CHAPTER FIVE
Although this book favors one trajectory within the Reformed tradition, diversity exists among our theologians. John Calvin basically maintained a medieval outlook of the natural and supernatural orders concerning the faculties of human nature, albeit emphasizing the fall's effects in good Augustinian fashion. Calvin affirmed 'that the natural gifts were corrupted in man through sin, but that his supernatural gifts were stripped from him.' He explained the supernatural gifts as: 'the light of faith as well as righteousness, which would be sufficient to attain heavenly life and eternal bliss.' Calvin seemed to own the Thomistic heritage that supernatural capacities, even related to original righteousness, were needed to obtain the beatific state. 184
I am pleased that Perkins has effectively ceded Calvin to our side here.
Francis Junius (1545-1602) may represent a mediating position containing some inconsistencies. 184
The inconsistencies are entirely in Perkins’s own head, as I will show.
On the one hand, he tied our nature closely to aspects of the supernatural order by relating the divine image to 'the law of creation, or our created nature as it was first created by God.' 184
Nothing in the quote above ties anything natural to “aspects of the supernatural order” because the “divine image,” “the law of creation,” and “our nature as it was first created by God” are all aspects of the natural order. Apparently, Perkins thinks something here is supernatural and thus thinks Junius is being inconsistent. The words that Perkins cites from Junius are as follows:
“Next, the image of God must be considered in two ways: first, in us according to the law of creation, or in our nature, as it was originally created by God; and then according to the law of restoration, or grace, as it is daily renewed in Christ and is destined to attain its ultimate perfection.”
Junius is here making a distinction between what he elsewhere calls the essential image of God and the relative image, or the image as it is adjusted to grace. You can read about this here (search “relative”) and here (search “adjust”). We will bring this up again later.
In this instance, he further seemed to equate grace with the renewal of that image that occurs in regeneration. 184
Yes, the image of God, which is natural, has been corrupted by sin. Grace is required in order to restore nature.
On the other hand, when as a professor in Leiden he exchanged (eventually published) correspondence with Jacob Arminius (1560-1609) about the nature of predestination, he articulated a basically medieval view of the nature-grace issue. 184
I am not sure what the apparent opposition Perkins is creating with his “on the other hand” comment is supposed to be referring to. Everything Perkins has said prior to this is perfectly consistent with a “basically medieval view of the nature-grace issue.”
On one side of that exchange, Arminius went beyond the Thomistic outlook, articulating essentially Robert Bellarmine's view: 'God's image is in man not by nature but by supernatural grace, not having respect to natural happiness but to supernatural life.' Pushing back, Junius sided with Thomas against Bellarmine by contending that nature is twofold having relation to the physical world and the spiritual world.⁵ Whereas Arminius claimed that no man was ever created in a purely natural state, Junius went further than Thomas by denying that man has supernatural endowments.184-185
I don’t know what this part of the sentence means: “Junius went further than Thomas by denying that man has supernatural endowments.” Junius went further than Thomas by denying that man currently has supernatural endowments? That’s certainly not true as clearly Thomas agrees that men now as fallen lack supernatural endowments. Thomas is not Pelagian. Does Perkins mean to say then that Junius goes further than Thomas by denying man was originally created with supernatural endowments? Certainly Junius affirms man was created in a state of pure nature and thus without grace for a time, but he doesn’t think man remained that way, but that supernatural endowments were superadded to him after his creation.
[Arminius’s statement] ‘that no man was ever created in a merely natural state.' If you mean that he was created without supernatural endowments, I do not see how this can be proved, (though many make this assertion). The Scripture does not any where make this statement. But you are not ignorant that it is said in the schools, that a negative argument from authority, as, 'it is not written, therefore, it is not true' is not valid. The order of creation, in a certain respect, proves [this is so, i.e. that man was created without supernatural endowments], since the body was first made from the dust, and afterwards the soul was breathed into it. Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the moment of its creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or that they were superadded after its creation? I would rather affirm that, as the soul was added to the body, so the supernatural endowments were added to the soul. If God did this in relation to nature, why may He not have done it, in the case of grace, which is more peculiar?” (https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xii.html).
If anyone doubts this interpretation of Junius, refer to my post here, in which I pull from the Mosaic Polity, his treatise on True Theology, his theses on freewill, and his correspondence with Arminius to prove the same interpretation.
and by affirming that God made even Adam in a purely natural state before bestowing supernatural grace: 'God contemplated man in pure nature upon whom he will confer supernatural aspects by his decree.’ Even in his distinction of pure nature and supernatural aspects, Junius affirmed the image of God as natural to human nature in righteousness and holiness. These supernatural endowments, therefore, do not pertain to Adam's image bearing status as such. 185
More accurately, supernatural gifts do not pertain to the essential image of God, although they do pertain the relative image of God:
The essential image is natural; the relative image was, so to speak, supernatural, for it looked to God, through nature joined to grace, by a peculiar and free motion of the will; God looked upon it, of grace, (for, what action of God towards us is natural?) We have that essential light, corrupted by sin; it is plain that we have not lost it. We have lost the relative light; but Christ restores this, that we may be renewed, after God, in his own image, and that the essential light may be purified, since natural things are corrupted, the supernatural are lost, as we have previously said. https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xii.html
Thus the supernatural gifts are often included in that part of the image of God which was wholly lost (along with perfect natural rectitude and spiritual life). Calvin’s words at the top are a good example of this.
This caveat demands more reflection inasmuch as it shows that Junius' use of pure nature differed from the meaning that developed by the time of early modern Roman theology. 185
Junius’s use of “pure nature” is the historic use of the term: contemplating a state in which no sin and yet no grace exists for man. When the Reformed attacked “pure nature” they attacked the concept of pure nature as understood by Rome, namely one in which concupiscence exists in man because Rome equated “original righteousness” with the donum superadditum.
