritorious.

This may be called “neonomianism proper” and is Baxter’s chief error. I have dealt with such a formulation here: https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/a-note-on-merit and here: https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/samuel-petto-on-merit

Our citation from Baxter here is as follows:

(1) Neither can our performance of the conditions of the Gospel in the most proper and strict sence, be said to merit the reward: seeing there is nothing in the value of it, or any benefit that God receiveth by it, which may so entitle it meritorious; neither is there any proportion betwixt it and the reward. (2) But in a larger fence, as Promise is an Obligation, and the thing promised is called Debt; so the performers of the Condition are called Worthy, and their performance Merit. Though properly it is all of Grace, and not of Debt.

The important part is that Baxter explains that he holds that our performance of covenant conditions acquires a "debt" due to the covenant of God, even though in itself it has no proportion to the reward (and this is all his denials here are limited to). Baxter lists 3 types of merit in his explanation of this thesis. The first is strict/proper merit of commutative justice which he denies (along with everyone else). The second I take to be equivalent to congruent merit (compare his description to Edward Leigh in my post on merit). And the third is therefore condign merit of distributive justice, which he says is "in God's ordinate justice" and by it our performance is made "capable of that title." It is this third type of merit which he ascribes to our works, not the second. So he affirms that our performance of covenant conditions earn right/title/debt to the reward,

Witsius lists four characteristics of Neonomian error with regard to justification: "1. They include under the header of ‘faith’ the hope of forgiveness and love of God and also sorrow at sin; 2. They argue that faith serves in the stead of the perfect obedience demanded by the legal covenant; 3. They view faith as a deed carried out by prescript; 4. They argue that this precondition is demanded of us in the Gospel.”

The first error will be addressed below, the last 3 are what is relevant here.

To quickly summarize the error here, we can take note of Baxter’s peppercorn analogy commonly criticized by the orthodox. In this analogy, although Christ has merited our justification and freed us from the curse of the law, the right to the New Covenant is held out to us under condition of us offering an insignificant “peppercorn” of faith. The issue here is whether the peppercorn is operating as condign or congruent merit. From Baxter’s Aphorisms above, it is clear enough that he categorizes faith as ex pacto condign merit rather than ex pacto infallible congruent merit since he tells us that in this case the promise creates an “obligation” and a “debt” (albeit not a “proper debt”, which here is only to deny strict/proper condign merit, i.e. commutative justice of arithmetic proportion). Thus faith operates as an ex pacto condignly meritorious cause, creating a debt and entitlement to reward out of the covenant (indeed the use of the peppercorn analogy itself seems to imply as much). This is precisely why the orthodox came to criticize Baxter and the neonomians at this point since in holding faith to be ex pacto condingly meritorious, they by consequence make two condignly meritorious causes, two impetrations, two debts, and two material causes of our justification. Now, that Baxter has in mind ex pacto condign merit which procures a title out of (distributive) justice of geometric proportion, can be discerned when he elaborates on his meaning:

The third kinde of Meriting is sufficiently explained in the Position [quoted above]: where the Obligation to reward, is Gods ordinate Justice, and the truth of his Promise: and the worthiness lieth in our performance of the Conditions on our part. This is improperly called Merit: This kinde of Meriting is no diminution to the greatness or freeness of the gift or reward: because it was a free and gracious Act of God to make our performance capable of that title; and to engage himself in the foresaid promise to us; and not for any gain that he expected by.

Baxter here explains the type of merit he has in mind in his proposition above. Faith here is “made capable” of “title” from “God’s ordinate justice,” which seems to be clearly describing ex pacto merit of geometric proportion out of distributive justice. This interpretation is made even more likely by the fact that he contrasts this third kind of merit with the second kind, which most naturally reads as equivalent to congruent merit (compare his explanation of the second kind of merit to the quote from Edward Leigh at the top of my post on merit). Baxter affirms here that it was a "free and gracious act to make our performance capable of that title," which only denies proper/strict merit, instead affirming ex pacto merit, but nevertheless clearly affirms ex pacto condign merit nevertheless since he affirms that our performance of the conditions are in fact made capable of title out of God's justice.

This interpretation of Baxter can also be confirmed by comparing his comments in his Catholick Theology:

He [Thomas Aquinas] concludeth that man meriteth not at all of God according to absolute or simple Justice, which goeth by equality; sed secundum divinae ordinationis quandam praesuppositionem, as man obtaineth that as a reward by his operation for which God gave him the operative virtue. And so that here is but modus quidam Justitiae, as a Father hath to a Child, and merit only secundum quid, at non simpliciter. And he addeth, that our voluntary doing our duty is our merit, not as profiting God, but manifesting his glory, and pleasing his will; and so God is not a Debtor to us, but to his own will or to himself.

…

Indeed Aquinas defendeth that which Vasquez seemeth to deny, that in God there is Distributive, though not Commutative Justice (quia à nullo accipit.) And that though God do all according to the good pleasure of his will, yet he doth all things Righteously, because his Will is the Rule of Justice, and he willeth what his Wisdom dictateth. And that he giveth himself his Due, in that he doth all to the glorifying of his goodness: and he giveth the creatures their due, in that he ordereth one for another, as its end, and the parts for the whole: yet he is not called a Debtor to any, because all are ordinated to Him: which Justice is called, The Condecency of his Goodness. And is there any thing to be blamed in all this? I am sure that Englishears are so used to hear that God is Just, yea, that the Glory of his Justice is a great End of his Government, that good men will hardly endure you to deny it: Though yet through prejudice they hardly digest the name of that Merit or Rewardableness which is the object of that Justice; because of other mens abuse of the word, and some mens hard interpretation of it. But God the Righteous Judge will give the Crown of Righteousness (2 Tim. 4. 8.) not according to Names and Logical Notions, but mens works.

See more on pages 276-277 here: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26883.0001.001/1:103?rgn=div1;subview=detail;type=simple;view=fulltext;q1=debt

In the above quotes, Baxter repeatedly cites Medieval scholastics who are simply denying strict/proper condign merit (that is, they are denying commutative justice), while at the same time affirming we merit out of distributive justice. Since he argues from this that therefore there is no conflict between us and Rome, this implies he thinks that such a denial is sufficient. In other words, he thinks that the only “difference” between the Reformed and Rome in the point of merit is that Rome (allegedly) affirms strict/proper condign merit, whereas the Reformed deny it. Of course, he knows that this is not actually the case. No Romanist has ever been so sottish as to affirm strict/proper condign merit (I except, of course, an insane few who are by no means representative of the whole). Thus he knocks down a straw man in order to show that Rome and the Reformed actually agree on the point of merit. But, of course, the orthodox acknowledge that no Romanist, no not even the Judaizers of the book of Galatians, affirm strict/proper condign merit. And the very fact that Baxter attempts to argue in this way betrays the fact that he does not understand the real difference between Rome and the Reformed on this point because he ends up siding with Rome in his own comments on merit. It is as if I were to show that Rome does think that the Pope is God, thereby proving that we do not really differ from them in our ecclesiology. Nobody has ever made this accusation. As I have written before, so I will repeat here, the neonomians constantly made this error: their denial of merit was only ever limited to strict merit because they thought that the problem in affirming merit had to do with the material deficiency in our works such that they were imperfect and not strictly equivalent to the reward, not seeing that the issue lies not in the matter, but in the form. To put the matter rather bluntly: a covenant that offers eternal life on the basis of condign merit for even a sin-stained (I mean materially; obviously it cannot be rewarded qua sin-stained) and trivial action is, formally, as much as a covenant of works as Christ's own and differs from the Covenant of Grace, formally considered, equally as much as Adam's Covenant of Works does. Baxter’s citations of Scotus above especially betray this fact. He repeatedly makes the error of thinking that all that matters is the denial of proper/strict merit and the placing of the foundation of merit in covenant rather than in essential the form and causality of the merit itself inasmuch as an act, based upon that covenant foundation which eliminates all commutative justice, formally impetrates a right/debt/title to a reward. Chauncy puts this point this way: “it's the faederal nature of the condition, not the greatness or smallness of the condition that makes it meritorious. If God had said unto man in Paradice, Take up this leaf or that straw, and thou shalt live for ever, eternal life had been his due, upon his doing thereof, and demandable by him, and the covenant made it so; viz. a due debt, ex pacto, i. e. legally so; for a due debt is due in a law sense.” https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A32758.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext (page 2; see also page 52 onwards). This, I think can also be drawn out from Baxter's reply to Lobb in which he says (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A27029.0001.001/1:10?rgn=div1;view=fulltext)

