Review of Perkins "Righteous by Design" Chapter 7

The previous chapter dealt with the issue of the natural and supernatural orders, arguing that the created order was oriented by God's design to the eschatological order. Contrary to extrinsic paradigms of human nature and destiny, God did not need to bolt the ultimate destiny of eschatological blessedness onto human nature by any superaddition or grace. The reason is that he designed us for that end in our nature in the way that he fashioned us. Our orientation to the eschatological order was included in his work of creation as he tailored Adam according to the divine image. (281).

As I’ve mentioned before, we can speak of a eschatological destiny sculpted into Adam’s nature in the sense of Adam’s natural end, which would consist in a natural contemplation and love of God in company with his children who likewise would have shared in this end. This is man’s natural end. It is built-into his nature and it is what all men naturally strive after but which, as a result of sin, no man is now able to achieve.

For man’s natural end to consist in supernatural beatitude—that is, for nature to be naturally oriented to grace—is either to court Pelagianism or to erase the distinction between nature and grace and therefore creature and Creator. If man is naturally oriented to grace, then not even sin can erase this orientation without destroying man’s nature and it follows that man’s natural powers are sufficient to attain his supernatural end. While the implications of this are problematic especially for a post-fall situation, I want to emphasize that the essential problem with such a formulation remains even for a pre-fall state. Natures are distinguished by their ends. If man is naturally oriented to the supernatural order—to the supernatural vision of God—then his nature is essentially supernatural. He therefore stands in need of no grace, no elevation,  to achieve the vision of God. Attaining the beatific vision is formally and actively in his power—all he has to do is to continue to  act according to his nature and it will be his. But the vision of God is a gift far above anything men can naturally achieve. Perkins’s solution, of course, is to make God’s “voluntary condescension” itself natural to man’s nature—man is naturally in covenant with God and so we can have both voluntary condescension and a natural supernatural end. But I would point out that such a formulation makes “voluntary condescension” fail to do what it was intended to do in the first place. If voluntary condescension is now essential to the nature of a creature, God cannot choose to create that creature without entering into such “voluntary condescension.” The condescension is now “voluntary” only in the sense that God could have chosen not to have created such a creature. But upon choosing to create this creature, God must enter into such “voluntary condescension,” just as, upon having chosen to create fire, he could not have chosen to create it without heat. But who can believe that any of the divines meant this when they spoke of “voluntary condescension”? Is it not clear that they meant to speak of a voluntary condescension completely incidental to man’s nature—one which may or may not have occurred according to the good pleasure of God?

I have previously argued that giving man a supernatural end by nature makes man essentially supernatural, and therefore divine. As true as this line of reasoning, I would further point out that not even God is properly said to be supernatural, which is more properly said of gifts in men that elevate them to the supernatural order. For that reason the very concept of a “natural supernatural” end is as contradictory as it sounds. Nature cannot attain to grace on its own. This was the essential difference between Augustine and Pelagius. The conflict between them was not even about the post-fall state per se, but it was about this principle. Nature requires elevation from a source higher than itself to be ordered to grace and this elevation is supernatural—above and beyond’s nature’s power.

God's covenant defined the proportion of creaturely works in relation to heavenly reward. (283).

This is true and I will return to press this point more deeply than Perkins does.

Although the point could come across as arcane, the basic premise is obvious in the fundamentals of life. Parents have the right to demand that their children, if still living at home, clean their room. They also have the right to attach the offer of going for ice cream upon completion of cleaning their room. Although this promise annexed to the child's natural obligation is free, we would hardly call it grace. After all, parents should facilitate rich communion with their children. The impulse in godly parents to build such communion with their kids reflects how God treated us from the outset. Still, the other upshot of that offer of ice cream upon completion of the non-negotiable condition is that, once offered, the parent better come through on the reward. A breach of justice would occur if the child completely cleaned his or her room only to be turned away from the offer of ice cream with 'I was just kidding.' The point is that once a covenant has been made, fulfillment of the required condition merits its reward on the premise of justice, not grace, even if that justice is familial, caring, and warm- hearted (283).

I don’t have a problem this quote per se, but I would only like to point out that not every promise entails justice in the reward. On this, see my post on Davenant. It is important that we do not so simplify ex pacto merit so that any promise=condign merit. The instance of heavenly rewards is a clear example of the contrary: a promise of reward to our works exists, yet this promise is not in distributive justice properly so-called and so does not confer a right (jus ad rem) to demand the reward by way of debt. See my post on merit linked to in the post above.

Covenantal merit, as articulated here, forms the principle difference concerning the differing conditions between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. (283).

This, I again agree with, but will return to press more strongly than Perkins. For now, I just want the reader to keep in mind that covenantal (or ex pacto condign) merit is the formal difference between the conditions of the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. If this is so, one should not point to material aspects of the conditions of each covenant to establish the formal difference (as I have said here: https://x.com/BrandonCorley99/status/1883642231115939889).

In the Reformed view, original righteousness was natural to man. This view ran contrary to Roman theology's assertion of supernatural righteousness and contrary to Pelagians, who said Adam was created innocent but not positively righteous. As the previous chapter argued, the moral law, which reflects God's own character, is the ethical ripple of the divine image hardwired into human nature. Our original righteousness, therefore, brands us with our intimate relation to our Maker. So, our constitution as God's image bearers with original righteousness orders us by nature to supernatural reality. Due at least to original righteousness as at least partly constitutive of our status as God's image bearers, our created nature contains native principles that intrinsically relate us to God. (285).

There’s a certain irony in the fact that both the Romanists and Perkins make the same error in not distinguishing original righteousness from the donum superadditum. The Romanists reason that integrity is above the powers of man’s nature and so they make it a preternatural gift included in the supernatural donum superadditum. Perkins, apparently, reasons that integrity must entail ordination to the supernatural and so he makes this ordination natural to man. But I affirm against the Romanists that integrity is not above the powers of man’s nature, and thus natural to him. The lower powers were created to be subject to reason and it is only on account of sin that they are not. And I affirm against Perkins that original righteousness need not entail ordination to the supernatural. Natural religion, contemplation, and love of God, considered as the author of nature, is sufficient for man’s moral integrity in a state of pure nature.