Junius clarified the relation of these supernatural additions to the image of God to our natural and supernatural ends. Thus, he explained his view of our supernatural end: 'The future of his nature in its integrity was natural happiness, although, so to speak, afterward to be absorbed into the supernatural on account of God's grace.’ This happiness was as much as the natural end of man's integrity and its natural limit. Drawing on the Thomistic view of ends, he posited: 'nature is the foundation of the supernatural. Coordinating the twofold ends, he denied that the subordinate natural end was at variance with the supernatural end, stating that the issue concerned the means of obtaining each end: 'Adam was able to strive for the former by nature, but able to be exalted to the latter on account of grace.' Junius outlined essentially a Reformed Thomist view of the nature-grace paradigm, resisting what he saw to be weaknesses in Arminius' view of original nature - owing to Jesuit theology - but still holding to a real distinction of the natural and supernatural orders. Junius' view of natural and supernatural ends might more effectively be categorized as subordinate and ultimate ends since he did not suggest that our supernatural end was superadded. Junius thought that grace enabled Adam to seek that ultimate end but did not state that grace added it to nature. 185-186
The last two sentences, to speak frankly, are utter nonsense. The entire point of speaking about a supernatural end is that it is not an end which is natural to us. Our nature is not intrinsically ordered to it and cannot reach it on its own. That’s why the supernatural end has to be reached by superadded grace and is thus extrinsic to our nature. It does not matter that the supernatural end may be viewed as an ultimate end in the providence of God and the natural end as a subordinate end. When viewed from the perspective of the natural order itself, the supernatural end is superadded even as much as grace is superadded to nature. Nobody would deny that the ability for a rock to be raised upwards is an end added to its nature, even if one ultimately intends for that rock to do so. The end of the rock, considered in itself, is only to fall downwards. When I cut down a tree to turn it into a piece of paper, it does not follow that because God has decreed for this tree to ultimately be turned into paper, this must not be an end superadded to the tree and is therefore its natural end. The natural end of man is intrinsic to him, and any supernatural end can only be an external end superadded to him, just as the natural end of a tree is to flourish as a good tree, not to become paper, even if that is ultimately where the tree ends up. My natural end is beatitude in God in a natural mode, and this is true even if God wills to give me grace to elevate my nature so that it is capable of beatitude in God in a supernatural mode, but the latter is certainly a superadded end since it is not my natural end. Refer back to our review of chapter 1.
John Owen (1616-83) took a position on the divine image that very closely resembled Thomas Aquinas' distinction of natural and supernatural capacities. In describing how the Holy Spirit immediately sanctified Christ's human nature so to make the Son's human nature entirely spotless and without any stain of original sin, he also drew the connection to Adam:
...let the natural faculties of the soul, the mind, will, and affections, be created pure, innocent, undefiled, - as they cannot be otherwise immediately created of God, - yet there is not enough to enable any rational creature to live to God; much less was it all that was in Jesus Christ. There is, moreover, required hereunto supernatural endowments of grace, superadded unto the natural faculties of our souls. If we live unto God, there must be a principle of spiritual life in us, as well [as] of life natural. This was the image of God in Adam, and was wrought in Christ by the Holy Spirit.¹²
For Owen, Adam's principle of spiritual life was in the imago Dei, which surpasses the soul's natural faculties of the mind, will, and affections. In other words, the sanctification of human nature relates to its endowment with the divine image as our connection to supernatural life for living unto God. Even the phrase 'supernatural endowment of grace' comes directly from Thomas Aquinas. In this respect, however, Owen employed the category of 'supernatural endowments' to refer to our constitutive elements that relate us to God, and used 'grace' seemingly in a broad sense of God's empowering a person to exercise the capacities of human nature unto spiritual ends. 186
I’ve mentioned elsewhere my suspicion that Owen ought to be interpreted as a Jansenist, holding the position that supernatural grace is necessary for spiritual life pleasing to God. However, I have not until now had the opportunity to explain why I take this view of Owen and will do so here. Owen states that:
“Three things were required to render man idoneous, or fit unto that life to God for which he was made: — First, An ability to discern the mind and will of God with respect unto all the duty and obedience that God required of him; as also so far to know the nature and properties of God as to believe him the only proper object of all acts and duties of religious obedience, and an all-sufficient satisfaction and reward in this world and to eternity. Secondly, A free, uncontrolled, unentangled disposition to every duty of the law of his creation, in order unto living unto God. Thirdly, An ability of mind and will, with a readiness of compliance in his affections, for a due regular performance of all duties, and abstinence from all sin.”
Owen then states that: “These things belonged unto the integrity of his nature, with the uprightness of the state and condition wherein he was made. And all these things were the peculiar effects of the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost.” Here, he seems to identify the three things listed above as effects of grace instead of nature, which would be in line with Jansenist assumptions. He goes on later and says:
“His [Christ’s] nature, therefore, as miraculously created in the manner described, was absolutely innocent, spotless, and free from sin, as was Adam in the day wherein he was created. But this was not all; it was by the Holy Spirit positively endowed with all grace. And hereof it was afterward only capable of farther degrees as to actual exercise, but not of any new kind of grace. And this work of sanctification, or the original infusion of all grace into the human nature of Christ, was the immediate work of the Holy Spirit; which was necessary unto him: for let the natural faculties of the soul, the mind, will, and affections, be created pure, innocent, undefiled, - as they cannot be otherwise immediately created of God, - yet there is not enough to enable any rational creature to live to God; much less was it all that was in Jesus Christ. There is, moreover, required hereunto supernatural endowments of grace, superadded unto the natural faculties of our souls. If we live unto God, there must be a principle of spiritual life in us, as well [as] of life natural.”
If we takes Owen's “live to God” as equivalent with spiritual life, Owen would seem to be saying that grace, the work of the Holy Spirit, is necessary for spiritual life; man’s natural faculties in a state of pure nature would be insufficient. This would certainly place Owen in the Jansenist camp. He appears to say as much when he says, “there must be a principle of spiritual life in us, as well [as] of life natural,” implying that spiritual life can only come from “supernatural endowments of grace, superadded unto the natural faculties of our souls.” Such a construal would seem to exclude a state of pure nature since in such a state man would be unable to please God and would not have spiritual life. This is, of course, contrary to what we have seen from men such as Junius:
“There was one mode of spiritual life in Adam, and there is another mode in us, in whom supernatural grace alone produces this life, while Adam had, together with this grace, the image of God unimpaired and uncorrupted, and therefore had spiritual life in both modes, the natural and supernatural.” (https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xvi.html)
And this would be contrary to men such as Zanchi, Charnock, and Gerhard, as noted here. Adam in a state of pure nature would still have been able to please God and would not have lacked spiritual life, which I have noted before as a very important point in Junius, as otherwise the state of pure nature can hardly be rightly understood (and, I think, one would have good reason to reject it’s possibility).