"And your second that the imputation of Faith as a work, is not of Grace, is cloudy, or untrue, or both. If by a work, you mean a work in Commutation obliging God, or any work which maketh the reward to be of debt and not of Grace, it's true that if faith were such a work it would be an act of Justice so to judge it. But Faith is no such work; and therefore it would be errour so to judge it. But if by a work you mean but a Moral act, as made by the Law of Grace the condition of pardon and life, then to Impute, Repute or Judge it to be what it is so made, is an act of Truth and Justice,"

Note that Baxter only denies faith to be a "work in Commutation obliging God," but affirms God accounts it as an "act of justice," further supporting the contention that Baxter only denies commutative justice.

Let us be clear here, the accusation the orthodox made against Baxter is not that he denied the imputation of Christ’s righteousness and not that he explicitly denies it to be the sole material cause of our justification (as some have wrongly said in our day). Rather, the accusation against Baxter is the same that they made against the Papists: that indirectly and by consequence, insofar as they set up two condignly meritorious causes, they therefore establish two material causes of our right to life (recall, as I explained here, that all condignly meritorious causes are also the material causes of the right which they earn) inasmuch as he thereby establishes two rights/titles to the New Covenant and thereby to its benefits. Although there is no issue with holding congruent merit to be subordinate to condign merit, there is in holding two condign merits to be subordinate to each other, even as the papists—Thomist, Scotist, Jesuit, and everything in between—hold good works to be condignly meritorious of eternal life, even while acknowledging Christ’s merits (as Turretin says, they do not deny the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, but “so limit the benefit of the imputation of Christ’s merits to obtaining the effect of infused grace that this imputation is made for no other end than to merit for us infused grace, in virtue of which we obey the law and, being righteous in ourselves are justified”).. Thus, Eede’s response to Baxter:

Except. I do not so require good works as the Papists do, they require it, as merit, or satisfaction, I as a condition required in the Gospel.

Exam. 1. You have the same evasions to elude the places of Scripture. 2. They do not make our righteousness coordinate with Christs righteousness, but subordinate: they are not so sottish as to think their owne works satisfactory to Gods justice, or in themselves meritorious of eternall life, they look for remission of the fault from Christ, and say that Christ did merit that we might merit. 3. It is false that you say, our good works are a condition required in the Gospel to our justification: they are not required of us that we may be justified, but that being justified we may glorifie our heavenly Fa∣ther. To whom with the Son, and holy Spirit be all glory.

Thus we have the common affirmation (as seen in my two previous posts) that there is no “antecedent” or “proper” condition of the Covenant of Grace on our part (that is to say, there is no condignly meritorious condition to be performed on our part by which ex pacto debt/title/right is given. It is only received; cf. my post on Petto). The right to the New Covenant was won by Christ and thus all condign merit is to be placed in him. Here is Hermann Witsius in his Economy of the Covenants:

A condition of a covenant, properly so called, is that action, which being performed, gives a man a right to the reward ... The condition of justification, properly speaking, is perfect obedience only ... Though some of the Reformed have said, that faith is a condition, sine qua non, without which we cannot be justified: yet they were far from being of opinion, that faith is a condition properly so called, on performing which, man should, according to the gracious covenant of God, have a right to justification as to a reward...The genuine opinion of the reformed is this: that faith justifies, as it is the bond of our strictest union with Christ, by which all things that are Christ’s become also ours.

Witsius treats this error of Baxter and the neonomains at length on page 147 here as well as here onwards. Rutherford addresses this error here. Isaac Chauncy addresses this error here, here, and here. See also Robert Traill here. Nathaniel Mather makes this point on pages 46 and 52 here (it may be helpful to note that while merit and reward are in fact correlates, they are so in their own order: so congruent merit procures a congruent reward and condign merit a condign reward; Mather uses “merit” here to mean ex pacto condign merit, as we have noted in my previous posts on merit that virtually all of the Reformed did the same just by virtue of the term.) See Keach on page 29 here.

John Brown of Wamphray deals with this error saying:

if man have any thing in himself, that can be called a Righteousness, though but a Subordinate Righteouness, & yet such a Righteousness, as giveth right & ground to justification, though that justification be also called, only a subordinate justification, conforme to the New Covenant, & the Condition thereof, he will soon boast, & account his justification not of free grace, but of due debt, conforme to the covenant: And though this be called, only a Subordinate Righteousness; yet proud Self will account it the Principal; because upon it dependeth all his justification; for thereby not onely hath he a right unto Christ's Merites, but unto justification it self; this being called the proper condition of the New Covenant, wherein justification, Adoption &c. are promised (as they say) upon this condition. And will not proud Man see, that he hath a price in his hand, & a compleet Righteousness, conforme to the Covenant, to presente unto God where-upon to seek & expect the reward of debt, according to the covenant?

Wamphray’s critique is that making faith into a price which obtains debt is to compromise justification based upon Christ’s righteousness alone since this is to bring in two merits of the same order and causality. Faith would not only receive a right, but also formally procure one. This becomes clearer once he goes on, listing this as an error:

To say, that this faith hath the same place & consideration, & consequently, the same force & efficacy, in the New Covenant, that perfect obedience had in the Old Covenant with Adam.

And he concludes that:

thus the New Covenant is of the same Nature & kinde with the Old, only its Conditions are a little altered, & made more easie; & their Performance of the condition must-have a merite with it, at least, ex pacto, though not ex condigno [that is, at least ex pacto though not proper/strict merit]; as neither Adam's Perfect obedience could have had. And the performers of this condition, in this case, may reflect upon their own deed, & lay their weight on it, &, it being their Righteousness, may plead upon it, as their immediate ground of right, before God, unto justification, & Acceptance.