This role for original righteousness is why the pure-nature view — both Franciscan and non-covenantal creation — posits that Adam's original righteousness was supernatural. (285).

More accurately, the reason that the Romanists posit that original righteousness is supernatural is because they cannot understand how man’s composite nature of body and soul cannot but entail a war between the lower powers and the higher powers left to their own devices. Responding to this line of thought is where Ghent’s true genius comes into play, as noted in our review of chapter 3, but in failing to distinguish OR from the donum, Perkins unfortunately misses this aspect of Henry’s thought.

This section tackles that problem of proportionality that has been the mist hanging over this whole book's major discussion points. Put another way, now we aim to formulate our doctrine of covenantal merit by stating its principles and by avoiding the shortcomings of medieval and Roman paradigms. Those paradigms resort to ontological explanations, regardless of whether those are intellectualist or voluntarist versions of sanctifying grace needed to merit. One key factor sharply distinguishes the view argued here from those medieval and Roman positions: whereas sanctifying grace supplements the value of our works to make them meritorious, the covenant defines their value to make them meritorious. (291-292).

Before addressing Perkins’s comments in this section, some preliminary considerations are in order. 

First, as I have noted in chapter 2, we need to distinguish between two senses of proportionality: intrinsic proportion of a nature to its end, and proportion of an act to a reward in justice. The first is physical; the second is moral. The first exists necessarily; the second exists contingently. The question of merit pertains to the second sense of proportionality, not the first. Whatever Perkins might say about merit is irrelevant to the first question. Thus nothing Perkins will say or can say in this chapter has any bearing upon the larger question of whether or not man’s is naturally oriented to the supernatural or not (which is a question pertaining to the first sense of proportionality).

Second, recall that there are, roughly speaking, two major schools of thought on merit in the Roman Catholic tradition: Thomist and Scotist. The Thomists and the Scotists differ on the formal basis of merit. The Thomists hold merit to be intrinsic to acts of grace. The Scotists hold merit to be extrinsic to these acts, established by covenant. 

But both the Thomists and the Scotists agree that, in this actual world, that works be done in grace is a material condition requisite in meritorious works (the Scotists holding this is contingently so; the Thomists holding this is necessarily so). 

Thus, on the Scotist position, the two senses of proportionality mentioned above are really separable (as we saw in chapter 2, Scotus holds that it is possible, in God’s absolute power, that a natural act—that is, one not proportionate to grace in the first sense of proportionality above—be rewarded with a supernatural reward—that is, that the work be proportionate to the second sense of proportionality mentioned above), but on the Thomist position, the two senses of proportionality mentioned above are inseparable (that is, any work of grace—that is, a work proportionate by the first sense of proportionality—just by being a work of grace, necessarily establishes a virtual covenant by which is is rewarded—thus being proportionate in the second sense of proportionality—and such that any work not proportionate in the first sense—that is, any natural work—cannot be proportionate in the second sense). Thus, whereas both Thomists and Scotists agree that, as it is, grace is a material condition requisite for merit, because they disagree on the formal basis for merit, they likewise disagree on whether or not grace is an absolutely necessary material condition for merit.

Third, as I have previously argued, it ought to be affirmed that, as it is, grace is a necessary material condition for merit of a supernatural reward. It is fitting that, if God should offer the reward of eternal life, He require that the supernatural reward of eternal life be won by supernatural means since the means ought to correspond to the end, lest, as we have seen Scotus warn against in chapter 2, we come dangerously close to Pelagianism. That this was, in fact,  actually the case whenever God offered eternal life to men, I affirm by pointing to the examples of Adam (who I affirm, with the Reformed, received supernatural grace in the garden) and Christ (who was filled with the Spirit above measure).

With those considerations out of the way, we can now address Perkins’s comment that:

Those paradigms resort to ontological explanations, regardless of whether those are intellectualist or voluntarist versions of sanctifying grace needed to merit. One key factor sharply distinguishes the view argued here from those medieval and Roman positions: whereas sanctifying grace supplements the value of our works to make them meritorious, the covenant defines their value to make them meritorious (292).

Presumably, what Perkins means by this is that both Thomists (“intellectualist”)  and Scotists (“volunarist”)  hold that grace is a necessary material condition for merit (“ontological explanations…sanctifying grace needed to merit”). Yet, strangely, he then groups both positions together as holding that “sanctifying grace supplements the value of our works to make them meritorious” which is opposed to the position which holds that “the covenant defines their value to make them meritorious. 

But clearly, in the case of the Scotists, this is a false opposition. The Scotists hold that the covenant defines the value of works to make them meritorious (this is the formal basis of merit), yet they also hold that, as it is, grace is necessary for merit of a supernatural reward (this is the material condition); and, if I am correct in what I have been arguing thus far, this is exactly what the Reformed hold. It is true that it was the Covenant of Works which acted as the formal basis for merit such that all the value in Adam’s works must be placed in that covenant and its stipulations. Yet it is also true that the material demands of the Covenant of Works included the stipulation that Adam’s works be done from a principle of supernatural grace to merit a supernatural reward so that there is a proportion of order between the means and the end (i.e. both are of the supernatural order).

Irons provides us with some guiding principles for the relationship of covenant and merit. Limiting the sphere of merit ideology, he premised, first, that 'Rather than an ontological state intellectually registered in the divine mind, merit is constituted only by fulfillment of a divinely-sanctioned covenant' and, second, 'The measure of merit is defined by the terms of the covenant, which itself is the only possible revelation and definition of divine justice.' The implication is that, 'There is no such thing as non-covenantal, condign merit because merit is by definition constituted by fulfilling what is stipulated in the covenant.' (292).

For now, I only point out that to affirm this is to affirm the Scotist formal basis of merit as explained above. This will be important later.

Reflecting Geerhardus Vos' insight defended in the previous chapter, J. V. Fesko rightly explained: 'Pure nature versus Adam's state in covenant is merely a theological distinction so that one might understand how nature and covenant relate to one another. Nature and covenant are ultimately concreated realities and thus inseparable, though distinguishable.' (293).