Further evidence for a Jansenist interpretation of Owen, albeit somewhat thin, can be drawn from the fact that he wrote the preface to Theophilus’s Gale very evidently biased treatment/apology of Jansenism. It is for these reasons that I have interpreted Owen accordingly.
Now, I do not think that Owen must be interpreted in this way. In the first paragraph we cited where Owen affirms certain natural gifts pertaining to original righteousness were “peculiar effects of the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost,” it seems to me this paragraph could be interpreted to mean that they were modally so. In other words, Owen is assuming Adam was created along with the superadded gifts of grace and thus possessed such gifts in a supernatural mode. The later paragraph is more difficult, but if we interpret “live to God” as possessing spiritual life in a supernatural mode and likewise interpret his “spiritual life” in the same way (Owen not specifying the mode of this life, but assuming a supernatural mode), Owen could be saved from Jansenism. I do not personally find such a reading convincing and so I will gladly hand Owen over to the Jansenists for now, but I will let the reader make up their own mind here. There was almost certainly a small Jansenist contingent among the Reformed as evidenced by Richard Field and probably also Theophilus Gale, as I have mentioned here.
Owen drew this connection to our wider topic of the covenant of works by connecting the law principle to the reason for the sabbath. After explaining that the sabbath set forth the prospect of eschatological rest, he turned to consider the nature of the sabbath command. For Owen, Adam's creation with faculties to know God and to be fit for eschatological destiny meant that 'the order of his nature, called "the image of God," inclined and enabled him' to love, to fear, to obey, and to trust God as his preserver and rewarder. In this connection, Adam had necessary obligations of obedience by virtue of his nature having the image-bearing relationship to God's nature, which included setting aside due time for the performance of worship. Accordingly, he described the covenant of works' superadded features:
Man in his creation, with respect unto the ends of God therein, was constituted under a covenant. That is the law of his obedience was attended with promises and threatenings, rewards and punishments, suited unto the goodness and holiness of God; for every law with rewards and recompenses annexed hath the nature of a covenant. And in this case, although the promise wherewith man was encouraged unto obedience, which was that of eternal life with God, did in strict justice exceed the worth of the obedience required, and so was a superadded effect of goodness and grace, yet was it suited unto the constitution of a covenant meet for man to serve God in unto his glory; and, on the other side, the punishment threatened unto disobedience, in death and an everlasting separation from God, was such as the righteousness and holiness of God, as his supreme governor, and Lord of him and the covenant, did require. Now, this covenant belonged unto the law of creation ...¹⁷
Although Owen saw the covenant of works as belonging to nature inasmuch as it cohered with the natural law, nonetheless superadded grace was necessary to address the problem of proportionality. This passage is not clear as to whether Owen saw the superadded grace in this instance as simply the making of the covenant to overcome the disproportionality issue, or as the superadded endowments of grace that he mentioned in the earlier quote about the sanctification of Christ's human nature. If the latter, it is hard to distinguish Owen's view from the medieval paradigm of using sanctifying grace as the ontological solution to the proportionality problem. 187-188
I want to point out that the main point Owen is making is that the Covenant of Works itself was superadded. He says that “the promise wherewith man was encouraged unto obedience, which was that of eternal life with God, did in strict justice exceed the worth of the obedience required, and so was a superadded effect of goodness and grace.” That is, the promise of eternal life in exchange for the stipulated obedience from Adam was what was superadded. Owen isn’t concerned with addressing sanctifying grace here, but what he does affirm cuts against Perkins’s contention that the Covenant of Works was natural to man.
The issue involved, however, was that Owen thought that the idea that Adam could obey in his own strength would make Adam an independent creature, since man was created to depend on the Spirit. 188
Ryan McGraw is cited as backing this point up, which could lend more credence to my interpretation of Owen as a Jansenist for whom the supernatural indwelling of the Spirit is necessary to human moral action per se.
This book's remaining arguments enlist representatives of our preferred view, so will not roll out extensive historical evidence for the issue's other side now. Intellectual integrity and academic honesty have been the point for presenting this multiform cast of the Reformed tradition even on important issues like this one. Nonetheless, the later Reformed Orthodox seemed more emphatically against the older separation of natural and supernatural orders, emphasizing nature and covenant more than nature and grace. 188
If I am reading this correctly, Perkins has realized that until this point he has not been able to find any representatives of the view he is setting forth and so now turns to focus only on those he believes agree with him. He will give two examples: Francis Turretin and Petrus Van Mastricht. Neither of them actually support what Perkins is saying, as I will now demonstrate and as I have, in Turretin’s case, already written on. The attentive reader will probably already know the necessary distinctions to demonstrate these men’s disagreement with Perkins, but I will nevertheless make these distinctions explicit.
Francis Turretin mounted an ardent argument against the donum superadditum both as to human nature as such and to Adam's covenant-keeping ability. 188
No, once again, Turretin countered the Roman version of the donum superadditum in which man lacks natural original righteousness. This is evident in that, during the statement of the question, he defines the version of “pure nature” he is countering like so:
“Thus man is said to be in pure naturals (puris naturalibus) who consists of his own parts and essential properties without the gift of original righteousness and without any superadded qualities or habits (good or evil). It is called a state of pure nature (status purae naturae) by a negative not a positive purity (by which namely he has nothing good or evil superadded to his nature).”
That Turretin affirms superadded gifts of grace, we have already proven in our review of chapter 2.
Contending against Bellarmine, Turretin denied even the hypothetical possibility of Adam's existence in pure nature. Drawing a critically helpful distinction, he posed that original righteousness was thoroughly natural in respect to the created order but now is supernatural inasmuch as grace restores it to corrupt sinners. So, he concluded that God's freedom in how he might create humanity did not mean that original righteousness was supernatural to the way that he did make us in his likeness:
“However much original righteousness can rightly be called 'grace' or 'a gratuitous gift,' and therefore not owed from God's part in the same manner also that nature itself was created by him, it does not for that reason follow that it was supernatural, or undue to upright nature's perfection, because although God owed nothing to man, nevertheless having posited that he willed to create man according to his own image, he owed to create him righteous and holy.” 188-189
I need not add anything here. Turretin affirms, with all of the Reformed, that original righteousness is natural. But this is nothing to the point about the donum superadditum, but only the Roman version of it in which one of its formal effects is to provide original righteousness.