Wamphray is making the exact same point that I have made repeatedly against a variety of different errors: that the form of a covenant of works lies in (ex pacto) condign merit and not otherwise. Whatever the material conditions of an act may be, however great or however insignificant that act may be in itself, and however there might be an abundance of grace in God’s rewarding of that act which he is not bound to do, all of this is irrelevant to the question of whether something is formally a covenant of works or not. The form of a covenant of works and a covenant of grace essentially differs by who is performing acts of condign merit. If any place for condign merit is given to us instead of Christ, even if it is also affirmed that Christ himself condignly merited for us, the Covenant of Grace has been turned into a covenant of works. The denial of strict/proper merit is entirely immaterial to the question at hand since strict/proper merit is but one species of the genus of condign merit. And it is condign merit per se (merit which gives a right to reward) which is the form of a covenant of works. Thus,

Adam could not be said to have merited life, by obedience, in was of proper and strict merit; yet in way of merit ex pacto, he could have been said to have merited; for the reward would have been reckoned to him, not og race, but of debt.

And again: It is false to say or suppose (as his following words intimate) that faith in the New Covenant hath the same place, force, & efficacy, which the righteousness of the law had, in the old Covenant. For then faith should be meritorious ex pacto.

So,

[Adam’s] reward was made [proportionate to his works] only by God's free Condescension; & God had, in that case, given what they had deserved according to the Covenant made, wherein such a reward was promised to obeyers; and, in justice, bestowing it as a reward upon such, as did fulfill the condition. Now, when Faith is said to have the same place, in the New Covenant, that Perfect Obedience had in the old, and so the same Efficacy & influence in the reward; & withall, it is supposed, that Faith is now no more the gift of God, than Perfect Obedience was under the old Law; is it not as true now, that God giveth no more, than what beleevers have by Faith (at least in some sort) deserved, by vertue of the Compact & New Covenant, wherein this reward is promised, as it would have been under the old Covenant? And is it not hence also manifest, that the New Covenant is made to be of the same Nature with the Old, and that the reward is as well now of debt, as is would have been by the Old Covenant? Is it not also hence undeniable, that hereby there is a proportion acknowledged, in some sort, betwixt Faith & the Reward?

If faith is a condition formally procuring right, even though ex pacto and by distirbutive justice, it thereby becomes the true immediate meritorious cause of justification (i.e. our right to the blessings of eternal life). Thus Brown:

Christ's Righteousness, according to Mr. Baxter,can not be called the meritorious cause of our pardon, justification, & Right to Glory &c. because it is only made by him the meritorious cause of the New Covenant, wherein pardon, Right to Christ & to Glory are promi∣sed upon New Conditions, & so is made the meritorious Cause of the con∣nection betwixt the performance of these New Conditions, & the obtaining of Pardon & that Right; so that by vertue of Christ's Merites, these New Conditions are made the proper & immediat meritorious cause ex pacto of these favours: And by this way, Man can not but boast & glory in himself immediatly, and give Christ only some remote far-off thanks, for procu∣ring the New termes.

I can go on quoting Brown on this point, but you can read him for yourself. His book is one of the most excellent works ever written, not only for refuting Baxterianism, but also on justification itself. See esepcially this chapter: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29752.0001.001/1:3.25?rgn=div2;view=fulltext

John Owen, at the end of chapter XIII of his Doctrine of Justification, when addressing insufficient ways of distinguishing the Covenant of Grace from the Covenant of Works makes the same point: it is immaterial to deny strict/proper merit of commutative justice in the CoG, since such did not exist in the CoW with Adam. What matters is that works are accepted as meritorious at all:

3. “There would then have been merit of works, which is now excluded.” Ans. Such a merit as arises from an equality and proportion between works and reward, by the rule of commutative justice, would not have been in the works of the first covenant; and in no other sense is it now rejected by them that oppose the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. 4. “All is now resolved into the merit of Christ, upon the account whereof alone our own personal righteousness is accepted before God unto our justification.” Ans. The question is not, on what account, nor for what reason, it is so accepted? but, whether it be or no? — seeing its so being is effectually constitutive of a covenant of works.

Melchior Leydekker, also listing other errors of Baxter we have included here, writes,

Thus you hear there of distinguishing the forgiveness of sins from justification, that the former has its causes in Christ, the latter in the believing person; of principal and subordinate, general and particular Legal and Evangelical righteousness; of the State of forgetfulness; of discharge of the Law; of the fulfillment of the conditions of the Gospel by believers, but that Christ has fulfilled the conditions of the Law; of faith for justification directed to Christ as King, no less than High Priest; of faith as a properly called condition of justification, not as an instrument of Christ's merits given for that purpose, but as conditions required by the Gospel so that man would be justified; of the conditional Covenant of justification; of Christ's imputed righteousness, but as in the effect and benefits, etc.

He goes on,

Furthermore, he [Baxter] deals much with the Condition for justification according to the Covenant of Grace, understanding in an Arminian way an empowering Condition, which they call a voluntary action regarding the future, required by God the Lawgiver and Christ the Testament-maker, in the New Law, Covenant and Testament, so that from their fulfillment an actual right to the benefit would be established; for otherwise there is no obligation nor right before the condition occurs. So he speaks, not allowing that faith in justification is considered by way of an instrument (as it is a grasping of Christ) to effect or obtain it, while he seeks refuge in a Logical or Physical quibble about a properly called instrument, as if he did not understand the Theologians. Further, he wants that not faith alone is a condition of justification, but also Conversion, teaching that it is set by God just as well as faith as a proper condition of justification; that it is no less a condition of the covenant of grace than faith is. Similarly he deals with the love of God and Christ, and with the obedience of works, because that is faith itself, and these flow from faith, as it views Christ as King. And when Paul was objected to, reasoning against works, he answered that the Apostle's aim is to bring down the Law of Moses and the Doctrines of Legal works; therefore that he had only to exclude merit, or works that were conceived as meritorious, and thus happened thereto, so that they through their worthiness would obtain forgiveness without the blood of the Mediator. Where these things want to look to, the prudent see who have eyes in their Forehead.

To make faith an ex pacto condignly meritorious condition— that is, a condition that through covenant earns a right or debt to the reward of justification—is to fall into the error of the Arminians, with whom Baxter is in substantial agreement on this point.

Much more can be said here, but I will end with the words of Stephen Lobb:

Thus to make good Works meritorious, they [Romanists] assert a Law, with a Promise; making the Dignity of the Work to lean on the Promise: And that the Reward may be Due ex justitia, the Law is turn'd into a Covenant, where Obedience to the Preceptive Part is made the Condition, that giveth Right to the Reward. So that it is that Conditionality of the Covenant, on which the Merit of Condignity is Founded. All which is undoubtedly true of the Covenant given Adam. For if he had but rendred the Perfect Obedience required by the Preceptive Part of the Law; or, which is the same, if he had Perform'd the Condition of that Covenant made with him; it would have given him a Right to the Reward, it would have been in Justice due to him, that is, he would have me∣rited it Ex Condigno.

Tho' his Temporary Obedience fell infinitely short of the Reward of Eternal Life; yet be∣cause of the Promise made on a Covenant-Condi∣tion, giving Right; the Reward, on his performing the Condition, would have been Due to him ex justitia (i. e.) he would have merited it Ex Condigno.

In like manner, if the word [Condition] when assign'd to the Covenant of Grace, be taken in this sense, viz. for that thing, which, being Perform'd, gives Right to the Reward, the Covenant of Grace is Confounded with that of Works, and Merit of Condignity effectually established.