Fesko’s comment here gives at least some insight into how Perkins is thinking about the relationship between nature and covenant. In previous chapters, I noted that Perkins is best understood as taking covenant to be an integral part of human nature necessary to well-being. Fesko’s comment that nature and covenant are “inseparable, though distinguishable” could imply that he sees either a formal or virtual distinction or perhaps a real (but inseparable) distinction between the two. Taking him in the latter sense, which seems to best align with Perkins (and is the most defensible of the options), we have already given a critique of this formulation in the previous chapter.

This formulation brings together several key biblical concerns. The Creator-creature distinction means that we cannot get around the unassailable basis that we can never have ontological demand against our Creator to place him in our debt. In Luke 17:10, Jesus laid out this clear principle: 'So you also, when you have done all that you were commanded, say, "We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty" (294).

I only want to briefly point out that despite the talk of “ontological demand against our Creator to place him in our debt,” if Perkins means that to speak of merit of arithmetical proportion, the kind of strict 1-to-1 merit that places God in our debt just by virtue of the intrinsic worth of the work, then (as Ussher himself will point out  on page 302), not even the Thomists are in disagreement with him here. As I noted in my post on merit (which will soon receive a substantial update to be made even clearer) the Thomists reject merit of arithmetic proportion of commutative justice (i.e. strict/proper merit), instead affirming merit of geometric proportion of distributive justice, simply differing with the Scotists over what I have already explained as the “formal basis.” This can be connected back to the comments I made in chapter 4 on Cajetan and the virtual covenant of the Thomists. The Romanists on the whole (with a few exceptions) rejected proper/strict merit such that God’s crowning of his merits in us was never wholly without grace. Voetius, in his The Force of Truth Breaking Forth in the Papacy, notes that:

“Thomas 1.2, question 114, article 1, says that God does not owe to us, but to his own disposition. Which is as much as if he said: the reward is not given from merit, but from grace. Which is the very opinion of the Reformed.”

The dispute between the Reformed and Rome was never over merit of arithmetic proportion. It was always recognized by both sides that merit is never strictly “ontological” and from the intrinsic value of the work itself apart from the condescension of God.

Stephen Lobb, who was given excellent light on this matter, makes this same point (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A48865.0001.001/1:4?rgn=div1;view=fulltext#backDLPS47). After pointing out that the Romanists argued only for meritum ex pacto, he says:

I might give many Authorities more, but these are enough to make it Evident, that the First Reformers denied the Gospel to be a Promise of Eternal Life on Condition of our keeping the Commandments, which must be Understood to be in that sence, in which the Papists held it; that is, they denied our Good Works to be such a Condition of Eternal Life, as gave Right unto it, as a Reward.

William Eyre likewise notes that “The Papists never pleaded for merit upon any other account [than ex pacto]” and then cites John Calvin himself in his Institutes of the Christian Religion making the same point against the Scotists and Nominalists of the University of Paris:

Hence it appears how much [the] Sophists [of Sorbonne] were deluded in thinking they admirably escaped all absurdities when they said, that works are able to merit salvation, not from their intrinsic worth, but according to agreement, the Lord having, in his liberality, set this high value upon them. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.v.xviii.html#fna_v.xviii-p22.3

Anyway, this is something of an aside as I hope to expand on these matters more in the future as the fruit of recent research I have been doing specifically into the importance of this distinction in orthodox disputes against the Socinians, but it suffices to say that the dispute with the Thomists and the Romanists more generally was never over an intrinsic arithmetic merit of strict/commutative justice.

This basis of the works principle, not God's divine freedom concerning how to create creatures in covenant or not, determines the law-gospel distinction. God established this principle with us by his decree concerning how he made us and related us to our obligation to obey him. Grace does not enable meritorious works: 'But if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace' (Rom. 11:6). In Galatians 3:10-12, Paul explained: 'For all who rely on works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, "Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the Book of the Law, and do them."' The reason is, as Paul applied Leviticus 18:5, that 'the law is not of faith, rather "The one who does them shall live by them."' Once grace is in place as the basis of being right with God and obtaining the beatific vision, the works principle is off the table entirely. The covenant of grace does not send us back to the covenant of works, as Turretin said: 'For the covenant of works promises life only to the perfectly just and meriting man. But the covenant of grace promises not only life but also salvation to the completely demeriting and unworthy man, namely to a sinner.'39 The exclusivity of the principles of works and grace means that the works principle in the covenant of works cannot be based on grace, though it must relate to God's freedom (296).

All of this is true when understood properly, but it is understood improperly if it is used to argue that therefore the Covenant of Works could not have required Adam to have performed works from a principle of supernatural grace. When we say that grace is opposed to works, we essentially mean to say that grace is opposed to condign merit (that is, merit which gives right [jus ad rem] to reward). I don’t think that Perkins really disagrees with this, as the whole point of ex pacto merit is to elucidate the type of merit that existed between Adam and God and it is to this type of merit that grace is opposed since “to the one who works, wages are not credited as a gift, but as debt”—that is, his works merit condignly. But notice that this is a statement about the essential or formal difference between the Covenant of Works and the Covenant of grace—not a statement about the difference between their material conditions. In other words, what essentially distinguishes a covenant of grace from a covenant of works is that the latter is based upon the condign merit of the one who performs the proper covenant condition. The difference between the two types of covenants does not essentially lie in “what one has to do” or “how one has to do it.”

As Isaac Chauncy put it, 

“It's the faederal nature of the condition, not the greatness or smallness of the condition that makes it meritorious. If God had said unto man in Paradise, Take up this leaf or that straw, and thou shalt live for ever, eternal life had been his due, upon his doing thereof, and demandable by him, and the covenant made it so; viz. a due debt, ex pacto, i. e. legally so; for a due debt is due in a law sense.”

Were God even to command man to perform a natural act such as to pick up straw and annexed the right to reward upon the performance of it, this would formally and essentially constitute a covenant of works no less than if he were to demand this man to expand the garden, slay the serpent, and love God above all things. It is the formal nature of works (whether or not they have a relation to debt ex pacto), not their material conditions which constitute them as meritorious or not. John Brown of Wamphray makes this same point—it depends upon whether or not works have been given an ex pacto relation to reward which makes them constitutive of a covenant of works; not upon any other consideration such as an intrinsic arithmetic worthiness of the works:

Thus the New Covenant is of the same Nature & kinde with the Old, only its Conditions are a little altered, & made more easie; & their Performance of the condition must-have a merite with it, at least, ex pacto, though not ex condigno [that is, at least ex pacto though not proper/strict merit]; as neither Adam's Perfect obedience could have had. And the performers of this condition, in this case, may reflect upon their own deed, & lay their weight on it, &, it being their Righteousness, may plead upon it, as their immediate ground of right, before God, unto justification, & Acceptance.