Turretin continued the same trajectory in discussing Adam's ability in the covenant of works. Although the covenant even intensified Adam's obligation to obey God, any help God gave Adam 'did not extend to pouring any new virtue into him but only to revealing the power of that strength which he had received.' Turretin's anti-Roman polemic had an important role for nature's integrity even in relation to supernatural realities. 189
Again, see chapter 2 for Turretin’s comments rejecting the need to infuse new virtue into Adam.
Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706), professor of theology in Utrecht, represents a more guarded use of terminology, emphasizing Adam's natural aspects in the covenant of works. He affirmed that original righteousness is 'natural to man' and that 'man was creature not only innocent, but also endowed with original righteousness.' In one respect, he aligned with Thomas: 'Original righteousness is ... that most ordered uprightness and harmony of the intellect, will, and affections.' 189
How this is supposed to align with Thomas, who held the rectitude of the will to be a preternatural gift of grace (see our review of chapter 3), we are not told.
Still, he connected the divine image and original righteousness intrinsically - 'man insofar as in his original righteousness he bears the image of God' - rather than posing this properly ordered state of affairs as supernatural. 189
Yes, original righteousness pertains to the image of God and so is natural to man (although, again, we do not say it is intrinsic to him such that it constitutes him, for it is an accident that has been lost).
Thus, he saw our supernaturally oriented faculties as natural to our nature. 189
What? How is this conclusion drawn from anything that Mastricht has said? Original righteousness is natural to man, therefore “our supernaturally oriented faculties are natural to our nature.” I am not even sure what this sentence means. What does Perkins mean by “supernaturally oriented faculties” here being “natural to our nature.” Is Perkins trying to say that our faculties are naturally oriented to the supernatural? But where does he get that from Mastricht, who has only denied that original righteousness is supernatural?
Within the covenant, Mastricht argued that Adam's natural strength, rather than grace-enabled and supernatural obedience, was required. As the condition, 'God stipulated from man an obedience that was perfect in every way, one that was to be offered in his own strength, which condition Adam also received.' 189-190
Here Mastricht is describing the form of a covenant as consisting in mutual consent. “In his own strength” is not opposed to superadded grace (for all agree that I am the one who exercises acts of actual grace), but is rather highlighting the necessity of restipulation on Adam’s part.. My point here is not to argue that Van Mastricht also affirms superadded grace (although I think he does), but only that this quotation does not prove what Perkins says it does.
Further, 'intrinsically, he was equipped with a perfect principle of obeying, namely, original righteousness.' 190
Only note here that Mastricht’s “intrinsically” here is used in opposition to an external principle and not in line with how Perkins has defined intrinsic back in chapter 1.
In Turretin and Mastricht, we find representatives of a Reformed construal of our nature in relation to obtaining our supernatural end that depended on premises that were more covenantal than ontological, which is precisely the view we argue.
…The point is that Thomas was the theologically closer, which does not suggest identical, historical antecedent on these issues because he was a stronger Augustinian theologian. The inverse way of stating this historical upshot is that the Reformed were committedly Augustinian even in their eclectic appropriation of the prior tradition.
First, Thomas bound the imago Dei to human constitution, closely aligning our relationship with God to creation itself. 190
I would like to know one medieval theologian who did not do this.
Citing Augustine, Thomas argued that man is fundamentally the image and likeness of God. Binding image and likeness together, he wrote, 'likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness - namely, that it is copied from something else.' For Thomas, image indicates a closer resemblance to the original than mere likeness, and 'man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness; and to be the image by reason of the imperfect likeness,' by which he meant that the Son is the only perfect likeness of God. Thomas located our image-bearing, which included likeness, in our rational nature that allows us to imitate God in understanding and loving God. By creation, then, we have 'a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God,' highlighting how we were made for fellowship with God even apart from our eschatological end. In other words, Thomas posed a fundamentally religious purpose to our whole constitution, posing image and likeness as no more than inflections on the same notion that we resemble God in our makeup. 190-191
Ironically, Perkins does not see how this supports the concept of pure nature. Thomas elucidates two ways (three, but for our purposes, we focus on two) that man can be said to be in the image of God:
“First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men.
“Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace.” https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1093.htm#article4
The first indicates that, for Thomas, there is a natural aptitude for the love of God common to all men. Thus, this is natural to man and would have existed in a state of pure nature, contrary to Perkins’s misrepresentations of the state of pure nature in chapter 1.
By contrast, Bellarmine separated the concepts of image and likeness. Leveraging his reading of the patristics, he argued that the likeness of God referred to abilities superadded to God's image given in human nature, 'From this host of patristic evidence, we are compelled to admit that the image and likeness are not entirely the same. Rather, the image pertains to nature, the likeness to abilities.' For Bellarmine, differing from Thomas, not everything belonging to our role and charge to reflect God at the creaturely level is constitutive of human nature. Thus, Bellarmine followed Bonaventure's interpretation that image and likeness differ 'according to mode' in that 'image is in the order of natural things, and likeness in the order of things belonging to grace.' 191
Bellarmine does not really differ from Thomas, even just considering the one quotation from Thomas above in which Thomas grants two ways man can be said to be in God’s image: a natural sense and a supernatural sense which consists in “conformity to grace.” The same point is made by Junius’s distinction between the essential and the relative image (https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xii.html)
Bonaventure's distinction then separates naturally implanted faculties from supernatural virtues. Bellarmine's appropriation of Bonaventure's interpretation further confirms our thesis that the Franciscan legacy concerning the imago Dei, original righteousness, and merit came to predominate the Roman tradition. 191-192
That our faculties may be separated from supernatural virtues is hardly a Franciscan distinctive. Supernatural faith is not naturally due to my intellect and charity is not naturally due to my will. Any Thomist will tell you this. Here is Thomas once again:
“Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above. Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above. One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Peter 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.”
Geerhardus Vos picked up this issue in his taxonomy of views about the imago Dei. He tagged that 'Bellarmine held that "image" designated the natural and "likeness" the supernaturally added.' To force Vos' critique to apply to Thomas, someone must supply the assumed but obviously incorrect middle premise that Bellarmine agreed with Thomas on this issue. Thomas' view falls within Vos' statement that the true position is that image and likeness both 'serve to describe one and the same concept from two sides.' Moreover, when Vos contended that the Reformed view means that 'the image of God comprises both the intellectual and the moral nature of man,' it seems to encompass Thomas' position that our image bearing binds us to understanding and loving God. 192
Bellarmine does not disagree that man is naturally apt to understand and love God (nor does any Chrisitan theologian that I know of). He knows that we are essentially rational creatures.