'Tis Confounded with the Covenant of Works, and made a Covenant of the same kind with it, for in both, as there is a Precept enjoyning Duty, and a Promise of Reward; even so, notwithstanding the Work falls infinitely short of the Reward,yet the Reward being Promised on a Condition, giving Right; A Right unto it Results from the Performance of the Condition,and the Reward is due ex justitia, and so Merit of Condignity is also established.

Nor can it signify any thing to say, we exclude all Merit from our Good Works, by ascribing all to the Grace of God, enabling us; and nothing to our own Strength, making their Re∣wardableness to Lean on the Ordination, and Promise of God, For the Papists make all these Necessary to Merit ex Condigno; affirming, That unless the Work proceed from Grace it cannot be meritorious of Eternal Life, and that they give not any Dig∣nity to their Good Works, but acknowledge that in themselves considered and Precise; as separate from the Ordination of God they are of no worth, that their Rewardableness is founded on the Promise.

In these things lye the very Nature of Merit; for which reason, to deny our Works to be meritorious because their Rewardableness is founded on the Promise, it is as if, you would deny Peter to be a Man, because he is a Rational Creature.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A48865.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

That only the effects of Christ’s righteousness are imputed and not Christ’s righteousness itself.

My good friend, Travis Fentiman, writing of the Neonomian John Humfrey, notes that, “Neonomians (such as Humfrey below, contra Davenant) had distinguished that the believer only receives the effects and fruits of Christ’s righteousness, but not Christ’s righteousness itself as his own. Witsius defends the position that the believer receives Christ’s righteousness itself as his own, quoting Davenant’s quotes of Chrysostom in support, as well as the Heidelberg catechism” adding “arguing that it does not become personally ours (against Davenant), though we partake of its benefit (which appears to have been a distinctive of neonomians).” (https://reformedbooksonline.com/topics/topics-by-subject/justification/#baxter). Whereas Baxter weakly tried to claim others to his side, Humfrey was more honest in this matter. This has been substantiated by G.A. Van den Brink who has dealt very thoroughly with this matter in the fourth chapter of his excellent work, The Transfer of Sin. Because of this, I will not go into too much detail here as I have no desire to re-do the work Van den Brink has already done. Packer also handles this issue well in chapter 10 of his The Redemption and Restoration of man. One can also simply read the sixth chapter of Witsius’s Animadversions (page 67 here: https://ia600701.us.archive.org/30/items/conciliatoryorir00wits/conciliatoryorir00wits.pdf). Once again, John Brown has also dealt very well with this in his book and should be consulted for more. D. Patrick Ramsey deals with this on page 157 here: https://www.midamerica.edu/uploads/files/pdf/journal/ramsey19.pdf

Baxter argues this in a number of places. Here I take from his Of the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26977.0001.001/1:5.2?rgn=div2;view=fulltext page 66:

Scripture speaking of moral matters, usually speaketh rather in Moral than meer Physical phrase: And in strict Physical sence, Christs very personal Righteousness (Material or Formal) is not so given to us, as that we are proprietors of the very thing it self, but only of the effects (Pardon, Righteousness and Life,) yet in a larger Moral phrase that very thing is oft said to be given to us, which is given to another, or done or suffered for our benefit. He that ransometh a Captive from a Con∣querer, Physically giveth the Money to the Conqueror & not to the Captive, & giveth the Captive only the Liberty purchased: But morally and reputatively he is said to give the Money to the Captive, because he gave it for him. And it redeemeth him as well as if he had given it himself. He that giveth ten thousand pounds to purchase Lands, & freely giveth that land to another; physically giveth the Money to the Seller only, and the Land only to the other. But morally and reputatively we content our selves with the metonymical phrase, and say, he gave the other ten thousand pound. So morally it may be said, that Christs Righteousness, Merits and Satisfaction, was given to us, in that the thing purcha∣sed by it was given to us; when the Satisfaction was given or made to God.

Baxter is clear here that he holds that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us only by metonymy inasmuch as we benefit from it. Baxter likewise states in his Catholick Theology that “Christ’s personal righteousness, divine or human, habitual, active or passive (as it’s called) is not given us or made ours, truly and properly in the thing it self, but in the effects.” (see 59 here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26883.0001.001/1:46?rgn=div1;view=fulltext). The “matter and form” of Christ’s righteousness becomes ours only “as an efficient cause,” not as “a constitutive cause nextly material, or formal of it” (Justifying Righteousness, 119).

It is difficult to see what can be meant by an imputation only as to effect. John Brown points out a consequence of this ambiguity:

The question is about the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, & the Answer given is concerning the Effects thereof given to us; But these Effects are not the Righteousness of Christ; nor are they to be called a Righteousness; nor are they in Scripture so called, unless we say with Joh. Goodwin, that

Righteousness Imputed is nothing but free justification. Yea these Effects must presuppose a Righteousness in the persons receiving them, either Inherently, or by way of Imputation: for God will justify no man, or declare no man to be Righteous, who is not Righteous: And concerning this Righteousness is our question: And Mr. Baxter giveth us nothing here for this, unless it be our believing: & this is that which Servetus, Socinians & Arminians say.

Such an affirmation could be taken in a sense no more than what Arminians affirm where we merely derive a benefit from the righteousness Christ historically worked out, as though this were analogous to the way that Saumur theologians affirmed the imputation of Adam’s sin: only by a sort of extrinsic denomination insofar it is the cause of the effect of original unrighteousness in us and thus no proper imputation of that sin at all. Cf. Isaac Chauncy: “That Righteousness it self is Imputed, and not any of the Effects, but the Effects of it are made ours by vertue of that Imputation. To say the Righteousness of Christ, i. e. his Obedience and Sufferings are Imputed to us only as unto Effects, is to say, We have the Benefit of them, and no more, but Imputation it self is denied; so say the Socinians, but they knew well, and ingeniously grant that they overthrew all true, real Imputation thereby,” https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A32770.0001.001/1:10.1?rgn=div2;view=fulltext see also page 98 onwards. An imputation as to effect means no more than that I benefit from Christ’s righteousness, and this much is affirmed by every Christian and every heretic who has ever lived (John Owen makes this same point, “To say that the righteousness of Christ,--that is, his obedience and sufferings,--are imputed unto us only as unto their effects, is to say that we have the benefit of them, and no more; but imputation itself is denied. So say the Socinians.”). Now, I do not think that Baxter himself, in his heart of hearts, would not have stopped at affirming this, but this does illustrate his error at this point.

As John Brown argues, “Imputation, as to effects, is no Imputation at all: unless the meritorious cause be imputed, in order to the receiving of these Effects, there is nothing imputed.” “When it is said, the merite of Christs passive obedience is communicated unto us, the meaning must be one of these two; either that it self is properly made over & imputed to us; or onely in its effect, free pardon of sinnes If this latter be said, Then no other Imputation is granted, than what Socinians will yeeld unto: & how can it be said to be Imputed, as to its Effects, when it self is not Imputed, in order to the partaking of these effects? If the former be said, then there is something, that is in it self imputed, & not meerly in its Effects.”