John Owen, at the end of chapter XIII of his Doctrine of Justification, when addressing insufficient ways of distinguishing the Covenant of Grace from the Covenant of Works makes the same point as Wamphray above: it is immaterial to deny strict/proper merit of commutative justice in the CoG, since such did not exist in the CoW with Adam since what matters is that works are accepted as meritorious at all:

3. “There would then have been merit of works, which is now excluded. ” Ans. Such a merit as arises from an equality and proportion between works and reward, by the rule of commutative justice, would not have been in the works of the first covenant; and in no other sense is it now rejected by them that oppose the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. 4. “All is now resolved into the merit of Christ, upon the account whereof alone our own personal righteousness is accepted before God unto our justification. ” Ans. The question is not, on what account, nor for what reason, it is so accepted? but, whether it be or no? — seeing its so being is effectually constitutive of a covenant of works.

In arguing the immateriality of denying arithmetic/strict merit, Owen and Wamphray reveal a fundamental principle of thiers: what distinguishes a covenant of works from a covenant of grace lies in whether or not works procure a debt/title/obligation ex pacto to reward, and not otherwise. Seeing that this is so, when we ask the question of whether or not if God stipulated that Adam perform obedience to Him from supernatural grace, whether this would have been a covenant of works or not, we can respond that it entirely depends upon whether or not God decided to constitute these actions as condignly meritorious or not. In other words, it will not do to say that if any supernatural grace was given to Adam, this would have turned the Covenant of Works into a Covenant of Grace. Works performed in grace can still be given an ex pacto relation to reward. The Romanists hold this is actually the case with our works and this is what the Reformed deny. The Judaizers never denied that our works are done out of grace and Paul did not argue with them by saying that any works performed by grace must de facto not be meritorious (otherwise, they would have been quite right about their lack of legalism!), but by pointing to the formal difference between a covenant of grace and a covenant of works. Thus, the fact that the Covenant of Works stipulated that Adam perform obedience to God out of a supernatural principle of grace does not make the Covenant of Works any less of a covenant of works.

That this might be made abundantly clear, all one has to do is to consider Jesus Christ. Christ was full of grace from the womb. God required Christ to perform obedience to Him not simply from his natural powers, but from the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity throughout the entire course of his mediatorial obedience. Christ was filled with the power of the Holy Spirit above every other man who has ever lived. Yet who would affirm that Christ’s reception of supernatural grace means that he could not have merited? Who would say that therefore Christ could not have completed his own covenant of works on our behalf? If the fact that Christ required supernatural grace to obey the material demands of the Covenant of Redemption does not make it any less a covenant of works, then neither does the fact that Adam required supernatural grace to obey the material demands of the Covenant of Works.

In short, grace and merit are opposed in covenants formally and not materially. You could also have derived this conclusion from the fact that, as Owen says, “There is infinite grace in every divine covenant, in as much as it is established on promises.”

This principle of defined work and reward according to roles predominates the parable [of the laborers in the vineyard]. Its clear point is that all believers enter equally into everlasting life no matter how long they had walked with God, rebuking the disciples who asked for more prestigious roles in the consummate kingdom of heaven (Matt. 19:23-30).41 Still, the workers had to do the work given to them to obtain their wages. Even as the passage concerns God's fair treatment of all his servants, it cannot be used to justify the Roman doctrine of congruent merit (297).

The connection as to why based upon “God’s fair treatment of all his servants,” it therefore “cannot be used to justify the Roman doctrine of congruent merit” is not clear to me here. Is the reason because congruent merit is not based upon justice? But if so, that simply explicates what congruent merit is. As I have argued in my post on merit and elsewhere (https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/john-davenant-on-infallible-congruent-merit), rightly understood, the Reformed are in agreement with Rome on congruent merit of eternal life, understood as meaning that our good works are the established means by which we come into possession of eternal life as a reward, although they do not procure a right to reward as condign merit does. This is not to say that the Reformed agree with Biel/Ockham that natural works may congruently merit grace (as I have written against elsewhere), but only that our works of grace are crowned with reward. Nor is it to affirm that our works merit a proper reward (if by “proper reward” one means a reward based upon right/title/debt), since it is definitionally not condign, not even ex pacto. Thus, I would say that the parable of the laborers teaches a congruent meriting of the reward of eternal life since here all “congruent merit” designates is a certain fittingness to reward that will infallibly follow upon the performance of the work, which is nevertheless not in justice, not even distributive properly so-called. Again, see my post on merit and on Davenant’s comments above for more explanation.

Because it tells of the master assigning an abundant reward to proper work performed, it rules out especially Biel's sense wherein God would accept even a sinner's works as meritorious of life in heaven. The master does not agree to accept deficient or corrupted work, even if its extent is circumscribed, but to provide an abundant reward assigned as the proportion to a proper job completed. The fall made it so that humanity cannot render any sort of proper work before God (297).

I am assuming that by “proper work” (Perkins nowhere appears to define this) he means a work materially free from all sin. I grant that God has not, in his actual power, and perhaps would not, even in his ordained power, will to accept such a work as meritorious of eternal life. But: 1) I do not grant that God could not do so in his absolute power. If the formal basis of merit is in the covenant, then nothing, by the nature of the thing, prevents God from rewarding a materially-deficient action with the reward of eternal life. 2) Not only Biel, but also Thomas, Scotus, and all of the Romanists hold that God, in his ordained power, can and in fact does in his actual power reward materially deficient (that is, venially sinful) works with eternal life; yet of course, not formally as venially sinful. Perkins will claim to be following Thomas on page 300 in holding that “the work must be perfect,” but, again, if Perkins means that the work must be absolutely sinless, Thomas does not agree with him! For Thomas, an act of charity condignly merits eternal life, even if it is materially admixed with venial sin. However, it is not rewarded insofar as it is venial, but only insofar as it is an act of charity. 