The Reformed then more aligned with Thomas that bearing God's image is concreated with human nature. 192
Again, who disagrees with this? Even in the citations given from Bellarmine, he has affirmed that the image of God is natural to man, reserving “likeness” for superadded gifts of grace.
Second, Reformed theology has closer affinity to Thomas' position that God created Adam with that original righteousness. It further clarifies that this original righteousness was a fundamental part of bearing God's image, so that it was inseparably, rather than superadded, concreated with our nature. According to Thomas, God gave original righteousness, which for him was a properly ordered subjection of the lower appetites to the spiritual faculties, with creation, although conceptually superadded to human nature. 192
Refer back to our review of chapter 3. Thomas very clearly affirms that original righteousness is superadded.
David Pareus (1548-1622), professor of Old and New Testament at Heidelberg, provides Reformed precedent for our interpretation that Thomas' view contained some ambiguities on this issue, explaining that 'Thomas' position 'is obscure because he did not explain what he means by sanctifying grace [gratiam gratum facientem]. Thomas called grace "that which by man is united to God."'⁴² Junius observed the same ambiguity. 192-193
See Junius’s words here https://ccel.org/ccel/arminius/works3/works3.iv.xx.html The ambiguity revolves around Thomas’s use of “natural condition” in relation to when man was predestined, but this ambiguity regarding the relation of election is one thing and that of the condition of Adam, when he fell into sin, is another, as Junius himself says. Here Junius is concerned to prove against Arminus that Thomas held that man was created in a state of supernatural grace and thus fell from this state.
This aspect of Reformed theology's closer alignment to Thomas is perhaps more complicated than the first. Pareus' position - which the next chapter will show to match the confessional consensus - was that 'original righteousness itself pertains to God's image, as part to the whole.' In this respect, the Reformed most resemble Henry of Ghent, who saw that the gift of original righteousness is intrinsic to human nature (donum concreatum). Martin Luther himself seemed to articulate Henry's exact point. At least Theodore Beza noted Henry as also one of the sounder scholastics from the medieval period. Like Thomas, Henry, when describing pure nature, simply meant nature undefiled by sin since God made it with natural or concreated original righteousness. 194
Perkins is correct to link the Reformed with Ghent. But, no, Ghent is not “like Thomas” here and it is again, quite frankly, embarrassing scholarship on Perkins’s part to suggest this. Once again, “pure nature” does not simply mean nature “undefiled by sin” but also excludes grace. Ghent argues that original righteousness is natural (or “concreated” in the sense of being a part of human nature in the state of pure nature), but again, this is not what Thomas thinks. Thomas affirms that a state of pure nature excludes original righteousness because, once again, he holds original righteousness to be “not from nature,” but rather a “supernatural endowment of grace.” If Perkins is confused here it’s likely because of the ambiguity in his own forced nomenclature of “concreated” which can mean either that something is a natural quality of human nature in the state of pure nature or that something is temporally created along with human nature. Of course, Thomas thinks original righteousness was temporally created along with human nature (that’s the entire reasoning behind how he avoids concupiscence in Adam’s state), but he does not think, like Ghent does, that original righteousness is a quality of the nature order, but instead holds it to be supernatural, as has already been made abundantly clear. This is precisely why Ghent is such an outlier and any serious Ghent scholar should be able to tell you this. Again, refer back to chapter 3.
Thomas, aware that these issues needed explanation in more principle terms, related sin's corruption to a detailed breakdown of human nature. He began by stating the three relevant aspects of human nature as our faculties, our inclination to virtue, and the gift of original righteousness:
The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice [donum originalis iustitiae], conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. 195
Perkins appears to misunderstand the sense in which Thomas affirms original righteousness to be a “good of nature.” Thomas’s point is not that original righteousness is of the natural order. Indeed, he is quite clear that it is not. It is supernatural. It may be called a “good of nature” only insofar as it was conferred upon the whole human race in Adam. It is “natural” only insofar as it would have been propagated. Cf:
“Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.” https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1100.htm
Note Thomas expressly denies that original righteousness was “caused by the principles of the species.” And he goes on to stress its supernatural character:
“the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (I:95:1, we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (I:95:1. This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul.”
Thomas could not be clearer. Original righteousness, for him, consists in “supernatural subjection of the reason to God” and therefore “results from sanctifying grace.” It is only said to be “natural” insofar as it would be propagated. But properly speaking, it belongs to supernature/grace, as even the grace they would have been born in “would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.” It is superadded to nature. The Reformed are not in agreement with Thomas here as it relates to original righteousness except on the specific point about the fact that original righteousness would be propagated to Adam’s offspring, on which point I know of no dissent from any Christian theologian (this is not to say there weren’t any) and thus this is far from a point unique to Thomas.
Given that this article was about sin's effects upon nature, his discussion of nature concerned pure nature as Thomas intended the concept, meaning unfallen and uncorrupted human nature. In that upright condition, our faculties have the natural impulse to act rightly before God.⁵⁶ We also had the gift of original righteousness. In that respect, we should keep in mind that all agree that original righteousness is a gift from God. The debated issue for our discussion is whether it is a superadded or concreated gift. 196
The third “good of human nature” Thomas has mentioned above, is excluded in his conception of pure/integral nature, as addressed in chapter 3, because it is a gift of grace. See especially his comments from De Malo there.
In the Franciscan lineage, Scotus suggested that humanity's natural condition remains essentially the same before and after the fall. For Scotus, humanity before the fall needed to merit original righteousness by 'ungraced' nature. He thought that, despite an increased difficulty, we remain able after the fall to perform works of pure nature for meriting the investiture of righteousness with which we further cooperate to merit justification. 198
As our citation of Scotus’s Ordinatio from chapter 2 shows, this is blatantly false. Scotus explicitly denies that man can merit without grace. It is worth citing this section again:
“He [God] is not believed so to have made disposition that pure nature or its act he would thus accept, because that ‘an act from purely natural resources is meritorious’ comes close to the error of Pelagius. Therefore it is more likely believed that he accepts nature and its act as meritorious through a supernatural habit.”