Speaking properly, we must distinguish Christ’s righteousness/merit from the effects of Chirst’s righteousness. Christ’s righteousness is his merit and it is Chirst’s merit which is imputed to us in active justification so that we might consequently partake of its effects (I touched on this a bit in the first question of this post regarding adoption). To elucidate this argument, consider that, as I have said before (https://x.com/brandoncorley99/status/1823125445543608387?s=46), there are two different senses in which we use the term “righteousness.” The first refers to an internal and physical holiness, the second to merit. When we are speaking about justification and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, the second sense is relevant here, not the first. To quote Stephen Lobb who made this same point before me:

There is a Righteousness, somewhat distinct from Holiness, which is done by a due observation of the import of the words Righteous and Holy; for if to be Righteous is somewhat distinct from the being Holy, then surely Righteousness is somewhat distinct from Holiness, in that the Denominatives Righteous and Holy, are from Righteousness and Holiness, their Denominating Forms; for which reason, if Righteousness, and Holiness be the same, since Denominativum & Denominans conveniunt in re significatâ, quia significant eandem formam essen∣tialiter, to be Righteous and to be Holy must be the same; The same denominating Form, ever giving the same denomination: And if to be Righteous, be not the same with the being Holy, Righteousness and Holiness cannot be the same; But to be Righteous, is somewhat distinct from the being Holy. To be made Righteous, is to be declared, pronounced, judged, esteemed and reputed in the eye of the Law to be just, i.e. to be not guilty, not liable unto the curse due to sin, but to have a right unto the Reward. He is Righteous (that is,) not guilty; He is Righteous (i.e.) He hath a right unto the Reward. But to be made Holy is another thing, it is to be Sanctified, which is by the infusion of Habits into the Soul. To be sanctified, is to be Physically and internally changed, to be inherently Holy. (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A48861.0001.001/1:7?rgn=div1;view=fulltext)

From this, Lobb goes on to explain that “as the sin of one cannot be imputed unto another, but in its guilt, even so the holiness of one, cannot be imputed unto another, but in its righteousness.” Christ’s “righteousness” in this conversation is his merit. Because the substance of his merit is imputed, therefore the substance of his righteousness is imputed, since the two refer to the same. Likewise, when we affirm that our sin was imputed to Christ, here we take “sin” as the demerit of sin, which we say is (substantially) imputed to Christ. The connection between the two works the same way: as guilt (demerit) is inseparable from punishment, so also merit (righteousness) is inseparable from reward and so the prior must be imputed to ground the latter. Guilt and merit are both means.

Sin—Guilt—Punishment : A Good Work—Merit—Reward.

The view of the orthodox holds that as our guilt was imputed to Christ as a means which grounds punishment [on this, see especially Van Mastricht at 3:534], so also Christ’s merit is imputed to us as a means which grounds reward. The Neonomian view rejects this; e.g. Baxter: “Christ never communicates his Merit in its formal nature, to any man; but only the effects of it.” (Confession, 265). [By the way, consistent with this in his Methodus, he likewise denies the imputation of the guilt of sin to Christ: “In the most proper and primary sense, that is, with regard to the guilt of the fault (Reatum culpae) as such, sin was never imputed to Christ, but will always be imputed to the sinner himself.” (3:38); cf. also Van den Brink 359 on Baxter’s version of the “non-imputation” of sin, which I could have counted as a separate error. Voetius in his Disputation on the Merit of Christ notes that these two denials (of Christ’s merit to us and our guilt to Christ) were common to both the Socinians and the Arminians, which did not go unnoticed by Lobb].

John Brown makes this point:

But if he [Baxter] shall yeeld to no other Imputation, than this [as to effect], he shall grant no Imputation: for that Imputation, as to effects, is no Imputation at all: unless the meritorious cause be imputed, in order to the receiving of these Effects, there is nothing imputed; for they Effects are never said to be imputed…Pardon is no Righteousness; neither is justification, Adoption, or Right to Glory properly a Righteousness; But do presuppose a Righteousness, after which we are enquiring, and cannot finde that Christ is made to be that to us; and consequently, either faith must be it, or there is none.

This can be related to the point Owen makes about active justification:

To be reputed Righteous, and to have Righteousness imputed, differ, as cause and effect. For that any may be reputed Righteous, that is, be judged or esteemed so to be, there must be a real foundation of that Reputation, or it is a mistake, and not a right Judgment; as a man may be reputed to be wise, who is a fool, or reputed to be rich, who is a beggar. Wherefore he that is reputed Righteous, must either have a Righteousness of his own, or another antecedently imputed unto him, as the foundation of that Reputation. Wherefore to impute Righteousness unto one that hath none of his own, is not to repute him to be Righteous, who is indeed Unrighteous, but it is to communicate a Righteousness unto him, that he may rightly and justly be esteemed, judged, or reputed Righteous.

Justification involves impartation (active justification whereby Christ’s merit is imputed to us), judgment/reckoning (passive justification whereby right to life is adjudged to us), and treatment (the bestowal of eternal life). The first (the imputation of Christ’s righteousness itself) is especially necessary to avoid legal fiction (on this see especially the third chapter of Van den Brink; cf. my paper on active justification; see also chapter XXIV of Davenant’s Justification; By the way, comparing Bellarmine’s arguments there to Baxter’s arguments elsewhere is striking). The merit of Christ first being imputed as the basis of justification, it on that basis becomes the immediate material cause of our justification (i.e. right to life and remission of sins); cf. my post on the matter and form of justification.

In justification, to be judged righteous (ie to have the right to life adjudged to oneself) presupposes a righteousness/merit antecedently imputed. Thus Christ’s righteousness/merit cannot be imputed merely in the effects (viz, right to life, remission of sins, etc.), but must itself also be imputed. As Brown says, “When a debtor is lying in prison, for debt, and a friend cometh & satisfieth the creditor for him by paying the summe, in his place & stead; the Law doth not impute that payment to the debtor merely in the effects: but imputeth the payment it self”, yet it does so “not in physical acceptation, as if it judged that he was the man, that in his own physical person” performed this act. Thus the opposition that Baxter tries to create between a physical reception of substance and a moral reception of effect alone is a false one (and the exact same dichotomy the Antinomians create). The substance of Christ’s righteousness (viz., his merit), can be received, yet only morally and not physically. Again, I cannot recommend G. A. Van den Brink’s The Transfer of Sin highly enough on this matter, not only the fourth chapter especially, but also everywhere he deals with exchange of person. One has to wonder whether or not Baxter’s consequentialist view of the atonement has any bearing upon this.

Quoting Owen once more,

And those who will acknowledge no more in this matter, but only a Participation Quovis modo, one way or other, of the Benefits of the Obedience and Righteousness of Christ, wherein we have the concurrence of the Socinians also, might do well as I suppose, plainly to deny all Imputation of his Righteousness unto us in any sense as they do, seeing the Benefits of his Righteousness cannot be said to be imputed unto us, what way soever we are made Partakers of them. For to say, that the Righteousness of Christ is imputed unto us with respect unto the Benefits of it, when neither the Righteousness it self is imputed unto us, nor can the Benefits of it be imputed unto us, as we shall see afterwards, doth minister great occasion of much needless variance and contests. Neither do I know any Reason why men should seek countenance unto this Doctrine under such an Expression as themselves reflect upon as unscriptural, if they be contented that their minds and sense should be clearly understood and apprehended. For Truth needs no subterfuges.