All the same, the parable states the principle that the master, certainly representing the Lord, can generously define the proportion of a great reward to whatever work was supposed to be fulfilled. Although the everlasting reward offered to Adam in the covenant of works was significantly or even infinitely disproportionate to the intrinsic value of the creaturely work, the parable suggests that God is able to overcome this disproportion by defining the proportion (297).

Yes, and this is why, in his absolute power, God can ordain any work to any reward.

This covenantal merit established the fixed relationship between this particular work that Adam was obligated to perform and this particular reward of incorruptible life. Adam's nature was then covenantally related to obtaining his heightened condition (298).

This is good, and once again, establishes the Scotist formal basis of merit.

God accommodated the covenant to our natural capacities as the creatures bearing his image, rather than superadding any additional supernatural faculties. [I have sufficiently addressed this in previous reviews.] Some of our natural faculties do bear more direct relation to supernatural realities [It is very unclear what this means]. That does not mean God added something to our nature to supplement the value of our works to make them ontologically meritorious [Again, grace is a mere material condition that God has required in works he has ordained to be meritorious of eternal life. God wisely keeps the means in the same order as the end. But they are not the formal basis why a work is meritorious. We can affirm both that God required supernatural works of Adam and that the covenant is what made his works meritorious.]. Rather, he defined the merit of our works covenantally [Again, distinguish the formal basis from material conditions. Both can be true.] (298).

Whereas Rome saw the solution to the disproportion between works and reward as the ontological elevation of nature to superadd strength to make our efforts supernaturally meritorious, the Reformed should see the covenant of works as established in the integrity of our original nature. Merit is then covenantal rather than ontological and pertained only to our first condition (298-299).

See my comments on 291-292 above. Grace is not formally what “makes our efforts supernaturally meritorious” for the Scotists, but only materially.

In our constructive work here, however, we argue that neither Thomas Aquinas' intellectualist premise nor John Duns Scotus' voluntarist idea of acceptatio is an exact fit to our argued formulation. Rather, eclectic elements from both need to come together.

The Scotist formal basis of merit we have seen Perkins affirm above simply is the Scotist idea of acceptatio. Perkins only denies this because he does not understand this.

On the one hand, our view is not Scotus' voluntarist idea of acceptatio. Richard Muller has suggested how the ex pacto category in some ways has links to the medieval Scotist doctrine of God's ordained power, which taught that God appointed specific means to acquire grace. Muller also contended that the Reformed developed this notion in quite different directions from the Scotists (299).

The citation is to Muller’s dictionary, presumably this sentence: “Although the conclusion would be denied by the Reformed scholastics, this view of the merit of Adam’s obedience approaches very closely the medieval concept of meritum de congruo.” Muller’s entry on congruent merit is entirely concerned with Biel’s formulation that specifically deals with congruent merit of first grace. It is correct, as I have noted previously, that the Reformed denied this. But importantly, as we saw in chapter 2, and against Muller’s entry on congruent merit, so did Scotus. But this is beside my main aim here. The only essential difference between the Reformed and the Scotists, as we have seen from Lobb, Chauncy, Brown, Calvin, and Owen above, lies at the level of actual power: has God actually covenanted our works of grace to be condignly meritorious of eternal life? The Reformed deny whereas the Scotists affirm.

Nevertheless, chapter two showed that many Reformed theologians implemented the ex pacto category precisely as a polemic against Roman Catholic paradigms of merit that were perhaps more closely related to the Scotist/Franciscan notions of merit (299).

This is true.

Contra Scotus and the voluntarist tradition, true merit, which is covenantal, is not that God arbitrarily accepts some sort of work as deserving. True, covenantal merit is that God swore to honor as meritorious what Adam truly ought to have perfectly done (299-300).

The opposition between “true merit” which is “what Adam truly ought to have perfectly done” and the view that “God arbitrarily accepts some sort of work as deserving” is strange. Any stipulation given to Adam would de facto be “what Adam truly ought to have perfectly done” if we understand here by “perfect” that which is “perfect” according to the manner in which it was stipulated (Consider that, on a republication view of the Mosaic Covenant for instance, Israel’s general obedience would have been truly meritorious of life in the land and would have been “perfect” in its own order as meeting this stipulation, yet this obedience would have been materially deficient). But if Perkins means to say that God could not have stipulated a materially sinful act as meritorious of eternal life, then again, distinguish between what God can do in his absolute power vs what he has ordained to do consistent with his wisdom. 

Moreover, Scotus' view involved the acceptatio personarum - the acceptation of persons - meaning that God's acceptio of a work for merit depended upon a prior acceptation of the person performing the work via sanctifying grace (300).

That a person possess sanctifying grace is a material requirement necessary for merit of eternal life in—at the very least, God’s actual power—is what is affirmed by the Scotists. And, if I am correct in what I have been arguing, it is likewise affirmed by the Reformed as evidenced by the cases of Adam and Christ.

For merit, the Reformed emphasize God's impartiality, noting that the work must be perfect (Rom. 2:11). We need to agree with Thomas that merit must be real, that is, it must have a true integrity that coheres with the righteousness of God's character, which is the basis of all moral laws (300).

Again, what is meant by “perfect” must be defined. If Perkins means that there can be no merit unless the work performed is absolutely without sin, then, as I am assuming Perkins agrees with republication, not even he agrees with this.

Second, I am taking Perkins’s “real” here to be explicated by the following sentence, “that is it must have a true integrity that coheres with the righteousness of God's character, which is the basis of all moral laws.” But the Scotists do not disagree with this. Whatever God ordains as meritorious must be an act consistent with the moral law. There is no controversy here except with the Ockhamists.

Our premise follows Thomas' intellectualist principles by insisting God cannot will a standard for our obedience as the basis of the works principle other than the perfect fulfillment of his law (300).

This appears to confirm that Perkins means to say that God cannot, not even in his absolute power, will a materially-deficient action to be meritorious. But I cannot help but once again notice the irony in that Thomas does not agree with him here! The “intellectualist principle” in Thomas’s view of merit lies in holding that acts of grace acts of grace are, by their very nature, ordered to the merit of eternal life for the wayfarer, because in the very bestowal of grace, there is a virtual covenant established by God whereby such acts are divinely ordained to lead to eternal life. It does not lie in holding that no materially-deficient action may be meritorious. 