Perkins has been duped by and is amplifying sloppy and outdated scholarship. For a far more accurate representation of Scotus’s views see Kennard’s John Duns Scotus on Grace and the Trinitarian Missions https://brill.com/display/title/61717?language=en
While this borderline-pelagianism may not fit Scotus, it does however, fit Perkins himself given that he believes that Adam was bound to merit something of grace (the state of glory) from his own natural powers, without any superadded gift of grace at all.
Fourth, before tackling the relationship of the Reformed to medieval views of sanctifying grace proper, we need to consider some metaphysical categories and how they fit within this discussion. In this respect, the Creator-creature distinction is primary. We must grapple with the concepts of univocity and analogy considering the relationship between God and creatures. For brevity, this discussion will be somewhat crass, missing nuances that philosophers would want to maintain. For our purposes, we need these concepts only to help us understand more central matters to our discussion. In a univocal understanding of the Creator-creature distinction, God and creatures differ basically in quantity rather than intrinsic quality. God differs from creatures by having more being, more knowledge, more power, etc. For example, God and humans know things in the same way, but God has infinitely more knowledge. On the analogical view, God and creatures differ qualitatively, so that God's being, knowledge, power, etc. is foundational while creatures' is derivative. For example, God and humans know things in the same way, but God has infinitely more knowledge. On the analogical view, God and creatures differ qualitatively, so that God's being, knowledge, power, etc. is foundational while creatures' is derivative. 200
It’s fine to proceed with this definition of univocity (this is what Voetius and Burgersdijk refer to as “complete univocity,” as we will see), but to attempt to attribute this view to Scotus, as Perkins will go on to do, is just silly and will be found wanting, as Scotus affirms nothing more than univocity of concept (along with the majority of the Reformed themselves). More importantly, I don’t know of any Christian theology not named Gordon Clark who would seriously contend that, for instance, God’s knowledge is only quantitatively and not qualitatively different from man’s knowledge. The view is a priori extreme and so we should be suspicious of anyone trying to attribute this to any theologian.
Scotus, explicitly targeting Henry of Ghent's explanation of analogy which amounted to equivocation, understood the Creator-creature distinction univocally, meaning that God and creatures exist in the same way. 201
I want to know what Perkins means by saying Scotus affirms that “God and creatures exist in the same way.” We certainly share in the same formal notion of existence (and e.g. Van Mastricht affirms the same), but God’s existence is infinite whereas ours is finite.
In the traditional reading, Scotus thought that 'a single unified notion of being' applies in reference to God and creatures alike, grounding metaphysics. Scotus was Kant's apparent more proximate precursor than Thomas was, introducing an interesting factor in evaluating Leonine Thomist epistemology. Accordingly, Scotus' metaphysics entailed that we either cannot know God at all, or that we must accept the creatures' being is univocal with God's. Scotus favored the latter option. Through an array of complex metaphysical distinctions about modality in infinite and finite being, Scotus maintained divine transcendence and avoided real pantheism as well as programmatic nominalism. 201-202
Scotus’s univocity is a thesis about the concept or (as noted here) notion of being. He does not affirm, as Perkins has suggested with his definition of univocity, that Perkins holds to a complete univocity of being such that God is just a bigger version of us with more wisdom, power, etc. Consider Scotus’s own words:
“It is plain, therefore, from what has been said that God and creatures are in reality wholly diverse, agreeing in no reality . . . and nevertheless they agree in one concept such that there may exist one concept common to God and creatures fashioned by an imperfect intellect.”
Univocity applies to name and form only and not to mode, order, and perfection. “Being” is a concept, indeed, it is, Scotus argues, the most general concept possible such that before we know anything else at all about a being, we know that it is, in fact, a being.
He preserved some sense of true universals. 202
This is the sentence immediately following the above paragraph. I don’t know how it connects to it. I can only imagine that Perkins is here suffering from the same strange fixation on universals where they are not really relevant that Richard Cross has noted has plagued Matthew Barrett in his rather devastating review of Reformation as Renewal. But while we’re on the topic of universals, it’s worth noting that the Reformed go even beyond Scotus here in their denial of the reality of universal unity, as evidenced by Franco Burgersdijk:
“Thesis VIII: In the meantime, we do not agree with Nominalists who think that universals are purely nominal. For not only do we admit that things exist before the operation of the mind, which are called universals, as they also concede, but we also admit that there is in things the foundation of universality without the operation of the mind, namely, that exact similarity of many individuals of the same species in formal unity, which they do not concede.
In this, we also differ from Scotus, who wants that exact similarity of many individuals in formal unity to be true unity, and thus, universal unity itself.
However, we assert that, as singular individuals are per se one thing, and this not only by numerical unity but also by formal unity, we genuinely deny that the natures of many individuals without the operation of the mind are one nature. We acknowledge some similarity and agreement but not unity.” https://reformedbooksonline.com/on-metaphysics/#particular
Or Arnold Senguerdius:
“Universal unity is not real but only of reason, so that it is not given in things before and apart from the operation of the mind. For whatever exists immediately on the part of the thing is singular.” https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/arnold-senguerdius-on-general-and-special-metaphysics cf. Chapter 5 there.