An imputation as to effect is no imputation at all (as Van den Brink rightly notes, pg. 201n127). Thus Owen, speaking of Baxter's doctrine of justification in his appendix to Vindicae Evangelicae:

He that shall deny the imputation of the Righteousnesse of Christ, and maintaine that our performance of new obedience is the matter of our Justificationbefore God, according to the tenour of the New Covenant, and yet grant the satisfaction of Christ, and assigne it a place (some or other) in the businesse of our Justification, his doctrine is but al∣most Socinian, and yet in my Judgment is altogether an Errour.

Again and again, Owen combats the Neonomian error on this point in his Doctrine of Justification, to which I refer you for more.

I have used Bullinger’s erroneous view of the supper to illustrate the difference between the neonomian and the orthodox view on this point before and the more I have thought about it, the more fitting such a comparison has become to my mind. Indeed, I think that both are operating on the exact same principle. Both Bullinger and Baxter want to cast the matter in such a light that the two options are: 1) a physical reception of substance 2) a moral reception of effect. In doing so, they neglect the third and orthodox view: a moral reception of substance. Both Bullinger and Baxter stop their reasoning in the effect and benefit derived from the substance, not allowing the substance itself to be received except insofar as the effect and benefit is received. Both Bullinger and Baxter fail to ground the reception of the benefits of the substance in the logically prior reception of the substance itself. Yet this cannot do. Just as I receive the whole Christ in the supper, including the substance of his body—matter and form—and with that body its effects and benefits, so also in faith I receive the substance of Christ’s righteousness—matter and form—and with that righteousness its effects and benefits. And yet all this morally and not physically so that in the first there is no corporeal presence and in the second there is no confusion of acting person. As the Synopsis said of Bullinger’s view, so also is it true of Baxter, he is not “passing on the truth fully enough.”

That faith was only remotely purchased by Christ.

Our citation from Baxter is as follows:

Faith is a fruit of the Death of Christ, (and so is all the good which we do enjoy): But not directly as it is satisfaction to justice; but only Remotely, as it proceedeth from that Jus Dominii which Christ hath received, to send the Spirit in what measure and to whom he will, and to succeed it accordingly; and as it is necessary to the attainment of the further ends of his Death, in the certain gathering and saving of the Elect So that most directly it floweth from the good pleasure of God and the Redeemer, which we call Predestination. (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A27064.0001.m001/1:5.3?rgn=div2;view=fulltext)

Such an error seems clearly to be connected to Baxter’s consequentialist view of the atonement, on which, again, see Van den Brink. John Brown already noted above that this seems to be connected to Neonomianism whereby faith becomes ex pacto condign/proper antecedent covenant condition. Against this, see chapter XXVI of Brown’s Justification. Against this, one can also read Voetius’s disputations on The Merit of Christ, Regeneration, and on Subsequent Grace as well as Owen’s Doctrine of Justification and his Of the Death of Christ (1650), Davenant’s Dissertation on the Death of Christ, Anthony Burgess’s Doctrine of Justification; although here I am only naming examples of works which immediately come to mind that exposit the opposite position whether implicitly or explicitly, as virtually anybody among the Reformed can be named here as against Baxter. Beyond what Van den Brink has written regarding Baxter on Christ’s satisfaction, I have nothing to add.

That faith, in the act of justification, receives Christ as king and that faith formally includes love in its essence.

The first error we conveniently addressed as the second question of this post above and so I will skip any further comments on it. John Brown’s chapter XXXIV might also be read.

For the second error, here is Baxter in his Aphorisms:

Let me here also tell you, that I take love to Christ as our Saviour and Lord, to be essen∣tiall to this Acceptance: and so some degree of Love to be part of Justifying Faith, and not properly a fruit of it, as it is commonly taken. (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26862.0001.001/1:72?rgn=div1;view=fulltext)

I actually believe that Baxter’s error here makes sense on his assumptions (assumptions which are not limited to him!). The reasons that Baxter goes on to give for making love a part of the essence of faith, I believe in fact necessarily follow. However, as I hope to argue in far more detail at a later time, this erroneous consequence is due to an erroneous premise. I have had a special interest in the relation of faith to the intellect and the will since 2023 during a study comparing Turretin and Thomas Aquinas on the matter. Again, I hope to elaborate on the conclusions I came to during that time in a future post, but put simply: I believe that the question of whether or not love is included in the essence of faith is inseparably tied to the question of whether faith belongs formally to the intellect alone or in some way also to the will. And I furthermore believe that many of the Reformed, since the beginning of the Reformation itself, confused matters by placing faith, in some way formally, in the will. This, I believe, confused the nature of the two virtues, ends in nonsense, and ultimately culminated in William Ames placing saving faith formally in the will, leading to further nonsense rightly corrected by guys like Maccovius, Gomarus, and Voetius. Due to this error, many descriptions that many theologians have made of faith’s operation in the will do not actually describe faith, but the distinct virtue of love. Thomas Goodwin makes this point explicitly:

There have been some that would make the act of faith in the will to be a cleaving unto Christ for his excellencies. The truth is, that is nothing but love, it is not faith; but that act of the will, which is properly faith, answers unto Christ as a Saviour, and as a means of salvation appointed by God. Now, go, take Jesus Christ as a Saviour, and as a means of salvation appointed by God, it is not love answereth to that in Christ, but it is a trust and believing on him. It is not a cleaving unto Jesus Christ for his excellencies, that is that proper act of faith which we call justifying, but it is that act of the will which hath relation unto him as a Saviour, and as the means of salvation; and the proper act that answereth to that, is trust and confidence.

See also page 175 of Rutherford above. This brief account that I have given of the historical-theological matters, I have only recently found out is exactly the same account given by Stephen Lobb starting at page 126 here: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A48865.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext#backDLPS127

I had originally thought that my argument here was somewhat original to me, but it seems Lobb expressed the exact same thoughts as myself 300 years prior to me (which is, oddly, not the only time he has done this!). What is important to remember here is that, although other theologians place faith at least partially in the will and will attribute such acts as “cleaving unto Christ for his excellencies” to faith, they will deny the consequence that this entails that love is an essential part of faith. Now, both Baxter and I actually agree that their denial of the consequence is unsuccessful, but we end up in different places. Whereas orthodox theologians who place faith partially in the will refuse to follow the consequence and thus deny love to be an essential part of faith, Baxter refuses to do so.

Now, to present the true and orthodox position, the two virtues are (at least) formally distinct from each other (even as their subjects, the intellect and will are) and thus it would be as wrong to say that love justifies as it would be to say that a man reasons due to his animality. It cannot be said that one theological virtue belongs to another as an essential part of the other. Faith virtually and radically contains hope, love, and all of its proper acts and effects. However, it does not formally contain love, as it is a distinct formal/actual virtue.

The confusion between faith and love (being grounded in the confusion of their proper subjects) is hardly unique to Baxter (although, of course, the owning of such a consequence is). Voetius at several points addresses tyrones or juniores, inexperienced, immature, or younger students, and warns them of the dangers of reading in the works of practical theologians “of the consequent acts of faith that they would mix or confuse faith with obedience and the elicited and commanded acts of both [respectively], and thus unwittingly stumble into some affinity with Socinian and Remonstrant errors.”

“The commanded acts consequent to faith” says Voetius, “are those that do not operate in themselves but in other theological virtues; which receive their motion, power, measure, and direction in their action from faith, and such are the elicited acts of hope, love, new obedience, patience, and renewed repentance.”