To belabor the point, Thomas not only holds that this is possible (and thus would reject that “God cannot will a standard...other than perfect fulfillment of his law), but also that this is actual! It is unclear whether or not Perkins is aware of his disagreement with Thomas on this point, but if he is, we should expect him to give us an argument as to why, from the nature of the thing, it is impossible, from God’s absolute power that He cannot choose to reward materially-deficient actions. If Perkins means to argue for a trajectory here, then one cannot appeal broadly to Thomas’s “intellectual principles” without giving us an argument for why Perkins’s conclusion follows from them. Again, Perkins, if I am not mistaken, holds that God actually did this (republication), but perhaps his thesis is limited to the reward of eternal life (which would nevertheless still require such an argument).

Thus, the Reformed version of acceptation, if we must call it such, lacks Scotus' voluntarist hue, denying that the standard of covenantal merit can change (300).

If by the “standard” of covenantal merit, Perkins simply means the moral law, then this is, once again, trivial. I’m not aware of anyone who is currently arguing that God could will sin to be meritorious. But if we’re talking about what it is that formally makes an act to be meritorious, then as Perkins himself has established throughout this chapter as the reader can see by my commendations above, that is nothing else but the will of God depressed through covenant itself. Thus when we come to this following section…

With Thomas, then, righteousness is a reality that must be truly achieved if we are to merit eschatological blessedness. In contrast to Scotus, the standard for merit is grounded fully in nature and cannot be altered. Against Thomas, we should reject any ontological basis for merit's warrant of reward (301).

I find it difficult to see how Perkins avoids contradiction regarding the formal basis of merit. On the one hand, he wants to affirm with Scotus that merit is formally constituted by the covenant—that is, it depends entirely on God’s free ordination. On the other hand, he also claims that the standard for merit is “grounded fully in nature and cannot be altered.”

If by this he merely means that no sinful act may be rewarded as meritorious, then the claim is uncontroversial and ultimately trivial. But if he intends to assert that there is some natural and necessary basis for merit—that, for example, a work must be materially free from all sin in order to qualify—then it seems to undercut the Scotist position he wants to uphold. For in that case, merit would not rest formally on the covenant alone, but also, in some way, on an intrinsic natural proportion between the act and the reward, which contradicts the core Scotist claim that such proportion is established solely by divine ordination. If it is “natural” and “cannot be altered” in this sense, then it is no longer ex pacto. Perkins wants to have his cake and eat it too.

In the following way I take it to be demonstrable, that the affirmation that God can—by His absolute power—constitute any act as meritorious insofar as it is not sinful necessarily follows from the Scotist position on the formal basis of merit:

Major: That which is formally made meritorious solely by divine ordination or covenant (and not by intrinsic proportion to reward) can, in God's absolute power, be any action not repugnant to justice.

Minor: Any non-sinful action is not repugnant to justice.

Conclusion: Therefore, any non-sinful action can, in God's absolute power, be constituted as meritorious.

In support of the major:

Major: Whatever formally depends solely on the free will of God and is not determined by intrinsic proportion can, in God's absolute power, be applied to any object not repugnant to divine justice.

Minor: Merit formally constituted solely by covenant formally depends solely on the free will of God and is not determined by intrinsic proportion.

Conclusion: Therefore, merit formally constituted solely by covenant can, in God's absolute power, be applied to any object not repugnant to divine justice.

By the way, I take the reason that Scotus is against the position of Ockham that a sinful act may be rewarded insofar as it is sinful to be something like this: nothing can be both just and unjust at the same time and in the same respect. To say that an act has been constituted as meritorious is to say that it grants a right (jus) such that it is just that, by the divine law, this act receives a reward. But if this act is considered as granting a right insofar as it is sinful, this act is already unjust according to the divine law antecedently to this free covenant constitution insofar as it is sin. So the same act is both just and unjust at the same time and in the same respect which is a contradiction. Therefore, sinful acts cannot be rewarded as sinful even in God's absolute power. This argument, as stated, technically applies only to condign merit, however, a similar argument can be applied to congruent merit by considering the contradiction between moral fittingness to reward vs moral fittingness to punishment at the same time and in the same respect.

Covenantal merit for Adam as voluntary condescension distinguishes the Reformed view from medieval views. It differs from Thomas' view that human works are intrinsically meritorious based on infused grace. It also differs from especially the later Franciscan view that God arbitrarily assigns merit to even sin-stained human works done from 'pure nature.' Rather, God's covenant with Adam defined the proportionate relationship that Adam's absolutely perfect works were the condition that would earn everlasting blessing [True, but as an ordinate material requirement; not as an absolute necessity.]. Adam had to render perfect obedience by the strength of his nature rather than by grace-enabled [There is a false dichotomy here as though there could be no merit if it was grace-enabled. See our comments above; again, Jesus Christ merited out of grace-enabled obedience. I add that my construal better safeguards against a confusion of law and gospel in the matter of justification than Perkins does by rightly placing the difference in the formal aspect of merit rather than in any material condition of it.] or imperfect best efforts. Still, these realistically perfect works were meritorious because God had covenanted to reward them with the appropriate blessings (301).

The rest of the chapter I either have no substantial qualms with, or have already addressed in previous reviews & feel no need to rehash here, so I will skip around a bit.

I want to comment on aspects of Perkins’s critique of Lee Irons on merit, but before I do so, I think it is important to review a few things that have previously been established:

1. Perkins holds that covenant is an integral part of human nature. This means that while he does not think covenant is constitutive of human nature such that human nature cannot exist without it, it is still a necessary part of human nature’s well-being. We derived this from his analogy to a shoe and its laces (or, as we put it, to a human being and his arms). For this, see my comments on pages 241 and 249 in the previous review. Perkins holds that covenant was “forged” to Adam’s nature.