A recent lacuna in Scotus scholarship concerning the Reformation's relationship to Scotus deserves a brief excursus. First, this mainstream understanding of Scotus himself as holding a thoroughgoing univocity has come under some scrutiny as some scholars have argued that Scotus' univocity applied only to semantics rather than to ontology itself…Further, the scholars contending that Scotus did not hold a thoroughgoing univocity are not mere historians but are committed to Scotus' philosophy. Their historical arguments are then in fact defenses aiming to undo the damage associated with Scotus' metaphysics, especially as Radical Orthodoxy, Brad Gregory, and Hans Boersma have pinpointed Scotus as the beginning of the end in the development of secularism's philosophical underpinnings…On the other hand, the Reformation's supposed Scotist connection must be questioned from two vantages. One vantage concerns the truth in the Scotus Story insomuch as it pertains to Scotus' own views and whether Scotus should get blamed for the intellectual underpinnings of secular modernity. In this regard, even if Scotus focused on semantics, something in his theology truly suggests univocity of being. The second, arguably more important, vantage concerns our present focus, specifically that the Reformed were not Scotists. Even given the first vantage, the Reformed were not advocates of the ideas wherever whence they came - even as Gregory and others have seen those ideas a Scotist - supposedly leading to modernity. The historical point in our view concerning these debates over Scotus is that the Reformed aligned more with an analogical rather than a univocal metaphysic, undermining one foundational premise of the narrative that blames the Reformation with continuing the Scotist ideals responsible for secularism. Thus, even if the recent reinterpretations of Scotus hold, the present argument that the Reformed opposed nominalism and univocity entails that at least Gregory's thesis has no remaining legs on which to stand, being in that case undermined from the Roman and Protestant sides. 203-204
This is an amalgamation of quotes that I decided to address altogether at once. I think it worthwhile to quote a good chunk of Thomas Ward’s Ordered by Love at this point since he explains Scotus’s thesis in a very digestible manner that even laymen can understand:
“Why, then, is Scotus’s doctrine of univocity so controversial? The long answer to this question has been offered expertly in recent years by scholars such as Richard Cross and Thomas Williams, and there is no need to rehearse it here. The short answer is that various people have misunderstood Scotus. Some have thought that the doctrine of univocity applies to things in general rather than only to words and concepts. Whereas Scotus’s actual view is that the concept or term "being" is used the same way for both God and creatures, others have claimed that his view instead is that God and creatures are beings in the same way. Those who misunderstand Scotus in this way sometimes go on to saddle him with the nefarious view that being is a thing or property that both God and creatures share. Having set up the straw man, they go on to accuse Scotus of very bad things, such as idolatry. After all, on the nefarious view, being is more fundamental than God himself; being turns out to be the ultimate explanatory principle of all things, even God himself.
Thank God, then, that Bl. John held no such view! Instead, he thinks that we really can isolate in our thinking a concept of being as such, being with no determining features added on to it. This concept of being is the fundamental intelligible link between God and creatures, by which we are able, really able, to leap in thought out of the realm of the world and into God Himself. Creatures are beings. God is the cause of creatures. Whatever is in the effect is also in the cause. So God is a being. Admit-tedly, it is prosaic almost to the point of irreverence to say about God merely that He is a being. But it is no less true for being prosaic, and the truth can never truly be irreverent, for God is Truth. Still, many would balk at this assertion that God is a being. They think it entails that God is just one being among many, that calling God a being brings Him down to the level of mere creatures. While the piety on display in these sorts of protestations is admirable, the protests rest on a huge mistake. It simply does not follow that God is at our level if He is a being. Scotus would be the first to insist that God is infinite being, whereas any creature is merely a finite being. And there cannot be a greater gap between beings than infinite on one side and finite on the other. But even infinite being and finite being are exactly similar to one another in one tiny respect, a tiny respect which secures the whole of natural theology: each is a being. They do not share being, though creatures participate in God's being as effects participate in their causes, and as images participate in their exemplars. But we who think about beings have one simple concept-the concept of being - and we can correctly apply this very concept both to God and to creatures, to infinite being and finite being.” 30-31
To his credit, Perkins mentions Ordered by Love in a footnote, recognizing it as an example of scholarship that has argued that Scotus holds a univocity of concept rather than a “thoroughgoing univocity,” but I do not wholly excuse Perkins because he should have heeded the scholarship at this point, which would have very quickly proven true if he done the slightest of research into Scotus himself rather than heeding what 20th century “scholarship” has said about him.
The Scotist idea of the univocity of the concept of being is explained with precision by Franco Burgersdijk:
“All these things, however diverse they may be, can be comprehended under one concept and notion, which does not represent substance or accident, nor God or creature in species, but something in which all these coincide. And we experience this in ourselves: indeed, when we hear the voice of “being”, our mind is drawn from the multitude to unity, forming some common concept in all things, by which being is represented, not as such or such in species, but simply as being. This is what is commonly said: to give one formal concept of being, as being is.
From this proposition, it follows that all beings must somehow agree with one another; for there must be one object corresponding to one concept. Therefore, there is affirmed one concept of all beings, in which all beings must coincide and should be united in some common relation. Either the object of that common concept of all beings will be a certain commonality of all beings, or it will be something collected and aggregated from the proper particular natures of beings. The latter is clearly false; for when the object is aggregated from many particular objects, the concept of the mind would also be aggregated from many concepts, each corresponding to its own object. Therefore, a certain commonality and agreement of all beings must be conceded, according to which one common concept can be apprehended by the intellect. This agreement is commonly called an objective concept...
But neither is the word Being to be referred to those which are completely Univocal: for perfectly Univocal things are said to be those to which the λόγος τῆς τοῦ εἶναι [notion of to be] corresponds with the common name in such a way that both are equally common. But the λόγος τοῦ εἶναι [notion of to be], which corresponds to the common name of Being, does not belong equally to Substance and Accident, God and Creatures, but to Substances and God primarily and by better right than to Accidents and Creatures: The cause of this inequality is that Accidents depend on Substances and Creatures on God, and that not only insofar as they are Accidents and Creatures, but also insofar as they are Beings. For that Accidents and Creatures are, they owe, the former to Substance, the latter to God; and indeed to God, not only because they were once affected by him, but much more because even now they are conserved and sustained by God, which we now presuppose.” Institutes of Metaphysics, Book II, Chapter II.
Scotus’s univocity thesis is primarily about the univocity of the objective concept of being. If a person affirms that, they are Scotist. Those who reject it, although they might agree on the univocity of the formal concept of being (e.g. Fransico Suarez), would not count as Scotist on this point. Being is the most general and simple concept that our minds can conceive of, and so our minds are drawn to apply it both to God and to creatures. But the thesis has nothing to do with a complete univocity, as though God and creatures or even susbtances and accidents are the same sorts of beings, which is obviously absurd. Arnold Senguerdius affirms the same thing as Burgersdijk (and Scotus):
“There is a single formal concept of all beings; for in conceiving being, we experience our mind not being drawn into multiple concepts but gathered into one, which is neither God nor creature, neither substance nor accident, but something common to to all, just like when we hear the name ‘animal,’ we do not conceive either man or beast but something abstract common to both man and beast. This is also evident because one can be certain that something is a being without knowing what kind of being it is, whether substance or accident, created or uncreated, as happens with those who certainly know light or color is a being but doubt whether it is a substance or an accident. From the unity of the formal concept follows the unity of the objective concept because the formal concept derives its unity from its object and must conform to the objective concept since it represents it; therefore, there cannot be one formal concept unless the objective concept is also one. Moreover, if the objective concept of being were not one, when I say ‘God is a being’ or ‘this is a being,’ the sense would either be ‘God is both substance and accident,’ which is clearly false, or ‘God is either substance or accident,’ which first goes against experience, showing that in these statements there is a different sense. Secondly, from this, the unity of the objective concept can be inferred because being either a substance or an accident is common to God and creatures, substances, and accidents. And what would be the sense of the proposition ‘Substance is a being’? Would it be ‘Substance is both substance and accident’ or ‘Substance is either substance or accident’?” https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/arnold-senguerdius-on-general-and-special-metaphysics cf. Chapter 2 there.