And finally, Hoornbeek: “Scripture never attributes to love the force of justifying, which force would apply to love more than faith, if faith derived the force of justifying from love, or if love had the force of justifying conjointly with faith, that force at least ought to be attributed to it and faith equally. But Scripture always attributes the force of justifying only to faith.”

That faith does not justify as a (passive) instrument, but as a condition.

Baxter argues this in a few places. See his aphorisms here: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26862.0001.001/1:59?rgn=div1;subview=detail;type=simple;view=fulltext;q1=Form

In holding that faith is not an instrumental cause of justification, Baxter was actually arguing with good intent against arminians since in his mind granting any sort of causality to faith (even instrumental) grants too much to faith. Instead, Baxter holds that faith is merely a condition sine qua non. There are two criticisms to be made here, albeit they are somewhat complicated. The first is that this position is still possibly connected to errors 1 and 4 inasmuch as faith’s causality in justification thereby becomes equal to every other condition since, considered as a condition, it justifies equal with every other condition, albeit not equally (Burgess will expand on this). The second is that there is mere philosophical error here inasmuch as Baxter denies the existence of passive instruments, but the force of the first criticism relies upon this one.

Regarding the first error, the criticism lodged by Burgess here (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A30241.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;view=fulltext) I take to be this: a different formal reason must be given for faith’s role in justification than that of a condition or mere dispositive cause (hence why the Reformed went with specifying instrumental cause, which formal reason does not aequè belong to any other condition in the point of justification). For Baxter, faith justifies aequè (equal) with other conditions since it justifies under the same formal ratio that they share in as a condition or a dispositive cause. But it does not justify aequaliter (equally) with them since it is the more proximate cause of justification. In other words, the critique of Burgess is that, in whatever way faith is said to justify, it is not sufficient that it be said to justify not aequaliter with other conditions while affirming it justifies aequè with them. Rather, an altogether different formal ratio of faith’s justification must be given. Furthermore “condition” does not include in its formal ratio the passivity of reception as “passive instrument” does. While it is true that faith may be viewed both as an instrument and as a condition, these remain two distinct formal ratios and, as it is a condition, it does not, formally, justify any less than other conditions (i.e. in this sense, repentance, love, obedience, etc. are all conditions sine qua non of justification). Thus, faith justifies (in the relevant sense) not as it is a condition, but as it is an instrument. In other words, what Baxter says is true only about faith as it is a condition (in which case it justifies aequè but not aequaliter with other conditions); but it is false about faith as an instrument (in which case it does not even justify aequè with conditions like repentance, love, obedience, or even itself considered as a condition). Thus Burgess:

But it's said, Faith hath a peculiar fitnesse and aptnesse to receive Christ, which Love hath not. It is true, and therefore Faith onely Justifieth, and not Love: Thus it maketh against him [Baxter], and not for him. Besides, with him, Faith justifieth as a Condition, not from its peculiar aptnesse, and therefore Love and Repentance being Conditions, must justifie aequè with Faith, though not aequaliter, Faiths aptnesse is the remote reason, as it is a Condition, that is the proxime and formall reason: Now Repentance and Love have this formall reason, for they are Conditions: Certainly, if Brutum were Animal rationale, he would be Homo, as well as man is.

Now while I think there is little disagreement here [see Baxter’s comments here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26883.0001.001/1:49?rgn=div1;subview=detail;type=simple;view=fulltext;q1=Instrument] and I want to give him some leeway here as there are at least some who would hold faith not as a proper instrument, but as a condition, who nevertheless would not then speak of Baxter's justifying repentance, love, etc. there is at least, imprecision in thus making its causation equal to other conditions in this [see John Brown’s comments on the above passage form Baxter https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29752.0001.001/1:3.29?rgn=div2;view=fulltext too long to quote] and thus Burgess and Brown are still making a valid (and ultimately, important) point in this matter.

But if such a critique is to hold, his denial of passive instruments must be addressed in order to secure passive instrumentality as the formal ratio under which faith justifies. Plus, it is worthwhile to address this matter anyways.

Against Baxter, and in defense of Keckermann and Burgersdijk, consider that the essence of an instrument consists in fitness for use, which holds true even when instruments are not actually being used. Subordinate efficients, considered in themselves, still retain the essence of instrument even considered apart from the primary efficient due to their obediential potency to act as instrumental causes. Subordinate efficients considered in themselves effect either actively (as heat in fire) or passively (as a knife) in that the knife has no virtue or ability to effect anything apart from the object pressing against the blade of the knife while it’s supported (which is a fundamentally different mode of efficacy compared to fire’s heat).

In justifying faith, the primary efficient is our persons (Baxter’s argument about us not being the efficient cause of our justification is fallacious and seems to confuse active and passive justification, as though it were an issue to thereby say that we passively or applicatorily justify ourselves; George Kendall makes a similar criticism in his Theokratia*), the subordinate efficient or instrument is our faith, and it holds the essence of instrumentality because of the obediential potency that exists in it, which obediential potency is founded in the Covenant of Grace which is able to constitute it as holding moral efficacy to justification (I add here that even phsyically considered it is naturally suited for such a work, as I hope to expand on later). Faith is a passive instrument in justification because of its act of reception of the righteousness of Chirst. A person might also simply consider faith as an active instrument, which although I think less precise, would be sufficient to establish a different formal ratio than that of a condition.

*Cf also Crandon: I deny the Assumption or Minor; he [Baxter] proves it thus, "Man doth not justifie himself". This is an equivocation, and besides the question. None ever made man the causa prima of his justification, none I mean of all those whom Mr. Baxters disputes against. Himself indeed and his followers asserting the perfection and merit of mans righteousnesse consisting in faith and good works, and affirming that this righteousnesse of man, and in man, doth give him title to the righteousnesse which is by Christ, cannot well be cleared from making man the first cause of his justification. But we speak nothing tending to this purpose; and in no other sense do we say that man acteth to his justification, but by this apprehending and applying to himself the justification of God. And in this respect man is not only the principall but also the sole efficient of apprehending or receiving Christ to justification, and faith his alone receptive instrument therein, by the instrumentall subsurviency of his faith in receiving Christ. We make it not mans instrument of Christs satisfaction, or of Gods acceptation, or of his declaring, but only of our applying it to our soules.

It’s also worth mentioning that in any case, faith considered in relation to justification cannot be considered as a mere causa sine qua non since it operates a moral cause which by the covenant constitution of God has some influence unto the effect of justification. A mere sine qua non of justification would be something like possessing a brain (as without a brain, I cannot have faith, seeing as I would be dead). A sine qua non is a mere necessary condition or circumstance. But faith is an ordinance of God (to use a similar analogy, the word preached is an ordinance of God and thus acts as a moral instrument to give grace to its hearers, but the air in which the sound of the preached word travels would be a mere sine qua non. In the same way, nature is but a sine qua non of grace). Both Wamphray and Owen make this point:

Brown: Shall we have so meane & low an account of the ordinances & appointments of God, in reference to spiritual ends? Seing the Lord hath appointed Faith, in order to Justification, we must not look upon it as a causa fatua, or as a meer circumstance, but as having some kindly influence in the effect, by vertue of the appointment of God, & such a connexion therewith, that it no sooner existeth, but as soon justification followeth. Faith then can not be called a meer causa sine qua non. Historical faith & several other antecedents, may be a conditio or causa sine qua non; for no man of age can be justified without it; yet we may not say, that we justified by it, as by saving faith; the same may be said of Conviction & Sense of sin, of some measure at least, of legal Repentance, and of desire of Pardon & of Peace, which yet may be, and oft are without justification. And it may also seem strange, how this causa sine qua non, can be called a potestative condition; or how that which is said to be a proper potestative condition, ex cujus præstatione constituitur jus a actuale ad beneficium, can be called meer conditio or causa sine qua non, seing it hath such a considerable moral influence in the effect?