2. There is, nevertheless, ambiguity about whether Perkins believes that God could have chosen not to “forge” covenant to human nature. If he is consistent in holding that covenant is an integral part of human nature necessary to well-being, creating man with a lack of covenant would be analogous to creating man with a lack of arms, which everyone would affirm is in God’s power. Refer back to my comments on page 243. But at times Perkins appears to speak as though man’s nature is itself contingent upon God’s will (see my comments at pages 277-278); that is, Perkins seems to imply that God could have decided that an integral part of man (covenant) could not be an integral part of man. The “forging” of covenant to Adam’s nature to be an integral part of it and the orientation of man’s nature to the supernatural order could have been different. But this, as I pointed out previously, would be to confuse the very nature of natures. The natural ends of things cannot have been otherwise than they are. If they were, then those things would no longer be those things, but other things. Marriage is always and in every possible world the union of man and woman for the purpose of procreation. Otherwise, it would not be marriage. Likewise, men are always and in every possible world rational animals ordered toward contemplation and love of God. Otherwise, they would not be men.

   
   

Now, the  main issue that Perkins has with Irons’s thesis, I take to be explicated by the following:

By suggesting that the God-image relation as such necessarily involves the relation of the covenant of works and its principle of merit, Irons has posed that Adam's ontic status in God's likeness entitles him to the opportunity to merit. In other words, the principle of merit concerns what God necessarily owes to Adam on account of Adam's nature (311).

On the one hand, Perkins rightly opposes Irons’s attempt to make covenant a necessary entailment of human nature. Yet on the other hand, I invite the reader to consider from the above just how close Perkins stands to Irons. Granted, Perkins does not posit the same kind of distinction that Irons does between humanity and covenant—which, in Iron’s case, must be formal/virtual—but the alternative is not much better. Covenant is either an integral part necessary for well-being (which, as argued in chapter 6 is absurd and cannot ever be demonstrated), or it is natural to man and yet could not be natural to him (which, as argued above, is a contradiction). 

Perkins faults Irons, writing,

The culminating problem is that to equate fully the image of God and the covenant of works seems to entail that the Christian's renewal after God's image would include a renewal of the covenant of works (312).

Which, true as it is, is no less of a problem on the view that covenant is an integral part of human nature. If covenant is a part necessary to man’s well-being, then his restoration ought to include the renewal of this part of man. Again, perhaps Perkins might respond that what is natural to man is that he be in some covenant or another, but not that a covenant of works per se is integral to man, but at this point we have diverged so far from all sound metaphysics and end up in mere special pleading. Covenant is an integral part of man’s nature because Perkins’s thesis requires that it is. No one ever thought of this—not Aristotle, not Thomas, not Scotus—but here is a discovery that every philosopher has failed to figure out: that human nature requires a supernatural covenant for its own natural well-being.

There is further evidence of Perkins’s apparent confusion about the nature of natures on page 313:

His [Irons] premise is the same as we saw throughout the medieval and Roman tradition that God must give whatever is proper to a particular nature (313).

Which is also echoed on page 311:

The Roman argument is that God must give what is due to any given nature, inspiring them to distinguish the natural order from the supernatural and to introduce the donum superadditum in order to protect the gratuity of man's eschatological destiny. 

What I want to know is whether or not Perkins affirms that “God must give whatever is proper to a particular nature”? If he does not, this would explain why he apparently thinks that God could have created natures otherwise than they are. But such a denial is as equally perplexing to me as the claim that God could have chosen not to naturally order us to our natural end. You might as well claim that God could have created man irrational or could have created fire without the property of heat or could have created marriage without procreation. Natural ends are essential to natures. Perkins is better off affirming that God must give whatever is proper to a particular nature but simply contending, as he does, that ordination to the supernatural is proper to human nature. This, at least, would involve only one contradiction (natural ordering to the supernatural) instead of two (a natural end that is only contingently natural). It is also for this reason that Jacob Wood’s words are not very sensible:

In every state, humanity desires that end which God has assigned to us; but since God has called us in the present, historical state to the beatific vision, human nature has a natural desire for its supernatural end.' (314).

Again, when we are talking about natural ends, we are speaking of ends essential to given natures. God cannot “assign to us” different natural ends in different states. All men by nature desire to know God, but according to a natural mode and proportion—that is, insofar as He is knowable by natural reason through His effects. Man’s supernatural end, namely the beatific vision, and the formal desire for it, are not owed by nature but are superadded by grace (on the distinction between an elicited natural desire for the beatific vision, which I affirm, and a strictly natural desire, which I deny see question 5 here). 

To a certain degree, I take this to be rather intuitive. Man’s rational nature enables him to reason from effects to causes—that is, from creatures to the Creator—and thus, through created things, to attain some knowledge and, subsequently, love of God. However, what man’s nature does not enable him to do is to see God immediately, that is, to intuit the divine essence. The beatific vision entails a mode of knowing that exceeds the proportion of any created intellect. If man were naturally ordered to the beatific vision as his natural end, this would mean that his nature is capable, by its own powers, of attaining such a vision (this is what it means to be naturally ordered to some end). But clearly it is not—no, it was never able to do this even pre-fall. Therefore, man is not ordered to the beatific vision by nature, but only by supernatural grace. Refer back to chapter 1.

Before ending the review, there are a few I want to comment on.

First is 310-311:

We can further that point by noting that Adam's merit could not reasonably be non-covenantal because of this representative principle. Adam's potential to merit concerned himself and his posterity since he acted federally as a public person. Nothing in the revelation of divine justice as such could guarantee that the personal fulfillment of the works principle would warrant eschatological reward for oneself and others whom that one represents. This principle governs even the covenant of redemption. Christ's mediatorial obedience was intrinsically perfect, yet only the covenantal dimension of his merit determined the remit to whom his earned reward applied - unless we embrace hypothetical universalism wherein, put over crassly, Christ impetrated truly in a sense for all humanity but applies that impetration only to the elect by virtue of the decree (310-311).

For the sake of charity, I will assume that Perkins does not have a specific formulation of hypothetical universalism in mind, such as that of Davenant and Ussher (in which case he would be wrong about them holding that Christ impetrated for all humanity), but is only speaking generally of at least some HU positions. In any case, I just want to point out what seems rather obvious to me: that ex pacto merit and hypothetical universalism are not immediately and per se opposed to another. You can argue that, by consequence, a HU view that holds Christ impetrated for all would be inconsistent with HU (and I think this would be correct), but clearly one can deny that impetrated for all and still hold to both HU and ex pacto merit. I would have assumed that Perkins is very much aware of this in the case of Ussher, but I suppose that is why this comment is somewhat perplexing to me.