Voetius, denying complete univocity, just as Scotus does, affirms a univocity of concept or ratio:
“Are the names of God and creatures univocally applied? We respond: we deny in respect to a complete univocity. But we affirm in respect to a univocity that unequally descends upon each specific mode and concept (ratio). This is why the names must be referred back to the analogous names of dependence or attribution and similitude or proportion.” (see the next link for the source. Note also that Voetius makes univocity of concept the basis for analogy here, just as Scotus does).
Perkins is, of course, partially reliant upon Muller’s Not Scotist, which, while popular, is certainly and severely flawed. As Andreas Beck has already noted, Muller’s thesis cannot even get off the ground because he conflates any talk of univocity from Scotus with a complete univocity and takes all references to analogy as evidence of Thomism, ignoring the fact that Scotus holds that univocity of concept is the basis for analogy and thus references to analogy do not favor Thomism any more than they do Scotism. A better approach would have been to see who among the Reformed affirm or deny the objective concept of being. But because Muller does not understand Scotus’s univocity thesis, this leads him to, at least in Burgersdijk’s case, cite the very place where he affirms it as evidence that he denies it as I mentioned here. I plan to write a full response to Muller’s Not Scotist eventually, but I hope that what I have provided here is sufficient for now. I also refer you back to Thomas Ward’s review of Barrett. Note also his “Suggestion for Writing Big Books” which I have long been thinking is very applicable to this book and am further confirmed in this opinion the longer I review this work.
This review has become rather long and I have decided not to comment much on Perkins’s comments regarding auxilium on pages 204-213. I will only note that we need to distinguish actual grace from general help. Adam in a state of pure nature still required God’s general help to act rightly. But he was also given actual grace which elevated his nature, unlike general help. Also concursus (which I don’t think even the worst Jesuit denies) has to be distinguished from one’s belief about physical or moral premotion. Also on page 207 Perkins states that God gives “no auxilium or sufficient causality to evil human acts even if he has actively decreed to permit them,” but it should be noted that God still needs to concur with the material aspect of sinful acts in order for them to occur, although he certainly is not a cause of their formal aspect as sins. Page 213 repeats the same mistaken interpretation of Thomas I have repeatedly addressed.
That then raises the premise of merit. For Thomas, in contrast to Scotus, righteousness and sanctifying grace were united, so that someone with original righteousness had what was needed to obtain eschatological glory. 214
The reader should know by now that this is untrue. Scotus affirms that sanctifying grace is necessary to merit glory.
For Thomas, the need for sanctifying grace to elevate the value of our works to be truly proportional to supernatural reward shows that his premise for merit is real righteousness. For Thomas, merit is ontologically grounded, meaning that the undergirding righteousness is truly worthy of its reward. 214
For Scotus, merit is ontologically grounded since the relation of a work to the covenant is an ontological category*. Again, a work is “truly worthy” of a reward only in relation to covenant on the Scotist view and the merit is real and grounded in ontology, but the formal principle of it is not intrinsic to the work itself. Nobody good Reformed theologian would deny the righteousness of Christ imputed to us to be real and ontologically grounded for precisely this reason: for it is grounded in a real relation.
*To be pedantic, although I agree with Burgersdijk that only quality is a real accident (or at the very least with Senguerdius that quality and quantity count as real accidents), the other accidents being non-beings, I assume here that ontology includes such things as affections of being, modes, privations, and thus the other accidents.
There is a true, not willed, ground to what righteousness is and thereby what could be counted as merit. 214
Again, distinguish righteousness and merit. Who is denying a “true, not willed, ground to what righteousness is?” except, I suppose, in relation to minutia regarding the euthyphro dilemma. Perkins still has not gotten at the essence of the Thomist-Scotist divide on merit.
This objectivity in Thomas - that merit must be truly righteous - corresponds more to the concerns in Reformed covenantal merit outlined in chapter two and defended in chapter seven. 214
Refer back to our review of chapter 2, look at what Chamier said there, and then see if this sentence holds up.
The Reformed use of meritum ex pacto then eclectically combined aspects of Thomas premise of real righteousness with other understandings of pacted righteousness. 214
I’m going to return to this sentiment in chapter 7, but I contend that this sort of combination is incoherent. The formal principle of merit is either in the covenant or in the work itself. It is either extrinsic or intrinsic to the work itself; there is no third option and no reconciliation. You can argue that the work must be materially righteous, even completely so, in order to be counted as meritorious, but that would not address the question of what the formal principle of merit is and would not qualify as a combination of the two views.
Nonetheless, unlike late medieval and early modern Roman views, Reformed covenantal merit never compromised the requirement of true righteousness as if God would accept even sinful best efforts as meritorious. 214
The last part about God accepting “sinful best efforts as meritorious” either means that God accepts sinful acts formally as sinful (a position that nobody, not even Ockham, takes as actual, although only he takes it as possible) or it means that God accepts acts which are materially sinful as meritorious. The second position, Perkins should know, is held not only as to possibility, but as to actuality, not only by Thomas but by all Romanists. They all affirm that God accepts our acts formally insofar as they are good as condignly meritorious of eternal life, even if materially stained with some sin. The Reformed certainly agree that God does not actually accept materially sinful acts as condignly meritorious of eternal life, but this is not to say that in his absolute—or even in his ordained—power he could not or would not do so. A person who agrees with Scotus that covenant is the formal principle of merit could easily take the view that in another possible world, the Scotist way of salvation is actual, even while holding that in this possible world, God has not ordained merit to any materially sinful work.
I’m not going to address the rest of the chapter after page 214 as the discussion shifts to modern debates which in my estimation are more apt to distract from and obscure the issue at hand than they are conducive to competent theological reasoning.
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