Owen: If it (condition sine qua non) be taken more strictly for that which is necessarily present, but has no causality in any kind, not that of a receptive instrument, I cannot understand how it should be an ordinance of God. For every thing that he has appointed unto any end, moral or spiritual, has, by virtue of that appointment, either a symbolical instructive efficacy, or an active efficiency, or a rewardable condecency, with respect unto that end. Other things may be generally and remotely necessary unto such an end, so far as it partakes of the order of natural beings, which are not ordinances of God with respect thereunto, and so have no kind of causality with respect unto it, as it is moral or spiritual. So the air we breathe is needful unto the preaching of the word, and consequently a “causa sine qua non” thereof; but an ordinance of God with especial respect thereunto it is not. But every thing that he appoints unto an especial spiritual end, has an efficacy or operation in one or other of the ways mentioned; for they either concur with the principal cause in its internal efficiency, or they operate externally in the removal of obstacles and hindrances that oppose the principal cause in its efficiency. And this excludes all causes “sine quibus non,” strictly so taken, from any place among divine ordinances. God appoints nothing for an end that shall do nothing. His sacraments are not arga sēmeia; but, by virtue of his institution, do exhibit that grace which they do not in themselves contain. The preaching of the word has a real efficiency unto all the ends of it. So have all the graces and duties that he works in us, and requires of us: by them all are “we made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light;” and our whole obedience, through his gracious appointment, has a rewardable condecency with respect unto eternal life. Wherefore, as faith may be allowed to be the condition of our justification, if no more be intended thereby but that it is what God requires of us that we may be justified; so, to confine the declaration of its use in our justification unto its being the condition of it, when so much as a determinate signification of it cannot be agreed upon, is subservient only unto the interest of unprofitable strife and contention.

(Possible): continuance of justification dependent on works; possible agreement.

I list this and the next one as “possible” errors because although I do not think Baxter actually errs in these things, many have accused him of it.

To cite Baxter:

Sincere obedience to God in Christ is a condition of our continuance in a state of justification, or of our not losing it. And our perseverance therein is a condition of our appearing in that state before the Lord, at our departure hence. (page 78 https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26974.0001.001/1:7?rgn=div1;view=fulltext).

The sum of this controversy may be summed up with a single distinction from Owen:

If those, who affirm that obedience is the condition of it [justification], mean that God indispensably requires it, and that the neglect of it is inconsistent with a justified state, we readily grant it. But if it be asked, What is that, whereby, in a way of duty, we concur to the continuation of our Justification? we say, it is Faith alone.

Davenant likewise affirms, with Owen, that:

Good works are necessary for retaining and preserving the state of justification—not as causes that by themselves effect or merit this preservation, but as means or conditions without which God does not will to preserve the grace of justification in people.

For my part, I don’t see Baxter as saying anything more here.

For more, one may check out John Brown’s Chapter. XXXV: Faith is the only Condition on our part, of the continuance of justification.

It is also helpful to note that if "condition" is understood not simply as a consequent condition and sine qua non, but as that which suspends the effect until its fulfillment, then justification is not dependent upon good works as a condition. In this sense, good works are a condition in the one justified, but not properly of justification. So John Brown:

It is said, that Repentance is necessary both as commanded, and as a meane appointed for attaining Remission of sins: And therefore must be the Condition of Remission. Ans. The consequence is not good; for this same may be said of Prayer, and other Duties; which yet cannot be called proper Conditions of Pardon. That prayer is a commanded duty, none will deny; That a praying sinner may be said to be using the meanes to attaine unto Pardon, and to be in the way of obtaining of it, will also be granted: and so in that respect, prayer may be accounted a meane: and yet it cannot be called the Condition; for then every one that prayeth should have pardon, though he act not faith: And if it be said, that it must be prayer in faith Jam. 5:15. I Ans. True, but then the Condition is not Prayer, but Faith exerting itself, and acting in & through Prayer: And the same we say of Repentance, and so keep it in its due place, and presse it in the Gospel way & methode.

And when taken in this sense, I grant that there is perhaps error in Baxter's formulation (cf. chater 1 of Owen's justification for a similar argument).

(Possible) A different understanding of final justification

Neither do I think that Baxter errs here and I do not really care to quote him.

I must dissent somewhat from Michael Brown’s otherwise excellent paper on Baxter here. I think that Baxter’s formulation of final justification, to the extent it is faulty if it may be at all, is only so insofar as it assumes other considerations already addressed here and so I do not count it as a distinct error per se.

The important thing to keep in mind that is that when we speak of “final justification,” we are speaking of “justification” equivocally. The form of “final justification” is different from the form of justification as we usually mean it, speaking of passive justification. Thus they are two substantially distinct “justifications.” The form of passive justification is the remission of sins and the adjugment of the right to life. To make final justification include either part of that form would be an error. But it is not clear to me that Baxter does this (albeit this is somewhat complicated by Packer, Redemption and Restoration, 251-253 and John Brown starting at 214 here https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A94870.0001.001/1:3.9?rgn=div2;view=fulltext#backDLPS218). See my post on final justification.

Conclusion

In conclusion, really nothing I have said here is anything new. Baxter was a semi-Socinian on justification, as Owen especially demonstrated at length in Vindicae Evangelicae and his Doctrine of Justification. For more on the errors of Baxter and the Neonomians, all one has to do is look to the cited sources: Owen’s Doctrine of Justification, John Brown’s Life of Justification Opened, Witsius’s Animadversions, Chauncy’s Alexipharmacon, Lobb’s Peaceable Enquiry into the Nature of the Present Controversie, Keach’s Marrow of True Justification and Everlasting Covenant, etc. And for secondary sources, again, I cannot recommend highly enough Van den Brink's The Transfer of Sin.

Where do the Reformed differ from Rome on sin?
Work in progress

Whether original righteousness is natural to man such that disordered concupiscence is preternatural to him? [Yes]

Whether it is requisite for sin that it be strictly voluntary (i.e. formally an act of the will) or whether it sufficies that it in any way adhere to or affect the will? [The latter]

Whether the privation of original righteousness and the habit of concupiscence is formally sinful and guilty and in itself, or whether it is sinful and guilty only by extrinsic denomination in Adam? [The former]

Whether primary first motions are sinful? [Yes]

(Against Thomists) Whether some sins of those in grace do not in themselves, due to charity, deserve eternal death? [No]

(Against Thomists) Whether sin expels grace physically or morally? [The latter]

(Against Many) Whether the form of sin is its guilt? (and address reatus culpae/poenae) [No]

(Against Many) Whether the habit of original sin is limited to the concupiscence of the sensitive apetitie or whether it is also of the will? [The latter]

How does faith relate to the intellect and the will?

Miscellaneous Questions

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