Second is footnote 74:

If Irons follows Kline's interpretation of Genesis 1:26—that the plural deliberation “Let us make man in our image”addressed the heavenly council of angels, who also seemingly bear the divine image—then the angels' apparent lack of prospect for eschatological advancement (since, as far as we know, the elect angels seem simply confirmed in their original condition) undermines Irons' contention that God's relation to the divine image as such has the merit-reward potential intrinsically inbuilt.

While Irons is wrong to posit an intrinsically inbuilt merit-reward potential, that angels were confirmed in glory is, as far as I can tell (and I don’t want to overstate this), nearly, if not absolutely, the unanimous position of all Christian theologians. Irons can easily (and ought to) reject the premise that angels were simply confirmed in their original condition apart from the reception of the beatific vision (I think as much can be derived from Matthew 18:10). The beatific knowledge of angels is a standard affirmation of Reformed systematic theology (see, for instance, Voetius https://brandoncorleyschoo.wixsite.com/brandoncorley/post/voetius-s-syllabus-of-theological-questions-all-questions-concerning-angels).

Finally, footnote 98 (I did not forget about you, Sam; I will defend you):

This point is another reason to reject the strictly positivist view of covenants outlined in Samuel Renihan, The Mystery of Christ: His Covenant and His Kingdom (Cape Coral, FL: Founders Press, 2020), 13–19. Primarily, if the first covenant is not conjoined to nature, then our eschatological destiny is not naturally part of our human constitution; in that case, we have effectively accepted the Roman view of the supernatural order as superadded to a pure nature. On the contrary, God designed our nature with inbuilt eschatological capacity (1 Cor. 15:42–49). Secondarily, Renihan's view is fully susceptible to all the criticisms of extrinsic religion, since he sees every covenant as purely positivist rather than natural.

I will take this line by line.

Primarily, if the first covenant is not conjoined to nature, then our eschatological destiny is not naturally part of our human constitution

First, while the Covenant of Works is established upon nature as its material substrate, as we have seen Turreitn affirm, it is no part of nature, as was argued in the last chapter. Man as a reasonable creature owes obedience to God by nature; and by nature he is equipped with a soul and a body in order to render that obedience. God’s gracious condescension through covenant, as argued in the last chapter, presupposes that nature and covenant are really distinct and separable. God could have chosen to create man in his natural state and never have enstated him into covenant. 

Second, if by “eschatological destiny” Perkins has glory & the beatific vision in mind, then that this is not naturally a part of our human constitution is exactly what I have argued for above. But if he means that there is no sense in which we can speak of an “eschatological destiny” of human nature apart from covenant; this I deny. Man’s natural end might be thought of as his “eschatological destiny.” Had Adam been created in a state of pure nature—apart from all grace and without any covenant—he still would have been ordered to his natural end: the contemplation and love of God proportionate to his nature. He would have progressed toward this end through the exercise of reason, the generation and education of offspring, and the fulfillment of those activities proper to human nature—governing the earth, cultivating society, and acting in accordance with natural virtue—so as to attain this contemplation and love within a community of others likewise set on the same end.

In that case, we have effectively accepted the Roman view of the supernatural order as superadded to a pure nature. 

I agree and I call all theologians to accept this. There is, ultimately, no other coherent construal of the relationship between the natural and supernatural orders. To take an easy example, consider the relationship between natural knowledge (scientia) and faith. Natural knowledge is complete in its own order. You do not need supernatural faith in order to come to have knowledge of those things which are naturally knowable. Yet faith can be superadded so that we might know things which are above nature. Grace perfects nature by actualizing the passive obediential potency it has to be ordered towards things of grace. In a state of nature, I can know all the truth of natural philosophy. But it is only by superadding grace to my nature that I can come to know any truth of supernatural theology. To hold otherwise is to violate the principle of proportionate causality because it would imply that nature is able to attain an end that exceeds the proportion of its own powers. A finite intellect cannot, by its own natural light, attain knowledge of an infinite being in His essence, for example. To posit that it can is to deny that a cause must be proportioned to its effect, and thus to collapse the necessary distinction between what is due to nature and what is gratuitously given by grace. Furthermore, it is to commit the error of Pelagianism (which I take, in its essence, to be a denial of the PPC) because it implies that pre-fall Adam, by his own natural efforts, could attain supernatural beatitude or know divine mysteries without the need for grace. This erases the gratuity of the supernatural order, and effectively makes eternal life a natural due rather than a free gift (again, this would be because it would be the intrinsic and natural final cause of humanity; not because God would be bound to give man the actual possession of it. See my comments on page 269 of the previous chapter).

On the contrary, God designed our nature with inbuilt eschatological capacity (1 Cor. 15:42–49). 

It might help to think about “inbuilt eschatological capacity” in terms of the actualization of obediential potency. Although man is not ordered by nature to glory and the beatific vision, he is, by nature, the kind of thing that can receive such an ordering. This would be the proper way to construe 1 Corinthians 15.

Secondarily, Renihan's view is fully susceptible to all the criticisms of extrinsic religion, since he sees every covenant as purely positivist rather than natural.

The hidden premise here is “Any view that treats covenants as purely positivist rather than natural is subject to the criticisms of extrinsic religion.” He seems to presuppose that if covenants are not grounded in nature, then religion becomes extrinsic. But this seems to assume that true, inward religion requires covenant, which is false. Natural religion exists and would exist in Adam created outside of covenant. Man is naturally ordered to the worship of God. That covenant is extrinsic to man does not mean that religion is. 

Finally, denying that man is naturally ordered to God in a supernatural mode does not entail that he is not naturally ordered to God at all. God is the material object of both man’s natural and supernatural ends. But these ends are distinguished by their formal objects, not by their material objects. God, under the aspect of first cause, is the formal object of man’s natural end. God, under the aspect of the beatific vision, is the formal object of man’s supernatural end. Again, consider the relationship between faith and reason. Strictly speaking, one does not (whatever Van Til may say to the contrary) need to know God as Triune in order to rightly worship him. Adam, had he never received any divine revelation, would have rightly worshipped God as first cause. God is man’s end in both the natural and supernatural orders, but not in the same way.